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This study is an empirical research work that employed the use of primary and secondary data to 
interrogate the nature of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Second and Fourth Republics 
with insights drawn from Osun, Oyo, Ondo, Lagos and Ekiti states in South Western Nigeria. 
Primary data were collected through a field survey and public documents. Sources of secondary 
data include texts, journals, newspapers, and other published literature. A hybrid of two models, 
the overlapping-authority model and the coordinate-authority model, was adopted to analyse the 
authority structure of different political actors saddled with different constitutional responsibilities.  
The findings of the study revealed that the central government has more fiscal power for policy 
direction, than the subnational levels of government. The empirical analysis showed structural 
imbalance in Nigeria’s federalism, which constituted obstacle to federal stability. In addition, the 
central government has the prerogative to legislate on matters under the exclusive legislative list, 
which defines the nature of power relations between the central government and the government 
of the subnational units. The increase in the number of the subnational units from 19 to 36 states 
in the 1979 and 1999 constitutions respectively, and the expanded expenditure obligations, 
weakened the revenue base of the subnational levels of government. The subnational levels, in the 
Fourth Republic, unlike those of the Second Republic, are less viable. This development weakened 
their fiscal strength for effective service delivery, because they lacked fiscal resources to fulfil 
their expenditure obligations. The federal government retains the bulk of government revenue.  
Additionally, appointments to public offices did not reflect the federal character. Through the 
exploration of the provisions of the 1979 and 1999 constitutions, there existed discrepancies 
between the constitutional provisions and their practice. The attitudes and behaviours of the actors 
at different levels of government were not in tandem with the constitutional provisions, with clear 
evidence of outright violation of the rule of law. The study, therefore, recommends the need to 
reassess intergovernmental fiscal relationship, strengthen the mechanisms and institutions for 
intergovernmental policy coordination, reliance on economic expert for effective service delivery, 
obedience to law, and maximization of states resources as a way of improving federal-state-local 
relations.   
Table of Contents                                                    
 
ix 
 
Declaration………………………………………………………………………………………..ii 
Dedication……………………………………………………………………………..................iii 
Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………………......iv 
List of Tables ………………………………………………………………………………… ….v 
Abbreviations…………………………………………………………………………………….vii 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………….viii 
Introduction to the study                                                                                                                 1      
                                                                                                                                        
Chapter One 
Problem Statement, Context and Methodology 
1.1 Background Information………………………………………………………………………4 
1.2Statement of Problem: Broader Issues to be investigated ……………………………………..6 
1.3 Context and Objectives of the Study……………………………………………………….... 8 
1.4 Research Objectives ……………………………………………………................................11 
1.5 Research Questions ………………………………………………………………………….11 
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation…………………………………………………………………11 
Chapter Two 
Federalism and Issues in Intergovernmental Relations 
2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….15 
2.2 Federalism: Characteristics and Perspectives………………………………………………..15 
2.3 Evolution of federal system………………………………………………………………….21 
2.4 Phases of the evolution of federalism in Nigeria …………………………………………....23 
2.4.1 The Pre-Independence Era ………………………………………………………………...23  
2.4.2 The Independence Era…………………………………………………………………….. 25 
2.4.3 The Military Era …………………………………………………………………………...26 
2.4.4 The Post-Military Era……………………………………………………………………...29 
2.5 Intergovernmental Relations…………………………………………………………………30  
2.6 Typologies of Intergovernmental Relations………………………………………………… 32 
2.7 Analysis of the typologies of Intergovernmental Relations………………………………… 33 
2.8 Issues in Intergovernmental Relations………………………………………………………35 
2.8.1 Autonomy………………………………………………………………………………… 35 
x 
 
2.8.2 Distribution of powers and responsibilities………………………………………………..37 
2.8.3 Centralisation of power……………………………………………………………………40 
2.8.4 Vertical/Horizontal relations……………………………………………………………….42 
2.8.5 Intergovernmental fiscal relations………………………………………………………….43 
2.8.5.1 Intergovernmental fiscal relations in Nigeria……………………………………………47 
2.8.5.2 Nigeria’s expenditure assignment………………………………………………………..48 
2.8.5.3 The assignment of revenue source……………………………………………………….49 
2.8.6 Administrative mechanisms for managing intergovernmental relations…………………..50 
2.9 Service delivery……………………………………………………………………………...50 
2.10 Constitutional provisions…………………………………………………………………...53 
2.11 Intergovernmental relations and Governance…………………………………………….. 54 
2.12 Intergovernmental relations and Sustainable Development Goals in Nigeria: Implications and 
Challenges…………………………………………………………………………………. .56 
2.13 Summary…………………………………………………………………………………... 58 
Chapter Three 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….60 
3.2 The role of methodology in a political science investigation………………………………. 60 
3.3 Methodological approach to the study……………………………………………………….61 
3.4 Research design……………………………………………………………………………...62 
3.5 The rationale for qualitative research design………………………………………………...62 
3.6 Case study design…………………………………………………………………………….63 
3.7 Research methods……………………………………………………………………………64 
3.8 Population……………………………………………………………………………………65 
3.9 Sampling……………………………………………………………………………………..65 
3.10 Sampling technique…………………………………………………………………………65 
3.11 Sources of data collection…………………………………………………………………..66 
3.12 Data collection instrument………………………………………………………………….66 
3.13 Data analysis………………………………………………………………………………..68 
3.14 Validity……………………………………………………………………………………..69 
3.15 Summary…………………………………………………………………………….. …….70 
xi 
 
Chapter Four 
Structure and Authority in the Nigerian Intergovernmental Relationships: Contextual and 
Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..71 
4.2 Coordinate-Authority Model ………………………………………………………………..72 
4.3 Overlapping-Authority Model……………………………………………………………….74 
4.4 Changing pattern of Fiscal relations in Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria……………79  
4.5 Features of Federalism in Nigeria’s Second Republic (1979-1983) and the Fourth Republic 
(1999-2007): A comparative analysis …………………………………………………………...82 
4.6 Intergovernmental bodies in Nigeria………………………………………………………...92 
4.6.1 Constitutional institutions………………………………………………………………….92 
4.6.2 Statutory agencies………………………………………………………………………….95 
4.6.3 Adhoc committees or informal bodies……………………………………………………..96 
4.7 Summary……………………………………………………………………………………..97 
Chapter Five 
 Intergovernmental Relations and Constitutional Provisions in Nigeria 
5.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..98 
5.2 Evolution of Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria………………………………………..99  
5.2.1 The Colonial Period ……………………………………………………………………...104 
5.2.2 The Post-Colonial Period ……………………………………………………………….. 105 
5.3 Constitutional provisions and the practices of Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria’s Second 
and Fourth Republics…………………………………………………………………..107 
5.4 Intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Second Republic: Empirical analysis…………...112 
5.5 Intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Empirical analysis……………122 
5.6 Changing pattern of Nigeria fiscal federalism and its implications on service delivery…...136 
5.7 Summary……………………………………………………………………………………145 
 
 
 
Chapter Six 
xii 
 
Empirical analysis of service delivery in the selected states, and constitutional provisions and 
practices of government in Nigeria’s Second Republic, 1979-1983 and Fourth Republic, 
1999-2007 
6.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………........147 
6.2 Healthcare service delivery…………………………………………………………………149 
6.2.1 Healthcare service delivery in Osun state………………………………………………...150 
6.2.2 Healthcare service delivery in Oyo state………………………………………................160 
6.3 Healthcare service delivery agreement……………………………………………………..181 
6.4 Service delivery in education……………………………………………………………….184 
6.4.1 Universal Basic Education………………………………………………………………..185 
6.4.1.1 Osun State Universal Basic Education…………………………………………………188 
6.4.1.2 Oyo State Universal Basic Education…………………………………………………..194 
6.4.1.3 Ondo State Universal Basic Education…………………………………………………195 
6.4.1.4 Ekiti State Universal Basic Education………………………………………………….197 
6.5 How states creation in the Fourth Republic constrained effective service delivery in Osun, Oyo, 
Ondo, Ekiti and Lagos states…………………………………………………………….199 
6.6 Constitutional provisions regarding the division of powers and responsibilities among the 
levels of government……………………………………………………………………………203 
6.7 Constitutional provisions on revenue allocation……………………………………………209 
6.8 State-Joint local government account………………………………………………………212 
6.9 Local government elections………………………………………………………………...216 
6.10 Federal Character………………………………………………………………………….220 
6.11 A reflection of federal stability and effective intergovernmental relations in Nigeria……223 
6.12 Summary…………………………………………………………………………………..228 
Chapter Seven 
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….232 
7.2 Summary of Findings……………………………………………………………………….234 
7.3 Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………..237 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………...244 
Appendix 1……………………………………………………………………………………..271 
xiii 
 
Appendix 11……………………………………………………………………………………273 
Appendix 111…………………………………………………………………………………..275 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction to the Study 
Political scientists engage in revealing the relationships underlying political events and conditions; 
and, from these relationships, they attempt to construct general principles about the way the world 
of politics works (Cuba 2002). The relationship that exists among the levels of government is 
referred to as intergovernmental relations (IGR). In other words, intergovernmental relations can 
be defined as the processes and institutions through which governments within a particular system 
interact (Phillimore 2013). There is no correlation between the system of government and the 
degree of centralisation of intergovernmental relations or the relative power between the various 
levels of government. Indeed, a number of federations, such as Australia and the USA are 
centralised while many unitary countries have recently decentralised (Fenna 2012, pp. 750-751). 
The United Kingdom (UK) and Spain have devolved substantial policy and political authority to 
regional governments. In developing countries, such as China, Vietnam and Indonesia, regional 
governments have increased their autonomous, decision-making powers and financial 
independence (Fenna 2012, pp. 750-751).  
However, federations are distinctive in that their constituent units (states, provinces, cantons), at 
least, in principle, have their existence and minimal competencies protected by a foundational law 
(the constitution or ‘basic law’) that cannot be readily over tuned (Fenna 2012, pp. 750-751). This 
essential characteristic means that IGR in federations has some distinctive features absent from 
IGR in non-federal countries. The existence of a presidential system can also have important 
effects on IGR, primarily by dispersing the channels of communications (Watts 2008, p. 119). 
Traditionally, analysis of IGR has focused on the formal structures and institutions, in particular, 
those connected with the financial arrangements between the levels of government (Painter 2012, 
p. 731). Thus, IGR involves extensive informal processes of exchange and interaction. The Anglo 
federations of the USA, Canada, and Australia did not make significant provisions for IGR in their 
constitutions; instead, the two principal levels of government (the central government and the 
government of the constituent units) would operate virtually autonomously in the policy spheres 
allocated to them by the roles and responsibilities designated in the constitution (Fenna 2012, p. 
753). IGR reflects each country’s particular national characteristics. The informal nature of IGR 
means that politics, power, and contingency tend to assume primacy over law, institutions, and 
consistency, in guiding the relations between the various levels of government. This results in wide 
2 
 
variations across countries. There is a dearth of literature on the comparative analysis or agreement 
on the ‘principles’ of IGR, which could serve as references for analysts and governments 
(Phillimore 2013). 
In particular, the constituent units often regard the promotion and protection of their policy and 
administrative autonomy as more important than promoting the ‘national interest’ or ensuring the 
harmonisation of service delivery across the country. However, while all the sub-national 
governments would agree on the desirability of autonomy, their substantive policy goals may well 
differ from each other depending on their economic, social and cultural circumstances and interests 
(Simeon 1972; Sharman 1977; Painter 2001, p. 139; Harwood and Phillimore 2012, pp. 88-89). 
In federations, three or more levels of government are common (e.g. central, state and local 
governments as in Australia and Nigeria). Nevertheless, the crucial intergovernmental relationship 
in federations is generally between the constitutionally protected constituent units and the central 
government (Fenna 2012, p. 751). Local government is generally established under state 
government legislation and regarded as a state government creation, even though the officials are 
popularly elected and have distinct responsibilities. The horizontal relationship involves the 
constituent units and deals with issues of local taxation and service provision (Phillimore 2013). 
According to Phillimore (2013, p. 231), national peak bodies of constituent unit government 
leaders have been formed to take joint actions not requiring the national government, to discuss 
common issues or to lobby the national government on issues of joint importance. 
The capacity of the constituent units to deliver effective and efficient service delivery is a function 
of the availability of fund, particularly through the internally generated revenue as well as the 
judicious use of available resources. The constitution defines the interplay among the levels of 
government, horizontally and vertically. As in most federations, where powers are constitutionally 
assigned to the levels of government, the Nigerian constitution stipulates the Exclusive legislative 
list where the central government has the exclusive powers to legislate. The Concurrent lists are 
areas that require the joint responsibilities of the central and the state governments. In this case, 
the central government has overriding powers over the state (The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999). In terms of legal relationship, laws passed by the National Assembly 
are superior to laws passed by the state legislature. Residual lists are areas that are reserved for the 
local government (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
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The Nigerian federal system provides for three levels of government i.e. the central, the state and 
the local governments. Powers in Nigerian federation are tilted towards the centre at the expense 
of the constituent units. The constitution allows the central government to have domineering power 
over the constituent units. This is evident in terms of a greater percentage of revenue that goes to 
the central government. In other words, the revenue allocation formula in 1999 was lopsided. In 
addition, Part 1 and Part 11 Second Schedule of the 1999 constitution contain 66 items and 30 
items in the exclusive legislative list and concurrent legislative list respectively. This analysis is 
different from the constitutional provisions in the First Republic where the regions had more 
powers than the centre.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 Chapter One 
 
Problem Statement, Context and Methodology 
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1.1 Background Information 
The Nigerian federal system has been characterised by the incessant clamour for restructuring in 
a way to make the constituent units more viable. A series of measures and mechanisms have been 
put in place to address this problem. The 1994/1995 National Constitutional Conference, for 
instance, sought for a federal system that would devolve power to the constituent units (Fagbadebo 
2000). Prior to the military take-over of civilian administration on January 15, 1966, the regional 
government had a measure of autonomy over their resources and finance. The nature of the 
interaction between the central government and the regional governments were mutual with a 
measure of balance in fiscal relations (MAMSER 1987). Military regimes since 1966 tinkered with 
the immediate post-independent federal structure and effectively altered the nature of relations 
between the constituent units and the central government. 
The centralised federal structure imposed by the military tilted power from the constituent units to 
the central government (Fagbadebo 2000; Omololu 2012). This arrangement facilitated the 
infusion of the centralised hierarchical structure of the military. The nature of the relationship 
between the centre and the constituent units no longer conform to Wheare’s conceptualisation of 
the federal system (Wheare 1964). According to him, the federal principle is guided by the ‘method 
of dividing powers so that general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate 
and independent’ (Wheare 1964, p.33). This conceptual definition of federalism represents the 
perspectives of other scholars on the federal system (Livingston 1956 and Riker 1964). The 
assumption of this principle is the need for the constituent units to have the power to cater for the 
specific needs of their respective domains.  
The core of this coordinate and independent nature is the fiscal autonomy of the constituent units. 
Each constituent unit would be able to develop at its own pace without necessarily depending on 
the central government in the exercise of power on some issues (Jinadu 1979; Dare 1979). This 
was the practice in Nigeria in the First Republic where the regional governments operated with a 
maximum status of constituent units with separate constitutions and fiscal autonomy (Jinadu 1979; 
Dare 1979). This arrangement was altered by the military following the coup of January 1966 and 
was further decimated by the outcome of the 30-month civil war (Jinadu 1979; Dare 1979).  
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The subsequent post-military constitutional arrangement effectively divested the autonomy of the 
constituent units with a reinforced centralised federal system. This study, therefore, seeks to 
examine the implications of the nature of the contemporary intergovernmental relations on service 
delivery in five out of the six states in South West, Nigeria. These states are Osun, Oyo, Ondo, 
Lagos and Ekiti States in the Second and Fourth Republics. The Second Republic, 1979-19831 was 
the first post-military presidential administration in Nigeria. The governing system in the First 
Republic, 1960-1966 was parliamentary. The Fourth Republic commenced since May 29, 1999 
with a presidential system of government. The two Republics have been selected for their 
similarities in structure and system of government. Nevertheless, the fiscal strength of the 
constituent units in the two Republics differs because of the increase in the number of the 
constituent units from 19 to 36 states.  The study seeks to examine the nature and features of 
intergovernmental relations in the two presidential systems in the Nigerian political system. The 
common trend in the two Republics (Second and the Fourth) is that the constitution empowers the 
central government to exert dominant fiscal power over the subnational levels of government. 
Consequently, the constituent units are less fiscally viable, and, therefore become vulnerable to 
authority manipulated by the central authority (Oyovbaire 1985 and Lawson 2011).      
This study seeks to examine these issues in relation to the developments in Osun, Oyo, Ondo, 
Lagos and Ekiti States. The selected states represent five out of the six states that form one of the 
six geopolitical zones that were established during the military government of General Babangida 
in Nigeria. Osun and Ekiti States were created out of the former Oyo and Ondo States in 1991 and 
1993 respectively. Lagos State has retained its status since the 1967 state creation exercises. Oyo, 
Osun, Ondo, and Ekiti are less fiscally viable in the Fourth Republic compared to the status of Oyo 
and Ondo in the Second Republic. Lagos State has retained its fiscal strength since its inception, 
as one of the most viable constituent units since its creation in 1967. This pattern is common to 
the other five geopolitical zones in Nigeria.  The choice of these states will provide an opportunity 
to have an empirical overview of the implications of the changing pattern of the structure of the 
                                                          
1 The military took over power in 1966 as one of the aftermaths of the post-independent political crisis in Nigeria. The 
military regime lasted till 1979 when the government adopted a presidential constitution for Nigeria. This Republic 
was also brought to an abrupt end when the military struck on December 31, 1983 following the crisis that greeted the 
1983 presidential elections.  The Third Republic was prematurely aborted following an inconclusive transition 
programme which was followed by another military regime in 1993. The successful transition programme culminated 
in the emergence of the Fourth Republic in May 1999. 
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Nigerian federal system on the fiscal strengths and service delivery in other states in the remaining 
geopolitical zones. 
It is against this backdrop that the thesis sought to provide answer to the following research 
questions: What are the common and divergent features of the federal structure in Nigeria’s Second 
and Fourth Republics? How does the changing pattern of the federal structure affect the fiscal 
capacity vis-à-vis service delivery of the selected states? What are the options for a more stable 
federal structure in Nigeria? In what ways, can the constituent units’ meet up with their socio-
economic and political obligations? And, how can we have effective intergovernmental relations 
in Nigeria?   
 
1.2 Statement of Problem: Broader Issues to be investigated 
This study explores the implications of the nature of the contemporary intergovernmental relations 
on service delivery in five out of the six states in South West, Nigeria. These states are Osun, Oyo, 
Ondo, Lagos and Ekiti States in the Second and Fourth Republics. The Second Republic (1979-
1983)2 consisted of 19 states and the Fourth Republic (1999-2007)3 comprised of 36 states. 
Nevertheless, the fiscal strength of the constituent units in the two Republics differs because of the 
increase in the number of the state from 19 to 36 states. The common trend in the two Republics 
(Second and the Fourth) is that the constitution empowers the central government to exert 
dominant fiscal power over the subnational levels of government.  
The constitution and fiscal autonomy of the constituent units in Nigeria’s First Republic was 
altered by the subsequent post-military constitutional arrangement with a reinforced centralised 
federal system. In the Second Republic, Section 4, second Schedule Part 1 and Part 11 of the 1979 
constitution contained 66 items and 28 items in the exclusive legislative and concurrent legislative 
                                                          
2 Section 3 First Schedule, Part 1 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 lists the states of the 
federation with their headquarters. The states include Anambra, Bauchi, Bendel, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Gongola, 
Imo, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Lagos, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto. 
3 Schedule 1 Part 1 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 lists the states of the federation and 
their local government councils such as Abia, Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, 
Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, 
Lagos, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, Zamfara 
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lists, respectively4. The constitution provided for 19 states as contained in Section 3, First Schedule 
Part 1, and the Revenue Allocation Act5 shared revenue among the three tiers of government, viz: 
Federal Government, 55%; State Government, 30.5%; Local Government, 10% (The Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979). This arrangement weakened the fiscal status of the 
constituent units as the principle of coordination and independence was no longer effective. The 
states were dependent on the central for financial allocations.  
In the Fourth Republic, similar provisions of the constitution further tilted power away from the 
constituent units to the centre.  The second Schedule Part 1 and Part 11 of the 1999 constitution 
contain 68 items and 30 items in the exclusive legislative and concurrent legislative lists, 
respectively. The revenue allocation formula inherited in 1999 assigned the Federal Government 
with 48.5% of national revenues; State Government, 24%; Local Government, 20%; and Special 
Fund, 7.5% (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The lopsided nature of 
fiscal federalism in the Nigerian polity has increased the financial strength of the central 
government at the detriment of the constituent units. While the exclusive legislative list contains 
items upon which the central government has the sole prerogative to legislate, it also has an 
overriding power over the items in the concurrent legislative list. In terms of legal relationship, 
laws passed by the National Assembly are superior to laws passed by the state legislatures. 
Aside from this, the increase in the number of the constituent units from 19 states in the 1979 
constitution to 36 states in the 1999 constitution, and the expanded expenditure obligations have 
weakened the revenue base of the subnational units. The constituent units in the Fourth Republic 
are less viable than those of the Second Republic . This has affected the nature of 
intergovernmental relations in a way that tilted more power to the central government. The 
implication is that the constituent units in the Fourth Republic depended more on the central 
government to meet up with their statutory obligations. In recent times, the states sought for a 
                                                          
4 Section 4 of the 1979 constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria states that the Exclusive legislative powers shall 
be vested in the National Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The National 
Assembly shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part 
thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive legislative list. Similarly, the National Assembly shall 
have power to make laws with respect to any matter in the Concurrent legislative list set out in the first column of Part 
11 of the Second Schedule to the constitution. 
5 Section 149(2) of the 1979 Second Republican Constitution of Nigeria states that any amount standing to the credit 
of the Federation Account shall be distributed among the Federal, State governments, and the Local government 
councils in each state, on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.  
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bailout from the central government to pay the arrears of wage bills of the public servants (The 
Punch, 26 June 2016).  
The implication of this development is that the weak fiscal strength of the constituent units in the 
Fourth Republic would affect their capacity for effective service delivery. Khemani (2001) has 
noted that the subnational units in Nigeria are not equipped with adequate revenue resources to 
fulfil their expenditure obligations because the federal government retains the bulk of government 
revenue. Thus, most of the constituent units in the Nigerian federal system are less fiscally viable. 
The proliferation of states in the Fourth Republic has weakened the revenue base of most states 
that were created. The internally generated revenue of most states in the Fourth Republic was 
relatively very low. Therefore, service delivery was low. States in the Second Republic were more 
viable, and effective, in service delivery. The extant constitution gave the constituent units less 
tax-raising powers and more responsibilities. Similarly, the bulk of federation revenue was 
allocated to the central government. This structural imbalance in Nigerian federalism has aroused 
my interest with the aim of determining the nature of contemporary intergovernmental relations 
on service delivery. 
 1.3        Context and Objectives of the Study 
Section 4, second Schedule Part 1 and Part 11 of the 1979 constitution contains 66 items and 28 
items in the exclusive legislative and concurrent legislative lists, respectively. The constitution 
provides for 19 states as contained in Section 3, First Schedule Part 1, and the Revenue Allocation 
Act shared revenue among the three tiers of government, that is Federal Government, 55%; State 
Government, 30.5%; Local Government, 10% (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1979). Comparatively, the second Schedule Part 1 and Part 11 of the 1999 constitution 
contains 68 items and 30 items in the exclusive legislative and concurrent legislative lists, 
respectively. The constitution also provides for 36 states and the revenue allocation formula 
inherited in 1999 are Federal Government, 48.5%; State Government, 24%; Local Government, 
20%; and Special Fund, 7.5% (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
This study was undertaken to further the understanding of governance at different levels of 
government in the Nigerian political system. The area of focus was on how the actors at different 
levels of government carry out their assigned functions vis-à-vis the constitutional provisions and 
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the implications of these actions on service delivery in the selected states. By constitutional design, 
the three levels of government have delineated functions assigned to them. These functions are 
distinct on one hand and interrelated on the other hand. The distinct functions allow each sphere 
of government to act independently while the interrelated functions allow some interplay among 
the officials both vertically and horizontally.  
However, the practice of the constitutional provisions by actors at different levels of government 
is far from the constitutional provisions. The empirical analysis reveals cases of flagrant abuse of 
power by different levels of government. Even when the constitution was cleared on certain 
matters, the behaviour and characters of the officials determine how the constitution would be 
interpreted. In the course of the study, the researcher discovered that power was tilted towards the 
centre at the detriment of the constituent units. Such overconcentration of power in the hands of 
the central government makes the constituent units to depend on the central government for 
existence. For example, the bulk of federation revenue goes to the central government. Empirical 
analysis reveals that the constitutional provisions for the creation of a local government by the 
state government have continually kept the local government as subordinate authority to the state. 
This invariably has made the autonomy of local government to be questionable.  
The consequence of this has been poor service delivery to the people. Therefore, local government 
has become an appendage of the state government. From the empirical data, the research study 
found out that the proliferation of states in the Fourth Republic has weakened the revenue base of 
most states that were created. The internally generated revenue of most states in the Fourth 
Republic was relatively very low. Therefore, service delivery was low. States in the Second 
Republic were more viable, and effective, in service delivery. States in the Second Republic had 
strong resource base and revenue generation power. Okigbo (1987, p. 207) observed that the 
Second Republic fiscal relations and structure put the states at an advantage because it gave them 
independent revenue from Personal income tax, stamp duties, and profit taxes, in addition to their 
share of the Federation Account.  
The extant constitution gave the constituent units less tax-raising powers and more responsibilities 
in the Fourth Republic.  
10 
 
Similarly, the bulk of federation revenue was allocated to the central government. This structural 
imbalance in Nigeria’s federalism has aroused my interest with the aim of determining the nature 
of contemporary intergovernmental relations on service delivery. The objectives of this study 
include an examination of the common and divergent features of the federal structure in Nigeria’s 
Second and Fourth Republics and how the changing pattern of the federal structure affected the 
fiscal capacity vis a vis service delivery of the selected states. Other objectives are the identification 
of the options for a more stable federal structure in Nigeria and identifying the various ways the 
constituent units could meet up with their socio-economic and political obligations. The study also 
sought to explore the available options for effective intergovernmental relations in Nigeria.  
The central idea of this study, based on findings, is that the constitution granted more powers to 
the central government at the expense of the constituent units. Similarly, the bulk of federal 
revenue goes to the central government. The overriding power of the federal over the states in the 
concurrent legislative list has made the states to become ‘stooges and puppets’ in the hands of the 
central government. The actors at the state levels lack the constitutional powers on concurrent 
matters, particularly when the federal laws are in conflict with the state laws.  
The argument of this study, based on empirical findings, is that most of the selected states, with 
the exception of Lagos, were not viable due to poor internally generated revenue. The states (Osun, 
Oyo, Ondo and Ekiti) depended on revenues from the federation allocation. Federal revenue 
allocation between 1999 and 2007 to Osun, Oyo, Ondo and Ekiti States were N107.4b, N135.9b, 
N183.3b and N92.7b respectively (Federal Ministry of Finance 2007). This represents 85.1%, 
84.5%, 92.5% and 92.1% of federal allocation to Osun, Oyo, Ondo and Ekiti States respectively 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2007).The empirical analysis also revealed that service delivery was 
a function of availability and effective use of fund. Unfortunately, the low internally generated 
revenue has incapacitated the states in the delivery of services to the populace. More importantly, 
the autonomy of local government as a third-tier level of administration is questionable due to the 
constitutional provisions that set it up.  
1.4 Research Objectives 
Specifically, the study was undertaken to further the understanding of governance at different 
levels of government in the Nigerian political system. The area of focus was on how the actors at 
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different levels of government carry out their assigned functions vis-à-vis the constitutional 
provisions and the implications of the actors’ actions on service delivery in the selected states. 
Other specific objectives include: 
(i) To examine the common and divergent features of the federal structure in Nigeria’s 
Second and Fourth Republics 
(ii) To examine how the changing pattern of the federal structure affected the fiscal 
capacity vis a vis service delivery of the selected states 
(iii) To identify the options for a more stable federal structure in Nigeria. 
(iv) To identify  various ways the constituent units could meet up with their socio-economic 
and political obligations 
(v) To explore  the available options for effective intergovernmental relations in Nigeria 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
The thesis seeks to address the following questions 
(i) What are the common and divergent features of the federal structure in Nigeria’s 
Second and Fourth Republics?  
(ii) How does the changing pattern of the federal structure affect the fiscal capacity vis-à-
vis service delivery of the selected states?  
(iii) What are the options for a more stable federal structure in Nigeria?  
(iv) In what ways, can the constituent units’ meet up with their socio-economic and political 
obligations?  
(v) How can we have effective intergovernmental relations in Nigeria?   
 
1.6 Structure of the dissertation 
This study engages the analysis of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Second and Fourth 
Republics in seven chapters. In chapter one, the study provides the general background of Nigerian 
federalism with a view to understanding the principles that guided the division of powers and 
interaction among the levels of government. It then problematise the contentious issues in the 
structure of Nigerian federalism, identifies the research objectives, and research questions. It 
further justifies the study by stating in clear terms the contribution of the study to knowledge.  
12 
 
Chapter two provides a review of the extant literature on federalism and intergovernmental 
relations. The chapter provides the foundation for the practice of intergovernmental relations in a 
federal polity. It then gives the basic principles and conditions that underline federalism. The 
chapter further discusses the four phases of the evolution of IGR in Nigeria, from the pre-
independent era, through the independent and the military era, to the contemporary era. Also, it 
explores the thematic issues of the research, and examines the nexus between intergovernmental 
relations and governance. It further discusses the challenges of Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) and its implications for intergovernmental relations in Nigerian polity. 
The third chapter outlines the research methodology adopted in the study. It discusses the role of 
methodology in a political science investigation. It further provides justification for the adoption 
of qualitative research design. The study also explores the population of the study, the sample and 
sampling technique, the sources of data collection, the research instrument used and data analysis. 
It provides justification for the use of interview as a major research instrument.  
Chapter four examines the contextual and theoretical framework of the study. The study adopts a 
hybrid of two models for the analysis of intergovernmental relations in Nigerian federal system. 
These are the overlapping-authority model and the co-ordinate-authority models. It further 
discusses the pattern of Nigerian federal structure. The study discovered that there is a fiscal 
imbalance among the levels of government. The centralised fiscal structure tilted more revenue to 
the central government at the detriment of the constituent units. This has affected the fiscal capacity 
of the constituent units in effective service delivery.  The study observed that Section 162-168, 
paragraph 11 in the Second Schedule of the 1999 constitution, tilted revenue power to the federal 
government. An overview of fiscal federalism in the Second and the Fourth Republics in Nigeria 
revealed that revenue was tilted towards the centre and the central government has overriding 
power over the state on issues of concurrent matters. Thus, the arrangement of power in Nigerian 
federalism was centripetal rather than centrifugal. The study further engages a comparative 
analysis of features of Nigerian federalism in the two republics, within the confine of constitutional 
provisions.  
In Chapter five, the study discusses the evolution of IGR in Nigeria, from the colonial period to 
the post-colonial period. It considers the provisions of 1979 and 1999 constitutions and the 
practices of IGR in the two Republics. In this, the study discovered cases of flagrant abuse of 
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constitutional powers by the actors at different levels of government. Furthermore, the study 
engages a comparative analysis of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Second Republic and 
the Fourth Republic. It discusses the major features of Nigeria’s intergovernmental relations, in 
the two republics, within the confine of constitutional provisions.  It further examines the pattern 
of Nigerian fiscal federalism. The study discovered that there is a fiscal imbalance among the 
levels of government. The centralised fiscal structure tilted more revenue to the central government 
at the detriment of the constituent units. This has affected the fiscal capacity of the constituent 
units in effective service delivery.  The study observes that Section 162-168, paragraph 11 in the 
Second Schedule of the 1999 constitution, tilted revenue power to the federal government. An 
overview of fiscal federalism in the Second and the Fourth Republics in Nigeria revealed that 
revenue was tilted towards the centre and the central government has overriding power over the 
state on issues of concurrent matters. Thus, the arrangement of power in Nigerian federalism was 
centripetal rather than centrifugal 
In chapter six, the study explores an empirical analysis of service delivery in the selected states. It 
uses the data collected as an evidence of the nature of service the states rendered to the people. 
Specifically, it examines service delivery in health and education sectors in some of the selected 
states. It then discusses how states creation constrained effective service delivery in the selected 
states of Osun, Oyo, Ondo, Ekiti and Lagos.  
Also, the researcher discusses the attitudes and behaviours of the actors at different levels of 
government vis-a-vis the constitutional provisions on the powers and responsibilities of the levels 
of government. The study uses the various sections of the constitutional provisions as a basis to 
determine the attitudes and behaviours of the actors at different levels of government. The research 
study discovers that discrepancy existed between the constitutional provisions and the practices of 
intergovernmental relations in the two Republics (Second and the Fourth). The study found that 
the practices of the constitution contravened the constitutional provisions. The study claimed that 
the actors’ behaviour towards their assigned duties was a violation of the rule of law and 
represented an infringement on the fundamental human rights of the citizens.  
In chapter seven, the study concludes with analysis brief on how Nigeria could emerge as a stable 
federal system with effective intergovernmental relations. The study considers the present 
arrangement of intergovernmental relations as constitutional issues, and therefore recommends a 
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series of constitutional reforms and suggests how the constituent units can meet up with their socio-
economic and political obligations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Federalism and Issues in Intergovernmental Relations 
2.1           Introduction 
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This chapter is a review of extant literature on intergovernmental relations. The first section of the 
review centres on federalism as the foundation for the practice of intergovernmental relations in a 
polity. In order to understand the implications of the nature of contemporary IGR on service 
delivery, one needs to have an overview of the practice of federalism in the developing and 
developed societies. This section also incorporates the characteristics and perspectives of 
federalism. The section that follows presents the evolution of federalism in Nigeria and its phases 
from the pre-independence era to the post-military era. The research study discusses the typologies 
of intergovernmental relations and its analysis. The researcher further explores the extant literature 
on major thematic issues in intergovernmental relations with a view to identifying the existing 
gaps, which the study intends to fill. The main thematic issues of the research are autonomy, 
distribution of powers and responsibilities. Others are centralisation of power, vertical/horizontal 
and inter-governmental fiscal relations, administrative mechanisms for managing 
intergovernmental relations, service delivery and constitutional provisions.  
2.2 Federalism: Characteristics and Perspectives 
Federalism has become the foundation for the practice of intergovernmental relations in a polity. 
Globally, federalism allows for self and shared-rule among the autonomous political units within 
a political structure (Elazar 1987, p.12). According to Wheare (1963, p.10), federalism entails “the 
method of dividing powers so that general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-
ordinate and independent.” Wheare’s definition connotes that the relationships between the central 
and the constituent units are both co-ordinate and independent. According to Moshood (2014), 
intergovernmental relations allow the subnational units to be involved in statutory functions of 
states. Hueglin (2005) observes that federalism deals with the breakdown of colonial empires and 
formation of a multitude of newly independent states after 1945; most of which were multicultural 
in nature because of their arbitrary composition, as assembled by the colonial powers.  
K.C. Wheare defines federalism as any political arrangement that allocates or divides 
governmental powers between at least two levels of government in such a way that the powers of 
the levels of government are co-ordinate in nature (Wheare 1964). Such co-ordinate relationship 
allows for independence, and interaction among the units of government. Supporting this view, 
Awa (1976, p. 5) observes that in a federal system, the central and regional governments are 
independent of each other within a particular sphere, with no one level of government subordinate 
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to each other but with coordinate relationship. Wheare’s dimension of federalism contains three 
elements: (1) the division of powers among levels of government (2) a written constitution; and 
(3) co-ordinate supremacy of the two levels of government with respect to their respective 
functions (Wheare 1964). 
Omololu (2012) observes that the federating units are motivated by contiguity; common defence; 
desire to be independent of foreign powers; and expectation of desirable economic gains. Wheare 
(1963, p.35) suggests that the adoption of federal system of government in a polity is necessitated 
by the quest for different units to unite under the same government and at the same time enjoy 
autonomous powers.  
Wheare identifies certain uncompromising qualities such as the powers to amend the constitution, 
the existence of an independent judiciary or body to adjudicate dispute arising from clash of 
powers between the federal and state governments and financial independence of both levels of 
government as financial subordination made an end of federalism. Having highlighted these 
qualities, Wheare asserts: 
I have put forward uncompromisingly a criterion of federal government the 
delimited and coordinate division of governmental functions and I have implied 
that to the extent to which any system of government does not conform to this 
criterion, it has no claim to call itself federal (Wheare 1943, p.34). 
Wheare (1966) highlights seven conventional conditions for federating. These are: (1) a sense of 
military insecurity and of the consequent need for common defence; (2) a desire for independence 
of foreign powers; (3) a realisation that only through union could independence be secured; (4) a 
hope of economic advantage for the union; (5) some prior political association; (6) a similarity of 
political institutions; and (7) a geographic contiguity.  
The position of Wheare has received mixed reactions from scholars like Livingston (1956), Riker 
(1964), Jinadu (1979), and Vile (1968).  One of the criticisms of Wheare’s perspectives is that his 
idea of federalism is both legalistic and inflexible (Riker 1964, pp.98-99). Livingston (1956) 
contends that Wheare’s federalism neglects sociological issues that are essential for the 
understanding of changes in the nature of federalism. Jinadu (1979, p.16) observes that the major 
weakness of Wheare’s federalism is that it lays emphasis on formal institutional requirements-
explicit: constitutional delimitation of powers; bi-cameral legislature; independent electoral 
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systems for both levels of government; multi-party but preferably a two-party system; and a 
Supreme Court.  Wheare has been criticised for his over-reliance on essential characteristics of 
United States’ federalism as the basis of formulating his federalism principle.  
Scholars regarded this model as static because federal system in America had undergone different 
phases of development (Birch 1955; Vile 1968). A point of departure of these scholars is that the 
applicability of Wheare’s principle of federalism will exonerate major known federations in the 
world. In other words, rather than the new federations adhering to the principles that guide 
Wheare’s federalism, the environmental factors that conditioned the formation of federation in 
each country should be recognised. 
Complimenting Wheare’s position on federalism, Watts (2001, p.28) identifies six major features 
of federalism. These include at least two orders of government acting directly on the citizens and 
a formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue 
resources between the orders of government, which ensures some areas of genuine autonomy for 
each other. The others are the provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views 
within the federal policy-making institutions, usually including the representation of regional 
representatives in the second federal legislative chamber, and a supreme constitution not 
unilaterally amendable, and requiring for amendment, the consent of a significant proportion of 
the constituent units. The last principle is the recognition of processes and institutions to facilitate 
intergovernmental collaboration in those areas where governmental powers are shared or 
inevitably overlap.  
Tamuno (2004, p.13) defines federalism as a “form of government where the constituent units of 
a political organisation participate in sharing powers and functions in a cooperative manner 
through the combined forces of ethnic pluralism and cultural diversity, among others.” Similarly, 
scholars like Jinadu (1987), Requejo (2001), Elazar (2001), Amuwo (2000), and Dare (2003), lay 
emphasis on pluralism, non-centralisation of power, and legal recognition for legislative 
competency of the tiers of government. Dare (2003) observes that the division of power among 
the levels of government in a non-centralised manner is the tenet of federalism. In the word of 
Jinadu (1987), a line of demarcation needs to be drawn between decentralisation of power and 
non-concentration of power in a federal system. Requejo (2001) observes that, even though 
subsidiarity is close to federalism, it could erode its content because the cornerstone of federalism 
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is the division of power rather than distribution of power. According to Watts (2001), “Federalism 
is the closest institutional approximation to the multinational reality of the contemporary world. 
Its goal therefore is to accommodate, reconcile, and manage social diversities within an 
overarching polity” (Watts 2001, p.1).  
In his analysis of federalism, Morton Grodzins uses his famous analogy of a layered cake to 
describe American federalism. According to Grodzins (1960), metaphor of layer cake is a system 
of dual federalism where the authorities of each level of government have distinct and separate 
spheres. Grodzins adds that layer-cake federalism entails division of power between the central 
and the state governments, with no interference from either of the level of government. He 
contrasts layer-cake with marble cake, which emphasises the inseparability of the central and the 
state governments, therefore, allowing cooperation between the central and the state governments.  
In the words of Stephan (1997), the emergence of American federal polity arises out of the need 
to ensure security of the existing sovereign states and to ensure balance of power relations. The 
Spanish, Indian, Belgian federal arrangements were to hold their diverse cultural patterns together 
in order to devolve power to the subnational units of government. Although, Wheare’s idea of 
federalism remains the guiding principle, other scholars like Livingston (1956),  Riker (1964), 
Jinadu (1979), and Vile (1968) have attempted to explain federalism based on the contemporary 
trends of modern government. This is evident because Wheare’s idea of federalism could not stand 
the test of time as regards the practice of federal system in America, Canada, Australia, India, 
amongst others.  
Dicey defines federalism as a political invention, intended to reconcile national unity and power 
with the maintenance of the rights of the separate “member states” (Dicey cited in Aderonmu 2010, 
pp. 13-14).  As he puts it, “whatever concerns us as a whole should be placed under the control of 
the national government and all matters which are not primarily of common interest should remain 
in the hands of the several states”. (Dicey cited in Aderonmu 2010, pp.13-14). Onyeoziri (2005) 
defines federalism as a way of managing conflicts among the diverse groups of people in the state 
through constitutional allocation of governmental powers that provides for co-ordinate and 
independent rules. To Jinadu (1979, p.13), federalism is a structure of government designed by 
political “architects” to cope with the twin task of ensuring unity and preserving the diverse nature 
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of the society. Federalism connotes a form of government where there is sharing of governmental 
powers and functions among the constituent units in heterogeneous society (Tamuno, 1998).  
Federalism implies bringing together the different units of a sovereign state that operate 
independently within the constitutionally defined boundaries (Elaigwu 2007). It is worth of note 
that the diversities in the nature of the society account for the idea of federalism. Quite a number 
of federal political systems are naturally pluralistic and politically diverse in their cultural, 
language, ethnic, religious and racial compositions (Wheare 1963; Awa 1976; Lijphart 1977). The 
central idea of federalism is that people with ethnic, cultural, religious and language differences 
are bound to live together within a defined territory (Mohapatra 2003). Therefore, federalism has 
become a political means of ensuring a balance of power between the central and subnational units 
through constitutional division of powers among the levels of government (Alemika 2003). 
Alemika (2003) has noted that there are two main objectives of federalism. These are: (1) to allow 
each group in a plural society to manage its internal affairs; and (2) to limit the centralisation of 
political power at the centre so that the national government cannot emerge as an instrument of 
total domination and tyranny. Nwabueze (1993, pp.224-225) further identifies the essential 
ingredients of federalism in his characterisation of the federal political system.  
 An arrangement whereby powers of government within a country comprising a 
large territory and/or diverse nationalities are shared between a national, 
countrywide government and a number of regionally-based governments in such a 
way that each exists as a government separately and independently from others, 
operating directly on persons and property within its territorial area, with a will of 
its own and its own affairs, and with an authority in some matters exclusive of 
others. Federalism is thus essentially an arrangement between governments, a 
constitutional devise by which powers within a country are shared between two 
tiers of government rather than between geographical entities comprising different 
people (Nwabueze 1993, pp. 224-225). 
Daniel Elazar (1995) states that federalism is a kind of political organisation that brings together 
different political entities in order to allow each entity maintains its political integrity. He remarks 
that the principle of federalism lays emphasis on bargaining and negotiation among several power 
centres. He argues that the dispersed power centre is a way of safeguarding individual and local 
liberties. Federalism, therefore, involves partnership arrangement where the relevant stakeholders 
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such as individuals, groups and government work together and determine the basis for power 
sharing among the levels of government (Elazar 1995). 
Federalism is a system of government characterised by semi-autonomous states in a regime with 
a common central government where authority is allocated between levels of government (Wheare 
1964; Riker 1964; Elazar 1987). Ostrom (1991) observes that federalism is a complex system that 
comprises of interacting units that operate within its areas of jurisdiction. In the word of Bednar 
(2009), such interaction produces a system that is not peculiar to any level of government. 
 Some scholars have argued that federalism could be either symmetric or asymmetric (Elazar 1987; 
Watts 1999b; Agranoff 1999). Symmetrically, the sub-states are empowered with the same level 
of authorities and relationship with the federal government (Zuber 2011). In an asymmetric 
federation, some sub-states enjoy self-rule (Zuber 2011). Examples can be found in Belgium 
(Swendon 2002), Canada (Watts 1999b), Russia (Zuber 2011), and Spain (Agranoff 1999). Bednar 
(2009) gives the characteristics of federalism as geopolitical division, independence and direct 
effect. However, the two dimensions of federalism give demarcation on the responsibilities given 
to the central and the subnational levels of government. The constitutional delineation of functions 
to the levels of government and the responses of these levels, largely determine the effectiveness 
of federalism. 
Other scholars have observed that federalism promotes the growth of the economy, identified as 
market-preserving federalism (Weingast 1995; Qian and Weingast 1997). However, when the 
federating states experience budget deficit and seek for bailout, the propensity of the central 
government to give out bailout was lower due to interstate competition for bailout funds (Qian and 
Rowland 1998; Wildasin 1998).  
James Madison (Federalist Paper No. 10) has opined that federalism might rescue democracy 
(Madison 1787). To him, a hierarchy of elections, as citizens gained experience with their 
representatives, could improve poor legislative representation. It also offers wider opportunities 
for participation by the citizens to fill various political offices (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1995). 
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997, 2000) support this claim noting that larger participation of people 
improves the outcome of democracy. To Aidt and Dutta (2010), federalism improves electoral 
accountability because voters are likely to have more information about their representatives. 
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Lijphart (1977), Elazar (1987), Stephan (1999), Listik, Miodownik and Eidelson (2004), have 
suggested that federalism would help to resolve tension among ethnic based societies. 
Public perception, occasioned by common culture, is essential to safeguard a federal system 
(Federalist 46; Riker 1964; Ostrom 1971; Elazar 1987; Weingast 1995; Levy 2007; Bednar 2009), 
although, there still exists few attempts to measure them (Kam and Mikos 2007; Kincaid and Cole 
2011). The recent trends in federalism require system-level analysis (Bednar 2009; Vermeule 
2009). This entails the translation of a system into performance and its fitness to a political culture 
(Bednar 2009; Vermeule 2009). Second is the dynamism, in the nature of federalism, which 
ensures that each level of government maintains its territorial boundary, although there is the need 
to ensure constitutional change to reflect adjustment in the boundaries of the levels of government 
(Banting and Simeon 1985). Third, the boundary of federalism is organic and bottom up due to its 
sensitivity to cultural and political processes.  
2.3      Evolution of Federal System 
The evolution of federalism could be traced to the ancient Israelite tribes of the thirteenth century, 
which witnessed the introduction of kinship (Elazar 1994; Althusius 1965; and Spinoza 1991). The 
Medieval Europe followed this where there was the development of self-governing cities (Elazar 
1995). Prior to the end of the Second World War (1945), there was general complacent for federal 
system of government. However, after the Second World War, federalism became more popular.  
According to Watts, 
Federation was seen by many, especially in Europe, as incomplete national 
government, as a transitional mode of political organisation, as a not really 
desirable but necessary concession in exceptional cases to accommodate political 
divisiveness, and as a product of human prejudices, or false consciousness 
preventing the realisation of unity through such compelling ideologies as radical 
individualism, classless solidarity, or the general will (Watts 2000, p. 4). 
In the post-Second World War, Netherlands and their former colonial territories reconstituted as a 
federation with asymmetrical relationships between the different parts (Elazar 1995). A new wave 
of federalism emerged in the 18th century with emphasis on confederation, which led to the idea 
of modern federalism (Hamilton, Madison and Jay 1961). Although, modern federalism started 
with the works of Jean Bodin, and followed by scholars like Otto Cosmanus, Hugo Grotius and 
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Pufendurf (Mogi 1931, pp. 26-33). Yet, works on contemporary federalism refer to K.C. Wheare’s 
analysis of federalism in his book titled ‘Federal Government’.  
Four schools of federal theory emerged in the 19th century. First, the work of Alexis de Tocqueville 
pointed out the strengths and weaknesses of the American experience (Tocqueville 1961). Second, 
the concern for the problems of federalism in German countries, the third, exemplified by Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon, anchored on the French tradition, which advocated a federal theory that 
inculcated both social and political dimension (Proudhon and Federatif 1979). The fourth was the 
imperial British Empire, which geared towards the attainment of a federal system (Elazar 1995). 
The post-Second World War era witnessed the proliferation of federal systems in countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia); Africa (Nigeria, 
Comoros, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania); and Asia (India, Malaysia, Pakistan, United Arab 
Emirates, United Arab Republic) (Elazar 1995). The reason for the adoption of federal system by 
most countries was connected with: (1) the need for larger political units required to build an 
effective and dynamic modern state; and (2) the need for smaller political units to have self-
governance (Watts 2000).  
In spite of the motives for federalism in developed and developing societies, many of these 
countries have had years of tension and wrangling in their federalism experiences (Zimmerman 
1993, pp. 1-13). In Latin America, there were some forms of scepticism because federal system 
was not in practice. This development in Europe stemmed from the slow pace of integration among 
European nations. In U.S., the centralisation of power through unfunded and underfunded 
mandates had led to the introduction of “coercive federalism” (Zimmerman 1993, pp. 1-13).   
Switzerland offers a good example of stable federal system with the exception of the challenge 
faced by Switzerland in maintaining relationship with the European community. The Canadian 
federalism experienced three decades of internal tension due to the Revolution in Quebec in the 
1960s and the four rounds of contentious mega-constitutional politics, 1963-71, 1976-82, 1987-90 
and 1991-92 (Russel 1993). Germany remained relatively stable, but attention was drawn to the 
issue of revenue sharing and of the ‘joint decision trap’, that has the feature of administratively 
interlocked federation (Scharpf 1988). 
2.4     Phases of the evolution of Federalism in Nigeria 
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There are four phases in the evolution of federalism in Nigeria. These are the pre-independence 
era, the independence era, the military era and the post-military era. Afigbo (1991) has classified 
the above analysis of Nigerian federalism into three phases. The period of informal federation, 
1900-1946; the period of formal federation, first phase, 1946-1965, the period of formal federation: 
second phase 1967-date.  These phases are the same. Afigbo expanded the pro-independence era 
and sought to present the different phases that characterised the consultations prior to the formal 
promulgation of federal system.  
2.4.1 The Pre-Independence Era 
Federalism started on 9 January 1950 with the Ibadan All-Nigerian Constitutional Conference. The 
Conference comprised of the representatives from all parts of the country to discuss on the system 
of government and revenue allocation formula that would be adopted (Sagay 2001; Awa 1976). 
At the end of the 1950 Conference, the political leadership of the three regions adopted a federal 
system of government that would grant autonomy to the three regions so that each of them can 
develop at its own pace (Awa 1976). The Conference came up with the following resolution. First, 
that a federal system of government should be adopted in the three regions, and, second, the three 
regions should become administrative regions with a Governor and a House of Assembly. Third, 
Lagos should become an autonomous municipality; the fourth was that there should be the 
existence of the federal government territory that will monitor the affairs of the three regions. The 
fifth resolution was that revenue from tax should be allocated to the three regions based on per 
capita, and, the sixth, Nigerians should start participating in their own governance (Awa 1964).  
In the light of these resolutions, the 1950 Conference marked the formal introduction of federalism 
in Nigeria. According to Sagay (2006): “We have no doubt at all that the process already given 
constitutional sanction, and fully justified by experience, of devolution of authority from the centre 
to the regions should be carried much further so that a federal system of government can be 
developed.” (Sagay 2006).  
The above statement shows that the conference was obviously thinking in terms of 
creating a federal structure of government for Nigeria comprising of two-tier 
system whereby the central government already vested with all the power in a 
unitary system of government would be made to devolve certain well-defined 
powers to the regional governments set up in each of the three regions (Sagay 
2006). 
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The 1951 Macpherson Constitution, produced out of the Ibadan conference, introduced a quasi-
federal system of government, while the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution adopted a full-fledged federal 
system of government.  
For administrative conveniences, the British divided the country into the Colony and Protectorate 
of Lagos, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1900 
(Osuntokun 1988). In 1914, without consultation and deliberation, the British merged the Northern 
and Southern Protectorates together under one administration (Osuntokun 1988). The British 
attributed the merger of the Northern and Southern Protectorates to two factors. First is the 
practical impossibility of maintaining artificial barriers between the South and the North, and, 
second is the need for effective and efficient management of the Northern Protectorate, which was 
lacking in viable resources (Osuntokun 1988, pp. 23-39).  
Afigbo (1991), Ekeh (1989), Mustapha (2004) have noted that the British colonial government 
used the principle of amalgamation to meet the financial predicament of the Northern Protectorate. 
In addition to the amalgamation of the two Protectorates (North and South), the British introduced 
“divide and rule” policy into her administration, this the British did by introducing separate 
patterns of administration through the use of Indirect rule in the North, direct rule in the South, 
and Lagos administered as a separate entity (Afigbo 1991; Ekeh 1989).  
Nigerian nationalists and scholars have criticised the arbitrary and undue imposition of federalism 
by the colonial administration (Awolowo 1947; Balewa 1947; Yusuf 1994; Awolowo-Dosumu 
1994 and Ayoade 1980). In the words of Obafemi Awolowo  
Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no 
‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are ‘English’, ‘Welsh’, ‘French’. The word 
‘Nigerian’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within 
the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not. There are various national or 
ethnic groups in the country… It is a mistake to designate them ‘tribes’. Each of 
them is a nation by itself with many tribes and clans. There is much difference 
between them as there is between Germans, English, Russian and Turks for 
instance. The fact that they have a common overlord does not destroy these 
fundamental differences (Awolowo 1947, p. 48). 
 A prominent Northern politician, and later the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, said, “since the 
amalgamation of Southern and Northern Provinces in 1914, Nigeria has existed as one country 
only on paper… it is still far from being united” (Balewa 1947, p. 208). According to Yusuf (1994, 
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p. 18), “the federation of Nigeria did not come into existence because some tribal chieftains sat 
over kolanut, tea or palm wine to agree to establish it…This federation as it exists now has many 
very serious limitations and weaknesses.”  Ayoade (1980,  p. 121) remarks that the colonial 
government packaged the Nigerian federalism to extend imperialism to the colonised territory.  
The 1946 Richard Constitution that introduced the concept of regionalisation made the centre to 
be weak, while the regions were stronger. However, federalism came into existence in Nigeria 
during the 1954 Lyttleton constitution. 
 
2.4.2 The Independence Era 
At independence, Nigeria inherited a federal arrangement that made each region to be dominated 
by a particular ethnic group, which created a sense of insecurity among the minority groups in the 
regions. This invariably called for the agitation for the creation of a Middle-Belt region in the 
North, a Mid-West region in the West, and a Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers region in the East (Uga, 
Ayorinde and Ehinomen 2005, p. 26).  Federalism during the independence period tilted powers 
to the regions while the central government exercised limited powers. The federal structure during 
the 1960 Independence and 1963 Republican constitutions granted the regions enough resources 
to discharge its responsibilities. Each regional government had autonomous powers that made the 
federal arrangement effective. Both the 1960 Independence and the 1963 Republican constitutions 
had similar features of federalism except that the President replaced the Queen of England in 1963, 
and the Supreme Court replaced the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council of 1960  (Uga, 
Ayorinde and Ehinomen 2005, p. 26).     
For Schwarz (1968), Nigerian federalism in the Independence era had the following features:  Each 
region had its own separate constitution, in addition to the federal government; each region had its 
own separate Coat of Arms and Motto, and each region established its own separate semi-
independent Missions in the United Kingdom, headed by an Agents-General’. The regional 
governments had residual powers. Any matter not allocated to the regions or the federal 
government automatically became a matter of regional jurisdiction. With these features, the central 
government became very weak while the regions were very strong. In the word of John P. 
Mackintosh “The Nigerian federation has always had peculiar features; the most evident being that 
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it was not created by the coming together of separate states but was the result of the subdivision 
of a country which had in theory been ruled as a single unit” (Mackintosh 1962, p. 223). 
2.4.3. The Military Era 
The intervention of military government in Nigerian politics in 1966 altered this federal structure. 
The military made the central government to have strong powers, leaving the states to become 
weak (Gana and Egwu 2003, p. 77).  
The military concentration of power to itself and at the centre ensured that the states 
were reduced to mere administrative units taking orders from the centre. The 
excessive centralisation of power, resources, and opportunities also encouraged the 
rise of authoritarianism and other forms of despotic rule, and the negation of 
democratic values (Ihonvbere 1999, p. 10). 
The Nigeria’s federal arrangement was disrupted by the military regime of Aguiyi Ironsi with the 
introduction of unitary system of government. The centralised and command structure of the 
military propelled the introduction of centralised administration, which did not augur well with the 
diverse and multiplicity of Nigerian society, hence, the counter coup of July 1966 that ushered in 
the administration of Gowon. Gana and Egwu (2003, p. 77) observe that military intervention in 
Nigerian politics in 1966 led to the transformation of federal structure into unitary system. 
The outbreak of the civil war on 6 July 1967, threatened the corporate existence of the country, 
with its attendant consequences on the structure of the federal system (Klieman 2012). During this 
period, secessionist forces in the three states of Eastern Nigeria engaged in open confrontation 
with the federal government (Ijalaye 1979). In order to resolve the agitation of the minority 
interests in the country, which partly precipitated the civil war, the federal government created 
twelve states in 1967, out of the four regions. The increase in the number of states, from twelve to 
nineteen states in 1979, complemented the effort to have a stable federalism (Ijalaye 1979).  
The politics of domination that ravaged the post-independence era encouraged military incursion 
in politics. The post-independence era had federal arrangement that was lopsided and encouraged 
ethnicity on a North-South dichotomy. This is contrary to the original principle of federal stability. 
In the word of John Stuart Mill, 
There should not be any one state so much powerful than the rest of the states. If 
there be such a one, and only one vote, it will insist on being the master of their 
joint deliberations; if there be two, they will be irresistible when they agree, and 
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whenever they differ, everything will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy 
between the rivals (Wheare 1963, pp. 50-51). 
K.C. Wheare reinforces this position, with a warning. 
It is undesirable that one or two units (in a federation) should be so powerful that 
they can overrule the others and band the will of the federal government to 
themselves. There must be some sort of reasonable balance, which will ensure that 
all the units can mention their independence within the sphere allotted to them and 
that no one can dominate the others (Wheare 1956). 
A remarkable step by the military toward the dissolution of the hitherto strong constituent units 
was the creation of twelve states out of the existing four regions in May 1967 in order to restructure 
the imbalance in the Nigeria federation. Gowon, in his nation-wide radio broadcast on 27 May 
1967, observed thus: 
The main obstacle to future stability in this country is the present structural 
imbalance in the Nigerian federalism. Even Decree No. 8 of Confederation or loose 
association will never survive if any one section of the country is in a position to 
hold the others to ransom. This is why the first item in the political and 
administrative programme adopted by the Supreme Military Council last month is 
the creation of states for stability. This must be done first so as to remove the fear 
of domination. Representatives drawn from the new states will be more able to 
work out the future constitution for this country, which can contain provisions to 
protect the power of the states to the fullest extent desired by the Nigerian people 
(Federal Ministry of Information 1967). 
Federal-State relation was based on Decree No. 1 of 1966, which empowered the federal military 
government to legislate for the whole country or any part thereof with respect to any matter 
whatsoever.  
In case of any conflict, between a decree promulgated by the federal government and edict enacted 
by the regions, the decree prevailed (Dudley 1963). Thus, the decree increased federal government 
authority over the states during the military regime (Dudley 1963). Fiscal relation, during the 
military era, tilted towards the centre. This further made the states to depend more on the centre 
for fund in form of grants and loans (Dudley 1963). In addition, off shore oil Revenue Decree, 
1971, otherwise called Decree No. 9 of 1971, vested the ownership of and the title of the territorial 
water and the Continental shelf on the Federal Government. It also made all royalties, rents and 
other revenues derived from or relating to the exploration, prospecting or searching for or the 
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mining or working of petroleum in the territorial water and the continental shelf, to be accrued to 
the federal government (Decree No. 9 of 1971).  
The command structure of the Military as reflected in Nigerian federalism tilted powers to the 
centre in such a way that the federal arrangement was more of unitary in outlook (Elaigwu 1998, 
pp. 6-7). The era of Military rule and the suspension of constitution gave room for the military 
government at the state level to exercise its control on the regions (Nnamdi 2009, p. 3). Such 
gradual erosion of powers of the state in favour of the centre has reduced federalism under the 
military to mere paper value (Abia 2006). The implication of this is the existing structural 
imbalance among the three levels of government (Ihonvbere 1999, p. 10). In this, Soyinka (2003) 
states,  
the truth is that, beyond the first four years of Nigeria’s independence, the federal 
principle was simply thrown overboard. A deliberate subversion of the rational 
relations of the state to the centre was embarked upon, upsetting the balance 
between the federal authority, the state, and even local government.  
 
 
2.4.4 The Post-Military Era 
With the return to a democratically elected government in 1979, federalism in Nigeria was 
supposed to be far better. However, the legacy of centralisation of the military prevailed. For 
example, the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions granted enormous powers to the central government.  
The long years of military rule and the command structure of government affected the civilian 
government of 1979 as the adoption of Presidential system of government that concentrated 
powers at the centre. The 1999 constitution that ushered in the Fourth Republic did not fare better, 
as the constitution embodied too much power at the centre. For example, The Second Schedule 
Part 1, of the constitution allocated sixty-eight (68) Exclusive Legislative powers to the Federal 
Government, while in Part 11, under the Concurrent Legislative List, the Federal authority further 
shares another thirty (30) legislative powers with the states. In the same vein, while the Third 
Schedule Part 1 of the Constitution established thirteen (13) Federal Executive Bodies, Part 11 of 
the Schedule established only three (3) State Executive Bodies, which are indirectly subject to the 
control of their Federal equivalent (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
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This is an indication that the Constitution vested, in the central government, too much power at 
the expense of the states.  
Ewetan (2012) identifies the post-military federal features to include increased financial powers 
of the federal government vis-à-vis the state governments, increased fiscal dependence of the 
constituent units on federally collected revenue, and states becoming an appendage of the federal 
government. Other features are the erosion of the fiscal autonomy of the federating units, and a 
master-servant relationship, in which the subnational governments were at the mercy of the federal 
governments. 
Similarly, Oyeneye, Onyenwenu and Olosunde (2004, p. 160) identify the features of federalism, 
within the context of Nigeria. These include a written and rigid constitution, subject to amendment, 
division of powers between the federal government and the subnational levels of government, and 
that central government had exclusive power on subjects in the exclusive list and final authority 
on concurrent matters. Other features are the adoption of multi-party system with the exception of 
1989 constitution, which provided two party system, the existence of bicameral and unicameral 
legislatures at the federal and state levels, respectively; supremacy of the constitution; Supreme 
Court, as the final arbiter of law; and illegality of secession by any section of the country.        
2.5 Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) 
Intergovernmental relation refers to the interactions that take place among the different tiers of 
government within a state (Adamolekun 1983).  In other words, intergovernmental relation is the 
whole idea of interaction that takes place between the central government and the subnational 
units. Bekink (2006) defines intergovernmental relations as a set of multiple formal and informal 
principles, processes, structures and institutional arrangements for both the bilateral and 
multilateral interaction within and between the different spheres of government.  
In his contribution, Odoh (2006, p. 16) highlights the objectives of intergovernmental relations. 
First is to promote peace and harmony among the three levels of government. Second is to enhance 
the emergence of co-operation rather than competitive federalism. Third is to ensure effective 
utilisation of available human and material resources among the various levels of government. 
Fourth is to accelerate the achievement of self-reliant economy. Wright (1995) identifies the 
characteristics of IGR with reference to American federalism. IGR comprises of all forms of 
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permutations and combinations that exist among the constituent units in a federal system and made 
up of activities and the attitudes of people occupying various positions at all the levels of 
government as well as the institutions of government (Wright 1995). In addition, IGR consists of 
concerted efforts of officials as well as the one-time occasional occurrences (Wright 1995). IGR 
encompasses the entire complex and interdependent relations among various spheres of 
government in legal, financial and administrative matters and policy coordination (Afesha 2015). 
Extant literature lays emphasis on cooperation between the central government and the subnational 
units, therefore, deemphasising the hierarchical relationship (Adamolekun 2011). Grodzins (1960) 
notes that friendliness and cooperation characterised intergovernmental relations and that conflict 
could occur within government or between the levels of government. Grodzins’ notion of sharing 
pervades his work and those of his students who participated in the University of Chicago’s 
Federalism Workshop. Grodzins’ work was based on dual federalism where there was a division 
of powers between the national and state governments.  
The emphasis of his work was the existence of two independent spheres of sovereignty. However, 
his later work, in collaboration with his students, stressed the primacy of cooperation rather than 
conflict (Fritschler and Segal 2016, pp. 95-122). In this, Grodzins notes the interactions of the 
subnational units in intergovernmental relations. To him, states are both the sources and recipients 
of federal and local powers.  
These later works of Grodzins and his students, stressed the pervasiveness of cooperation, not 
conflict (Grodzins 1960, p. 277). David Walker criticised Grodzins’ marble-cake and layer-cake 
dichotomy. 
If the marble cake theory is true, why is there so much conflict and hostility in the 
system? If the layer cake theory is true, how can we explain the many collaborative 
interactions that take place? We have reached the point at which we must look at 
the interactions vertically and horizontally and then must develop a new theory 
from that perspective (Walker 1970, p. 18).  
Intergovernmental relation allows each level of government to act independently and at the same 
time interacts in order to deliver services to the people. Layman (2003, p.11) observes that all 
levels of government focus on service delivery to the people. 
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Adamolekun (1983) and Olopade (1984) define intergovernmental relation as any form of 
interaction that takes place among the spheres of government within a polity. Okoli (2005) argues 
that the relationship that exists between the central and the constituent units, as spelt out in the 
constitution of the country, dominates IGR. According to him, the pattern of relationship, which 
is cooperative in nature, encourages both vertical and horizontal policy making at different levels 
and in different sectors of intergovernmental process. In federal systems such as Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, Nigeria, Switzerland, and the United States, the interactions between 
the central government and the subnational units become the central focus of intergovernmental 
relations as defined in the constitution of the land (Adamolekun, 2011). In his opinion, Watts 
(2008) identifies formal interactions, conducted exclusively, among the governments of 
constituent units.  
Olugbemi (1980, p. 113) identifies a nine-level structure of IGR. These are: (1) federal-state; (2) 
federal-local; (3) federal-civic groups; (4) state-state; (5) state-local; (6) state-civic groups; (7) 
local-local; (8) local-civic groups; and (9) inter-civic-groups. In contrast, Bamgbose (2008) 
observes three types of interactions in a unitary system. These are national-local relations; inter-
local relations, and external relations. 
2.6 Typologies of Intergovernmental Relations 
Fritschler and Segal (2016) have identified four typologies of intergovernmental relations. These 
are the joint policymaking, mutual accommodation, innovative conflict, and disintegrative 
conflict.  Joint policymaking involves the identification of the attitudes of the actors in decision 
making on issue of intergovernmental relations. In the joint policymaking, the actors are mostly 
bureaucrats and the level of decision-making is limited to the operating bureau. It differs in 
political styles and attitudes of the participating governments i.e. attitudes of actors. Douglas 
Harman of American University conducted a survey (1) to determine how “cooperative”, 
“friendly”, “competitive” and “hostile” the local officials are toward federal agency officials; and 
(2) to discover the perception of local officials about federal agencies in the adaptation of 
programmes to suit local circumstances (Segal and Fritschler, 1970). The outcome of the survey 
revealed that local officials embrace “cooperative” in their interactions with the federal 
government.  
32 
 
Bargaining and harmonious compromise among the political actors and units of government, at 
different levels of decision-making, characterised mutual accommodation. According to 
Schattschneider, “the outcome of all conflicts is determined by the scope of its contagion. The 
number of people involved in any conflict determines what happens; every change in the number 
of participants affects the result.” (Schattschneider 1960, p. 2). In the mutual adjustment, interest 
groups, congressional subcommittees and aid coordinators became involved in the negotiation and 
bargaining. Mutual adjustment involved some disagreements among participants on how to 
administer government programmes and how financial technicalities are handled. Nevertheless, 
well-established channels, with concession would remove these differences (Schattschneider 
1960, p. 2). 
Innovative conflict, as a typology of intergovernmental relation, at the inception, usually ends with 
cooperation. The features include involvement of different scope of the various sections and 
subsections of the political system, classification of intergovernmental relations as a part of a larger 
whole and the determination of the consequences and the values of conflict in intergovernmental 
decision-making (Schattschneider 1960, p. 2). Levine (1969, pp. 177-182) observes that 
intervention, directed toward restructuring the subsystem, described the situation, in which state 
agencies played other agencies, and governmental levels, against each other. Instead of dismissing 
conflict as an unfortunate deviation from the “cooperation and sharing” syndrome, it becomes 
possible to apply the theories of Lewis Coser and others to intergovernmental politics (Coser 
1956).  
Disagreement among the levels of government characterised disintegrative conflict (Fritschler and 
Segal 2016, p. 102). Other characteristics are the boundaries and extent of imposed rationality in 
bargaining i.e. nature of bargaining. Most descriptions of bargaining in intergovernmental system 
have centred upon routine relationships in which the guidelines under which decision-making 
occurs may be complex but understood, and, for the most part accepted by all parties concerned. 
Beyond the routine areas of bargaining, Lewis Froman’s categorisation of congressional 
bargaining offered helpful guidelines in delineating the stages of negotiation, which also occur in 
intergovernmental relations (Froman 1967). Jacob and Lipsky’s dimension of classification of 
intergovernmental relations consist of: (a) policy analysis; (b) synoptic indicators of the political 
process; (c) community power studies; (d) schemes of classification.  
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2.7 Analysis of the Typologies of Intergovernmental Relations 
The absence of intergovernmental factors, which affect local policy processes and outcomes, limits 
policy analysis of IGR. Some areas for research in intergovernmental relations, which would 
contribute to studies in policy analysis, are state and local policy in directional and or anticipated 
response to federal grants, state, county, and regional policies concerning decisions to apply or 
match funds and change structure or procedures and the variations in federal decisions to grant or 
refuse to grant funds (Fritschler and Segal 1970). Others are the variations in congressional and 
administrative guidelines and the processes used to change those guidelines, and the variations in 
enforcement of the guidelines (Fritschler and Segal 1970).   
Synoptic indicators of the political process involved techniques of analysing key areas of 
legislative decision making to intergovernmental relations. Key areas of decision making, in the 
study of state and local government, are the role perceptions and role systems of decision makers, 
the behaviour in collegial groups, including federal bureaucratic groups, interagency committees, 
and regional groupings and state-local groups and the social origin and recruitment studies of 
grant-in-aid decision makers at all levels (Fritschler and Segal 1970). Others are the content 
analysis of grant-in-aid documents, both applications and responses and interest group 
involvement in the grant-in-aid process. The inability of scholars to link such research questions, 
involving power to the large political community, limits the community power studies. Studies of 
the grant-in-aid community would provide such a link and would represent a new application of 
the community power idea to functional hierarchies, intergovernmental and interagency groups 
(Fritschler and Segal 1970).   
Table 1: A typology of intergovernmental relationships 
Type of 
political 
relationships 
Attitudes of 
Actors 
Actors and 
Levels of 
decision 
making 
Scope of 
participation 
Nature of 
Bargainin
g 
Nature of 
Administrativ
e Guidelines 
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Joint policy-
making 
Cordial and 
friendly 
Bureaus Functional 
hierarchies 
Routine Understood 
and accepted 
by all parties 
Mutual 
accommodatio
n 
Competitive Bureaus, 
Special interest 
groups, 
congressional 
Subcommittees
, aid 
coordinators 
Subsystems Negotiated 
bargaining 
Flexible 
Innovative 
conflict 
Manipulativ
e defensive 
Department 
heads, special 
interest groups, 
congressional 
subcommittee 
members, aid 
coordinators, 
white house 
staff 
Subsystems 
with outside 
intervention
s 
Non-
negotiated 
bargaining 
followed 
by 
negotiated 
bargaining 
Less flexible 
Disintegrative 
conflict 
Hostile Department 
heads, special 
interest groups, 
congressional 
committees and 
delegations, 
local political 
actors, courts 
Macro 
(System-
wide) 
Non-
negotiated 
bargaining 
Inflexible 
Source: Compiled by the author from A. Lee Fritschler and Morley Segal 
 
2.8       Issues in Intergovernmental relations 
This section reviews the main thematic issues of the research. Such issues include autonomy; 
distribution of powers and responsibilities; centralisation of power; vertical/horizontal 
relationships; intergovernmental fiscal relations; administrative mechanism for managing 
intergovernmental relations; service delivery; and constitutional provisions. 
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2.8.1 Autonomy 
The quest for devolution of power among nations has attracted debates from scholars on the 
concept of autonomy. Scholars have therefore attempted to explain autonomy using the 
intergovernmental relations institutional structures, fiscal arrangements and political channels. For 
Nwabueze in Adeyemo (2005) autonomy means that “each government enjoys a separate existence 
and independence from the control of the other governments” (Adeyemo 2005, pp.77-87). 
Autonomy may be a result of either the process of devolution or the transfer of power from central 
government to autonomous units holding corporate status under state legislation.  
Extant literature on autonomy shows the differences in the trends and models adopted by various 
nations. The Canadian constitution of 1867 granted the central government power to veto any 
legislation at the provincial level. Provinces are set up for the administrative convenience of the 
central government, and therefore, are never sovereign (Fritschler and Segal 2016, pp. 95-122). In 
the U.S., the influence of the federal government over state and local governments had increased 
and there had been the danger of loss of autonomy (Cohen and Peterson 1999, p. 26). In the United 
States of America, the federal government uses both direct and indirect means when it intends to 
influence state and local actions (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1981). 
Posner (1998, p. 31) observes that a ‘Centralised-Inclusive model’, which would suggest 
considerable mandating activity, could succeed bargaining between central and local governments.  
Wright (1982) concludes that in the U.S., bargaining or negotiation is a prominent if not dominant 
model of contemporary intergovernmental relations. However, there was a change in the trend in 
IGR in the 1980s and 1990s from “cooperative federalism” to “coercive federalism” due to the 
increased dominance of federal government (Wright 1982, p. 215). 
Intergovernmental relation in America allows the central government to wield considerable 
influence over the state governments especially in areas of fiscal federalism as the federal 
government exercises financial control over the states by withholding the federal grants to the 
states (Fritschler and Segal 2016, pp. 95-122). In a comparative context, Britain’s framework for 
analysing intergovernmental relations posits that local authorities are not agents of central 
government but rather have local discretion (Stoker 1991, p. 47).  
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Scholarly works in Nigeria have focused more on authority relationships, fiscal arrangements and 
institutional structures (Adeyemo 2005; Rezende 2007; Enejo and Isa 2014). Enejo and Isa remark 
that the setting up of state and local governments joint account committee, local government 
service commission, ministry of local government and chieftaincy affairs and other allied agencies 
at the state level have made local government autonomy in Nigeria a mirage. Oni (2013) observes 
that fiscal autonomy of the levels of government has become very difficult because there is yet to 
be an acceptable formula for revenue sharing. Supporting this claim, Ojo (2014) stresses that lack 
of financial autonomy at the subnational levels has led to groups’ agitation and at times litigation 
in the court of law. For example, the littoral states took the federal government to the court with 
respect to the offshore/onshore oil dichotomy.  
The administration of Olusegun Obasanjo had earlier approached the Supreme Court for the 
definition of a seaward boundary of a littoral state (ThisDay, 17 February 2003). By constitutional 
design, Section 162 (2) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides for the principle of 
derivation, to a share in the revenue accruing to the Federation Account from natural resources 
derivable from the continental shelf of Nigeria did not specify the dichotomy between the 
offshore and onshore (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The Supreme 
Court decided to exclude the revenue derived from the offshore drilling in the calculation of the 
revenue attributable to the oil producing states based on the principle of derivation (The Guardian 
April 5, 2002).  
In addition, the civil society groups and communities in the Niger Delta have agitated that they 
wanted a fair share of the past neglect and injustice they had suffered in the hands of both the state 
and multinational oil companies in the exploitation of the oil resources (Atoyebi, Lawal, Adekunjo 
and Kadiri 2013). The civil society and communities in the Niger Delta have challenged the control 
of oil and distribution of its benefits among the constituent units of the federation (Atoyebi, Lawal, 
Adekunjo and Kadiri 2013). Similarly, the 774 local governments in the country have approached 
the judiciary over lack of financial autonomy (Ojo 2014).  
Extant literature on autonomy has laid emphasis on the dominance of the federal government on 
the subnational units but has ignored the constitutional framework that empowers the central 
government to have domineering roles. In this, the study would bridge the gap by examining the 
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constitutional provisions of the levels of government to determine the coordinate and independent 
relationships. Scholars have opined that there was no consensus about the revenue sharing formula 
of the centrally generated revenue among the three levels of government (Ikeji 2011). This 
scholarly view is limited because scholars have failed to discuss the implication of revenue sharing 
formula on federal structure. The study would fill this gap by exploring the revenue sharing 
arrangement and its implication on service delivery in the contemporary federal system. 
2.8.2 Distribution of powers and responsibilities 
Intergovernmental relation has made it possible to demarcate governmental powers through 
constitutional delineation of functions. In Nigeria, the constitution specifies the list of functions of 
local government as contained in Section 7, Fourth Schedule of 1999 constitution. The main 
functions of a local government council, as stated in the constitution, included the consideration 
and the making of recommendations to a state commission on economic planning or any similar 
body, collection of rates, radio and television licences. Others are the establishment and 
maintenance of cemeteries, burial grounds and homes for the destitute or infirm, licensing of 
bicycles, trucks (other than mechanically propelled trucks), canoes, wheel barrows and carts; 
establishment, maintenance and regulation of slaughter houses, slaughter slabs, markets, motor 
parks and public conveniences. Local Governments are also expected to construct and maintain 
roads, streets, street lightings, drains and other public highways, parks, gardens, open spaces, or 
such public facilities, as may be prescribed from time to time by the House of Assembly of the 
state (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
The functions of local governments also include naming of roads and streets and numbering of 
houses; provision and maintenance of public conveniences, sewage and refuse disposal; 
registration of all births, deaths and marriages; assessment of privately-owned houses or tenements 
for the purpose of levying such rates as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of State. It 
is also expected that local governments are to control and regulate out-door advertising and 
hoarding, movement and keeping of pets of all description, shops and kiosks, restaurants, bakeries 
and other places for sale of food to the public, laundries, and licensing, regulation and control of 
the sale of liquor (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
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The only area that has received unending attention in the distribution of powers and responsibilities 
is the fiscal arrangement. Oni (2013) observes that fiscal federalism suggests a legal arrangement 
describing the distribution of revenue among the different levels of government in a federal 
structure.  In the U.S., the interdependent nature of IGR led to the growth of categorical grants 
distributed by the federal government to states and cities, which helped to establish national 
standards of welfare, and economic growth (Wright 1974). Such federal government effort 
encouraged the growth of “cooperative federalism” where national and subnational governments 
in partnership developed mutually acceptable scheme for social and economic development 
(Elazar 1962; Posner 1998, pp. 28-29). 
The federal government has the capacity to raise more revenues than the subnational units , thereby 
giving the centre the ability to exert control over the subnational levels by offering them grants 
(Hale and Palley 1981, pp. 54-59; Wright 1982, pp. 161-171). In Nigeria, the question of economic 
justice has not been realised in the distribution of responsibilities.  
Adamolekun (2011) has observed that allocation of responsibilities to the levels of government 
can be grouped into three: federal-regional-local, federal-local, and regional-local levels.  He 
identifies three approaches for the federal-regional level. The first consists of an exclusive federal 
list with residual powers vested in the regions; the second was an exclusive list for the regional 
legislatures; and the third consists of the two lists: an exclusive federal list and a concurrent list 
consisting of subjects upon which both the federation and the states have authority to make laws. 
To him, any matter that is not found in the exclusive or the concurrent list was contained in the 
residual list, which is exclusively reserved for the regional government (Adamolekun 2011). In 
spite of the formal constitutional arrangement that made federal government to have domineering 
power, the “New Deal” era in the United States in the 1930s called for “cooperative” federalism 
that allows for shared responsibilities among the levels of government (Adamolekun 2011). With 
the local government reform of 1976 that provided for a three-tier level of administration, a 
tripartite sharing of government responsibilities was put in place in Nigeria’s 1979 constitution 
among the federal, state and local governments (Adamolekun 2011).  
Table 2: Nigeria Expenditure Responsibilities 
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Tier of government Expenditure Category 
Federal only Defence; Shipping; Federal trunk roads; Railways; Posts; 
Telegraphs and telephones; Police and other security services; 
regulation of labour; interstate commerce; telecommunications; 
mines and minerals; social security; insurance; national statistical 
system; national parks; guidelines for minimum education 
standards at all levels; water resources affecting more than one 
state. 
Federal-State (Shared) Antiquities and monuments; electricity; industrial, commercial and 
agricultural development; scientific and technological research; 
statistics and survey; university, technological and post-primary 
education; health and social welfare. 
State-Local (Shared) Primary, adult and vocational education; health services; 
development of agriculture and non-mineral natural resources. 
Local government Economic planning and development; cemeteries; burial grounds; 
homes for the destitute and infirm; markets; sewage and refuse 
disposal; roads; streets, street lighting, drains, other public facilities 
Source: 1999 Constitution and various sector policy reports. 
 
 
2.8.3 Centralisation of power 
Extant literature reveals that there is continuous fiscal domination of the federal government on 
the subnational levels (Conlan 1986; Ugwu 1998; Suberu 2001; Diamond 2001).  Conlan (2014) 
observes that Reagan’s idea of centralisation has shifted balance of power and resources towards 
the centre. Therefore, a new approach to IGR called “coercive federalism” was introduced in the 
1970s and 1980s for the federal government to use regulation rather than fiscal incentives to 
control domestic policy (Kincaid 1990).  
Taking it further, Posner (1998) observes an increase in the use of unfunded mandates by the 
federal government, in spite of the 1995 Un-funded Mandates Act that sought some changes in 
their use to place unwanted fiscal demands on local government (Conlan, Riggle and Schwartz 
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1995). Such fiscal dominance gave the federal government an edge over the subnational units, 
thereby giving the centre the ability to control  the subnational levels by offering them grants (Hale 
and Palley 1981, pp. 54-59; Wright 1982, pp. 161-171). Similarly, the federal government 
exercises power over non-fiscal matters that are under the jurisdiction of the state governments 
such as the minimum age for drinking alcoholic beverages. For example, in the 1980s, the central 
government required the states to increase the minimum age of drinking alcohol to twenty-one 
years (Fritschler and Segal 2016, pp. 95-122). The central government then threatened states that 
may refuse the directive to forfeit the federal highway construction funds. This forced the states to 
change their laws on minimum drinking age in order to suit the federal laws. The American 
Congress used the same threat in the 1990s to encourage the states to reduce their blood-alcohol 
limits for drunk driving to 0.08 percent by 2004 (Fritschler and Segal 2016, pp. 95-122).   
Britain that adopted a centralised-Inclusive model had, in the last two decades, exercised central 
domination over the subnational units through the imposition of local government restructuring. 
Although, Bulpitt (1983) identifies the concept of dual polity, the relationship between the centre 
and the local government only made the latter to serve as junior partner. According to J.S. Mill: 
The authority, which is most conversant with principles should be supreme over 
purposes, whilst that which is most competent over details, should have details left 
to it. The principal business of central authority should be to give instruction, of the 
local authority to apply it (Mill cited in Bulpitt 1983, p.377). 
 The central government relies on legislative, executive, and judicial instruments as general 
supervisory institutions. This is especially the case in areas of nationally delayed authority, 
personnel assignments, organisational hierarchy, and intergovernmental fiscal relationships 
(Kwon 2003). 
At independence, Nigerian constitution allowed a method through which the national government 
could easily take over the powers of the regional governments under the pretext of assuring them 
of a democratic government (Ejimofor 1987). Ejimofor observes that when an insurrection or a 
disturbance existed in any part of the federation, which the regional government could not handle 
to the satisfaction of the national government, the latter could declare a state of emergency over 
the affected area and assume any necessary police powers to deal with the situation. The 
implication of this was that the central government could take over the legislative powers of the 
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regions. This power was used in May 1962 by the federal government during the crisis in the 
Western Region when a state of emergency was declared (Ejimofor 1987; Ayoade 2001).  
The centralised nature of military governing pattern and usurpation of responsibility without due 
recourse to the intergovernmental relations led to fiscal disequilibrium and functional dislocation 
of subnational units (Crommelin 2004). Supporting this claim, Oyovbaire (1985) observes that the 
federal-state relations, during the military era in Nigeria, were in favour of the federal government. 
Taking this discourse further, Ugwu (1998) observes that there exists a system of direct transfers 
from the federal government to local governments. However, most of Nigeria’s states and local 
governments are not able to raise more than ten percent of their annual budgets from the internal 
sources and they are heavily reliant on federal aid. On this, Suberu (2001) notes that economic 
resources as well as political power are concentrated at the federal level.  
In terms of fiscal policy, “extreme concentration” of control over the nation’s revenue flows has 
caused intergovernmental conflicts. Alluding to this, Diamond (2001) argues that centralisation of 
control over revenue flows has  
virtually erased a fundamental principle of federalism---that lower levels of 
government have some areas of autonomous authority that cannot be overridden by 
the centre—and robbed subordinate units of any significant incentive to generate 
revenue of their own (Diamond 2001, pp. 11-12). 
The study, therefore, explored the resultant effect of the skewed nature of the federal arrangement 
and its consequences on the service delivery capacity of the subnational units.  
 
2.8.4 Vertical/horizontal relations 
Scholarly works on vertical/horizontal relationships among the levels of government have 
continued to be the central focus in the literature (Elaigwu 1985; Tamuno 1970; Jinadu 2003). 
Elaigwu (1985) observes that the relationship between the central government and subnational 
units broke down after the military takeover because the subnational units were more powerful 
than the central government. This, according to Elaigwu (1985), resulted into threats of secession. 
With the promulgation of Decree No. 34 of 1966, the country momentarily adopted unitary system. 
The resultant effect of this was centralisation of the structure of government, leaving the 
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subnational governments as extensions of the central government. In other words, the system of 
government was characterised by the dominance of federal over state and local governments. 
During the military era, the subnational levels of government were accountable to the military 
authorities rather than to the state or local electorates (Alm and Boex 2002). In this case, political 
and fiscal decentralisation was not pronounced in the military system of government (Alm and 
Boex 2002). Under the military rule, state and local governments operate as distinct government 
units, provided important government services, collected own source revenues and received 
intergovernmental transfers, at the discretion of military governors and appointed local executives 
rather than at the discretion of the local electorates (Alm and Boex 2002).  
 
The democratic dispensation of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic in May 29, 1999 witnessed the most 
conflicting political opposition ever experienced, which brought competition rather than 
cooperation between the central and the subnational governments (Vanguard 1999). State-local 
relations have witnessed series of conflict. For example, 15 local government councils took the 
Sokoto state government to court, and the court prohibited it from deducting 3 percent of its 
statutory allocation to fund Sokoto Emirate Council, as passed by the State House of Assembly 
(Vanguard 1999). On the fiscal relations, Ekpe (2002) notes that even though the nature of 
relationship existing among federal, state and local governments from the constitutional point of 
view tends to be fiscal, a lot of mechanism or agencies exist among them that tend to link the 
relationship of the three levels of government in Nigeria.  
 
There existed a complex web of interactions bordering on participatory and joint management in 
the areas of funding of primary education, poverty alleviation programmes, training of local 
government career and elected officers among others (Gboyega 1989). The State Joint Local 
Government Account Committee was lopsided; government officials in charge of the account 
often manipulate the process in favour of the state government, at the detriment of the local 
governments (Gboyega 1989). Bello-Imam (1990), Ayoade (1992) and Ekpe (2002) have 
maintained that IGR during the colonial rule and Nigeria’s First Republic exhibited the features of 
principal/agent model. This means that the relationship between the local government and other 
higher levels, federal and state was not cooperative rather a relationship where the local 
government takes directive and commands from the higher authority (Ekpe 2002). 
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However, IGR in the 1979 Second Republic and the present Fourth Republic is characterised by 
overlapping-authority model because the actors of IGR perform multi-dimensional functions (Ibok 
and Ntekim 2014). Literature has revealed that federal-state-local relations are characterised by 
conflict and competition, which often leads to litigation in the court of law, such scholarly work, 
is limited in providing effective constitutional framework to resolve the conflict. The study intends 
to fill the gap by interrogating the existing constitutional arrangement with a view to identify areas 
of overlapping.  
 
2.8.5 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
There are two pertinent issues on the subject matter of intergovernmental fiscal relations. The first 
is the question of the relative powers of the central government and constituent units to raise 
revenues. The second is the relative importance of the proportion of total government revenues 
allocated to the central and subnational governments (Adamolekun 2011). Abubakar identifies 
some fundamental questions on how to attain the most equitable distribution of income, maintain 
high employment while avoiding excessive inflation, and efficient distribution of resources. It is 
pertinent to know that revenue transfer is common in all federations. Olaloku (1979) observes that 
three reasons were germane to the transfer of funds from higher authority to lower levels of 
government. These include (1) the nature of the functions and revenue sources of the three levels 
of government; federal, state and local governments; (2) the variations in the capacities of the 
lower levels of government to raise revenue; (3) the conditional transfers that gives instructions on 
the use of funds.  
Such intergovernmental transfers, according to Olaloku (1979), were dictated by the principles of 
derivation, need and national interest. Subnational levels of government in Sub-Saharan African 
generate about 20 percent of total government revenues and spend about 30 percent (Hobdari, 
Nguyen, Dell’Erba and Ruggiero 2018). The difference of 10 percent was from intergovernmental 
transfers. The bulk of national revenue of the Sub-Saharan African countries is under the 
jurisdiction of the central government revenue, made up of personal income tax, value-added tax, 
company tax, mining royalties, import tax, and export tax (Hobdari et al 2018). In addition, a few 
countries, like South Africa and Zimbabwe, allowed subnational governments to raise revenues 
through borrowing from municipal banks, loan funds, or the capital markets (Hobdari et al 2018). 
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 Concerning intergovernmental transfers in most Sub-Saharan African countries, the central 
government decides on the total sum of grants available as well as the sharing formula (Hobdari 
et al 2018). Formal intergovernmental transfers exist in countries like Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria 
and Uganda. For example, in Nigeria, intergovernmental transfer is in the constitution, although, 
inconsistency persisted in the implementation of the enshrined intergovernmental transfers (The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Section 164 (1) states that the Federation 
may make grants to a State to supplement the revenue of that State in such sum and subject to such 
terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the National Assembly (The Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
Scholars have observed that there is the need to reassess intergovernmental fiscal relation due to 
the belief that the constituent units (i.e. the state and local governments) are responsible for the 
provision of social services, yet they have limited financial resources to discharge the 
responsibilities (Fatile and Adejuwon 2008; Bello 2014; Nkwede, Nwali and Orga 2016). Thus, 
the central authority (Khemani 2001) retains the bulk of the revenue. To authenticate this, the 
revenue sharing formula in Nigeria among the central, state and local governments in 1999 are 
48.5%, 24% and 20% respectively. The remaining 7.5 percent was for oil and mineral producing 
areas, a stabilization fund, an ecological fund, and the Federal capital territory (FCT) (The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
Fajana (1996) observes that sharing of government revenue, grants-in-aid and loans are the 
dominant instruments of intergovernmental transfer of funds in Nigeria’s polity. Incessant changes 
characterised fiscal federalism in Nigeria (Fajana 1996). This has invariably led to the setting up 
of various committees and commissions to decide on the revenue sharing arrangement. These 
commissions have come up with series of recommendations as illustrated in Table 3. 
Table 3: Revenue commissions in Nigeria, 1946-1984 
S/N Commission/Committee Recommendation 
criteria 
Other basic features of 
recommendation 
1 Phillipson (1946) i. Derivation 
ii. Even 
progress 
Balance after meeting central 
government budgetary needs allocated 
to regions 
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2 Hick-Phillipson (1951) i Derivation 
ii Fiscal autonomy 
iii Need; and  
iv National interest 
 
Proportions of specified duties and 
taxes allocated to regions because of 
derivation, special grants- capitation, 
education and police. 
3 Chick (1953) i. Derivation 
ii Fiscal autonomy 
Bulk of revenues from import duties 
and excises to the regions on basis of 
consumption and derivation. 
4 Raisman (1958) i. Derivation 
ii Fiscal autonomy 
iii Balance 
development 
iv Need 
Proportions of specified revenues 
distributed based on derivation. 
Creation of Distribution Pool Account 
(DPA) with fixed regional 
proportional shares: North 40%; West 
31%; East 24% and Southern 
Cameroon 51% 
5 Bins (1964) Same as above plus 
financial 
comparability 
Composition of DPA relative shares 
slightly altered: North 42%; East 30%; 
West 20%; and Mid-west 8% 
6 Decree No. 15 1967 Same as above Regional proportional shares on the 
DPA split among the 12 new states. 6 
northern states receive 70% each. East 
and Western States share in 
accordance with relative populations.  
7 Dina (1968) i.Even development 
ii Derivation 
iii Need 
iv Responsibility 
government 
Special grants accounts introduced, 
recommended the establishment of a 
permanent planning and fiscal 
commission. Recommendations 
required. 
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8 Decree No. 13 1970 i. Population (50) 
ii. Equality of shares 
(50%)  
 
Export duties to state reduced from 
1000% to 60%; duty on fuel to state 
reduced from 1000% to 50%; mining 
rents and royalties to states reduced 
from 50% to 45%. 
9 Decree No. 1971 Same as above Transferred rents and royalties of 
offshore petroleum mines from the 
state to the federal government 
10 Decree No.6 Same as above On-shore mining rents and royalties to 
state reduced from 45 to 20 percent. 
Remaining 80% to the DPA. Import 
duties on motor, sprit and tobacco to 
be paid 100% into DPA. 50% of 
excise duties to be retained by federal 
government 10% to DPA  
11 Aboyade (1977) i. Equality of access 
0.25 
ii National minimum 
standards 0.22 
iii Absorption 
capacity 0.20 
iv Independent 
revenue 0.18 
v Fiscal efficiency 
0.16 
Replaced DPA with federation 
account. Fixed proportional share out 
of this account between federal57%, 
states 30%, Local governments 10% 
and special fund 3% state joint 
account and local governments joint 
accounts created 
12 Okigbo (1980) i. Population 40% 
(Equality of states) 
ii National minimum 
standards 40% 
iii Social 
development 45% 
Federation Account to be shared, 
Federal government 53%, State 
government 30%; Local government 
10%; Special Fund 7% 
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iv Internal revenue 
efforts 
13 Decree No. 1984 Same as above Federation Account to be shared: 
Federal government 55%; state 
government 32.5%; local government 
10% Ecological problems 1%; 
Development of mineral producing 
areas 1.5% 
Source: Abubakar, H.I 1992. Financial transaction, vertical and horizontal revenue allocation. 
Commissioned paper presented at the National seminar on revenue mobilisation organised by 
RMAFC. 
2.8.5.1 Intergovernmental fiscal relations in Nigeria 
Nigerian fiscal system is decentralised. In other words, the constitution defines the expenditure 
responsibilities of the levels of government. The central government provides services that are of 
national importance such as national defense, national transportation, immigration (Martinez-
Vazquez and Boex 1997). State governments provide healthcare facilities, secondary and tertiary 
education, and physical infrastructure (Alm and Boex 2002). Local governments are concern with 
local matters such as primary education and other traditional local functions.  
Of utmost importance in fiscal decentralisation is the sharing of resources among the levels of 
government. In this case, resources are highly centralised. All federally collected revenues are paid 
into the “Federation Account” which is then shared among the central, state and local governments 
based on the approved formula (McLure 1996).The formula for sharing the Federation Allocation 
is determined by RMAFC. Oil revenue constitutes a major source of revenue for Federation 
revenue and this makes Nigeria to be termed a “rential state” (McLure 1996) The eight oil 
producing states generate a huge source of revenue that is federally collected and later shared 
among the levels of government. Aside from this, 13% of oil revenue is shared with the oil 
producing states (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 1997). 
2.8.5.2 Nigeria’s Expenditure Assignment 
The assignment of fiscal functions among the levels of government has been a major issue in 
literature. This is due to the broad economic functions of government in areas of stabilisation, 
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distribution and allocation of resources (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 1997). Stabilisation and 
distribution should be performed by the national government while allocation function should be 
performed by the lower levels, so that government would be able to meet the needs of the taxpayers 
(Netzer 1966). By constitutional design, public services such as defense, transportation network 
that are of benefits to the nation are assigned to the central government. Expenditures assigned to 
the state governments include provision of healthcare, secondary and higher education, and 
physical infrastructure while the local governments involve in primary education and traditional 
local government functions such as local markets, and operating slaughter houses (Netzer 1966). 
The assignment of expenditure responsibilities in Nigeria coincides with the principles of sound 
expenditure assignment (Alm and Boex 2002). In this case, government services with a smaller 
benefits area are left to lower levels of government, while the federal government focuses on policy 
areas of national importance (Alm and Boex 2002). Alm and Boex (2002) observe certain concerns 
regarding the current assignment of expenditure responsibilities in Nigeria. These include: (1) 
Social policies: Subnational governments are assigned a large number of responsibilities for social 
policies, including social welfare, and poverty alleviation activities, healthcare policies, and 
primary and secondary education. These social activities are partially of a redistributive nature. 
Subnational government may not be in a position to provide adequate levels of these services 
unless funding is provided specifically for these activities by the federal government. (2) Joint 
expenditure responsibilities: Certain responsibilities are constitutionally assigned to more than one 
level of government. For example, higher education is a responsibility of both the federal and state 
governments. Such joint assignment can lead to one of two extremes if the two levels of 
government fail to coordinate their efforts. (3) Division of public and private sector activities: The 
division between the roles of the public and private sectors needs to be spelt out clearly. There is 
consensus among economic experts that the role of government should be limited to a specified 
set of functions, as summarised in the “Washington Courses”. States and local governments should 
be encouraged to follow the principle that “the business of business is business” and that “the 
business of government is governing”. 
2.8.5.3 The Assignment of Revenue Sources 
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Tax instruments must be assigned among the different levels of government. In Nigeria, states and 
local governments have not been assigned significant real-own-source revenues (Alm and Boex 
2002). The model adopted is one of fiscally weak substantial governments that do not generate 
much revenue from their own sources that do not independently legislate and administer their own 
taxes, and receive the bulk of their revenues from intergovernmental transfers (Alm and Boex 
2002). The major revenue sources such as petroleum revenues, corporate income taxes and the 
Value Added Tax (VAT) are collected by the federal government and distribute by formula to the 
units of government (Netzer 1966). VAT was introduced in 1994 to replace a state-level sales tax. 
States and local governments have a number of own resources or internally generated revenue 
(Netzer 1966). State level taxes include a variety of personal income taxes, capital gains tax on 
individuals, and development levies. Local governments are given the right to collect a myriad of 
minor rates, levies and fees. An assessment of Nigeria’s revenue assignments between the different 
levels of government shows that it partially conforms to the principles of sound revenue 
assignment (McLure 1996). Such assessment is based on (1) The amount of own source revenue 
of state governments which is typically only about 10-20% of a state’s budget. This lack of revenue 
autonomy is aggravated by the absence of state discretion over the rates of subnational taxes; (2) 
The own source revenues assignment to the local level offer local governments little or no revenue 
raising capability; (3) It is administratively difficult to share part of the VAT on a derivation basis 
with the states; (4) The constitution gives state governments the power to legislate local 
government taxes while the federal government was empowered to regulate state taxes. It means 
the state governments have no control over the size of their own revenues.    
2.8.6 Administrative mechanisms for managing intergovernmental relations  
There are several approaches to manage intergovernmental relations in a federal system. One 
approach, widely used in Canada, is the periodic conferences of political leaders and appointed 
officials (Adamolekun 2011). Matters that relate to finance and economic policy usually dominate 
the conferences. Many other conferences and meetings are held annually at the levels of both 
political leaders and administrators to deal with central-provincial, interprovincial, and provincial-
local relations (Adamolekun 2011). In contrast to the Canadian approach, Adamolekun (2011) 
observes that the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) managed 
America intergovernmental relation.  
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The ACIR amongst others was to give continuing attention to intergovernmental problems; to 
monitor the U.S. federal system and make recommendations on intergovernmental relations issues 
to all levels of government; to conduct extensive studies on intergovernmental relations; and to 
promote information sharing and consultation among the different levels of government. Similarly, 
Australia created the Advisory Council for Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) with the 
responsibilities of sharing information and making consultation but excluding intergovernmental 
fiscal relations. However, the Council of Australian Governments (CAG) replaced ACIR to 
initiate, develop and monitor the implementation of policy reforms that are of national importance 
to Australian governments.   
2.9  Service Delivery      
Service delivery has become the primary responsibility of any government to the people (Olowu 
2011). Olowu observes that the legitimacy of government to levy taxes on the people is on its 
capacity and capability to deliver services promptly. In analysing the service categories, Olowu 
highlights the distinctive features of public and private goods. According to him, a number of 
features characterised public goods. First, it was difficult to prevent people from consuming it. 
Second, people can consume the product without diminishing its usefulness to others. . Payment 
for goods, not closely related to demand or consumption and allocation decisions were primarily 
by political process.  Furthermore, Olowu made a classification of services into two. First, those 
financed by user charges, called utilities and, second, those financed through taxation, called 
services (Olowu 2011).  
Certain assumptions have changed the thought on service delivery. First, there was a distinction 
between “provision” and “production”. A provider is with the task of articulating and aggregating 
the needs and demands of his constituents and source for funds to provide public goods. On the 
other hand, the “producer” carries out the task of processing inputs into outputs. Second, is the 
growing concern that government only need to provide an enabling environment for production 
rather than dominating the provision of services (Olowu 2011). Ostrom and Ostrom (1991) have 
classified services into two broad types: (1) those that can be provided by the private sector are 
feasible for citizens; and (2) those for which exit options are not easy and for which voice 
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mechanisms must be enhanced, making the involvement of the public sector necessary in some 
forms.        
Service delivery in Nigeria’s Second and Fourth Republics has suffered serious setbacks. In this, 
General Buhari in his first speech after military coup on 31 December 1983 stated that: 
Let no one however be deceived that workers who have not received their salaries 
in the past eight or so months will receive such salaries within today or tomorrow 
or that hospitals which have been without drugs for months would have enough 
immediately. We are determined that with the help of God we shall do our best to 
settle genuine payments to which government is committed including backlog of 
workers’ salaries after scrutiny (Buhari 1983, p. 2)  
Similarly, in the Fourth Republic, Buhari addressing journalists in India on 28 October 2015 
remarked: 
 Where is the money? You must have known that the federal government has to 
help twenty-seven (27) states out of thirty-six (36) to pay salaries. Nigeria cannot 
pay salaries, the federal government itself has to summon the government of 
Central Bank on how it could pay salaries, not to talk of projects, agreements we 
signed with other countries on counterpart funding and so on (Buhari 2015, p. 1). 
Khemani (2001) observes that the constituent units are not able to deliver services because the 
fiscal allocation favours the central government at the expense of the subnational units that have 
the task of service delivery.  
Service delivery in developing societies of Latin America, Asia and Africa is inadequate. This has 
necessitated the adoption of self-help projects by the local communities in the provision of basic 
amenities (Akinola 1991, 1994, 2000, Adedeji and Onigu 1997).  Akinola (1991) observes that 
people have suffered disappointment from the state in the post-colonial era especially on the 
provision of social services, hence, the need to revive the traditional heritage of cooperation among 
them through the Community Development Associations (CDAs). He added that a high level of 
achievement in service provision through the CDAs while the contribution of government 
especially at the rural area has been minimal. Scholarly works on probing and interrogating the 
use of available resources by the subnational levels are still very rare in the literature. This work 
therefore, intends to fill the existing gap in the literature.  
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Table 4: Options for obtaining Public Services 
A government that serves as a collective 
consumption unit may obtain the desired 
public goods by:  
Example 
Operating its own production unit A local authority with its own fire or police 
department 
Contracting with a private firm A local authority that contracts with a private 
firm for refuse removal, street repair, or traffic 
light maintenance 
Establishing standards of service and leaving it 
up to each consumer to select a private vendor 
and to purchase service 
A government agency that licenses taxis to 
provide service, refuse collection firms to 
remove refuse 
Issuing vouchers to families and permitting 
them to purchase service from any authorized 
supplier 
A government agency that issues vouchers for 
food, education, rent, or health services. 
Contracting with another government A municipality that purchases tax unit 
assessment and collection services from 
another local authority or government unit, 
sewage treatment from a special health board 
district, and special vocational education 
services from an education school board in 
another region. 
Producing some services with its own unit and 
purchasing other services from other 
jurisdictions and from private firms 
A regional or local authority with its own 
police patrol force, which purchases laboratory 
services from another police authority, joins 
with several adjacent communities to pay for a 
joint dispatching service, and pays a private 
ambulance firm to provide emergency medical 
transportation. 
 
Source: V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom, 1991 “Public goods and private choices.” The meaning of 
American Federalism: Constituting a Self-governing Society, ed. V. Ostrom, San Francisco: 
Institute of Contemporary Studies, p.181. 
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2.10 Constitutional provisions 
One of the features of democratic governance is the existence of constitutional provisions that 
delineate functions among the institutions of government. The national constitution of each 
federation distributes powers and authorities in different ways. The Nigerian 1979 presidential 
constitution which metamorphosed into 1999 constitution, aimed at ensuring that each level of 
government acts within its areas of jurisdiction. However, available literatures reveal that there is 
a gap between constitutional provisions and the operation of IGR. Ihonvbere (2000) has argued 
that “the 1999 constitution failed to address in its entirety the character of the state, the nature of 
the custodians of state power, the critical issue of hegemony and the inability of the elite to initiate 
a national project, the national question, production and exchange relations, and other primordially 
determined or constructed identity questions” (Ihonvbere 2000, pp.21-25). 
Similarly, there has been flagrant disregard, by the federal government, with regards to 
constitutional guaranteed autonomy of the state governments. Often, the state governments had 
alleged that the federal government imposed national decisions on the state governments for 
implementation, without prior consultations.  For instance, the federal government unilaterally 
announced the minimum wage of N7500 per month for federal workers and N5500 for the states 
without due consultation with the states (Vanguard, 2000).  This action was unconstitutional since 
minimum wage was not an executive matter (Vanguard, 2000).  
Another aspect of constitutional abuse by the tiers of government was the creation of additional 
local governments by the states.  Eme (2008) observes that states like Lagos, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, 
Enugu, Ebonyi and Katsina embarked on LGs creation in the first four years of the Fourth 
Republic. The creation of new local development council areas, by the Lagos State government, 
between 2002 and 2004, led to face off with the federal government. The Obasanjo administration 
withheld the federal allocation to the state’s LGs, in 2006, to demonstrate that the new local 
government units were not constitutionally recognised. The phenomenon that represents abuse of 
constitutional provisions did not encourage cordial relationships among the tiers of government. 
Scholarly works reveal discrepancy between the constitutional provisions and the actual practices 
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of intergovernmental relations, yet no serious work is done to close the existing discrepancy in 
IGR. 
2.11 Intergovernmental Relations and Governance 
The sustainability of good governance in a federal system depends on effective intergovernmental 
relations. Good governance entails improvement in the standard of living and quality of life of the 
citizens. This implies that cordial relationships and complementary roles of the levels of 
government is a sine qua non for good governance. In other words, the effective functioning of 
each level of government in a federal polity is essential for effective service delivery. The 
imbalance in Nigerian federal structure has raised fundamental issues of what has happened to 
resource control, revenue allocation formula, state-local government relations, local government 
autonomy and rural development among others (Olusadum and Anulika 2017). The fundamental 
issues require restructuring to reflect true federalism that can sustain good governance (Olusadum 
and Anulika 2017).  
Good governance requires that each level of government performs its functions towards the 
achievement of the set objectives in its areas of jurisdictions. Good governance means 
“transformation of governance” (Ketti cited in Heady 2001, p. 428). It also means when 
government leads the citizens with utmost transparency, accountability and citizens’ consultation 
in the act of governance (Olusadum and Anulika 2017). Grindle (2004, p. 8) identifies good 
governance to include: (1) Check and balances in government and decentralisation; (2) Market 
efficiency, managing decentralisation and transparent budgeting; (3) Services for public 
transportation and safe water; (4) Strategies for asset creation for the poor and capacity building 
in the public sector.   
Alam and Hasina (2014) observe that good governance means competent management of the 
country’s resources and affairs in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable, equitable, and 
response to public needs. In developing countries like Nigeria, good governance is quite elusive 
in the life of the people because the major components of good governance are yet to be actualised 
in the state (Olusadum and Anulika 2017). The federal arrangement of Nigeria demands for 
cooperative federalism i.e. the central, state and local governments need to work in harmonious 
relationships to achieve good governance. When cooperative federalism seizes to be in operation, 
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service delivery at the levels of governance would be hamphered. Thus, intergovernmental 
relations in the form of cooperative federalism remain a sine qua non to accomplish good 
governance (Olusadum and Anulika 2017). A cursory look at federal allocation to the states and 
local governments in Nigeria reveals low revenue at the local governments which has made service 
delivery very difficult. For example, between 1999 and 2007, the federal allocation to local 
governments in Lagos, Osun, Oyo, Ondo and Ekiti was 149.3b, 102.5b, 127.3b, 74b and 60.1b 
respectively (Federal Ministry of Finance 2017). The implication of this was low revenue at the 
local government levels for the implementation of projects. The resultant effect of the low revenue 
base was poor service delivery at the local level. 
Using the indicators of good governance such as accountability, transparency, equitable and 
inclusive (Nnaeto and Okoroafor 2016) and the federal allocation to the subnational levels of 
government, it is evident that intergovernmental relations in Nigerian federation, particularly, 
vertical relations cannot enhance good governance. This is because local government has 
practically become an appendages and administrative unit of the state government.  
 
 
2.12 Intergovernmental Relations and Sustainable Development Goals in Nigeria: 
Implications and Challenges  
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nation’s 2030 Agenda replaced the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that came to an end in 2015. The MDGs concentrated 
largely on social outcomes while key development priorities such as infrastructure were absent 
from the list (Jaiyesimi 2016). The SDGs build on its predecessor in addressing poverty, inequality, 
injustice, and providing solutions to environmental challenges (Nigeria and the SDGs 2015). The 
United Nation’s 2030 Agenda has 17 SDGs and 169 targets. The 17 SDGs include: (1) No poverty 
(2) Zero hunger (3) Good health and well-being (4) Quality education (5) Gender equality (6) 
Clean water and sanitation (7) Affordable and clean energy (8) Decent work and economic growth 
(9) Industry, innovation and infrastructure (10) Reduce inequality (11)Sustainable cities and 
communities (12) Responsible consumption and production (13) Climate action (14) Life under 
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water (15) Life on land (16) Peace, justice, and strong institutions (17) Partnership for the goals 
(United Nations 2015). 
The SDGs allows different countries to set their goals and targets, while western institutions 
partner with local institutions as a strategy for achieving the goals (Nigeria and the SDGs 2015). 
The implication of this is that the citizens and the government have the responsibility of developing 
their countries (Nigeria and the SDGs 2015). In Nigeria, goal 8 lends itself to the country’s reality 
i.e. “to promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive 
employment, and decent work for all” (Nigeria and the SDGs 2015).Towards achieving this goal, 
the Nigerian government has focused on job creation. Similarly, Nigerian participation in oil and 
gas has improved tremendously (Jaiyesimi 2016). 
The need for interlinkages in societal actors such as the levels of government, government 
agencies, private sector and the civil society cannot be overemphasised in the attainment of SDGs 
(Petersburg 2013). Taking a clue from the implementation of MDGs in Nigeria which has given 
critical impetus to development planning and its attendant execution imperatives, the country 
would increase its level of commitment as it commences the implementation of the SDGs (UNDP 
2015). Therefore, the inter-relationships at all levels of governance need to be clearly outlined for 
smooth implementation of the SDGs (UNDP 2015).This means that functions to be performed 
among the three levels of government need to be clearly spelt out to avoid conflict of interests. 
Furthermore, smart partnership of government with private sectors and civil society organisations 
would avail the opportunities of different stakeholders to use the available resources and 
experiences to achieve SDGs (UNDP 2015). 
Nigeria’s transition into SDGs as it relates to intergovernmental relations include: (1) Sustaining 
the intergovernmental partnerships in tackling poverty and providing societal services through 
innovative programmes such as the CGS, CCT and other sector-based interventions (for SDGs 
1,2,3,4,5,6,9 & 11), (2) Strengthening institutional frameworks in the emerging SDGs agenda to 
meet with its implementation  challenges in Nigeria’s complex federal system. (3) Pursuit of early 
implementation of the post-2015 development agenda with its integration into National and State 
development strategies and plans.(4) Continuous implementation of good public financial 
management policies and practices through regular sharing of knowledge and state to state peer 
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reviews to achieve accountability, transparency and judicious utilisation of resources (UNDP 
2008). 
Since the takeoff of the SDGs, many challenges have faced African countries and particularly 
Nigeria in the attainment of the goals. Kumar, Kumar and Vivekadhish (2016) highlighted the 
challenges facing SDGs since its commencement. These include: (1) Huge Cost: The rough 
calculations have put the cost of providing a social safety net to eradicate extreme poverty at about 
$66billion a year (Report of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustaining 
Development Financing 2014). (2) Maintaining peace is essential for development: A threat to 
international peace and stability by non-state actors is emerging as a major factor for both 
developed and developing countries. (3) Measuring progress: A number of targets in the SDGs are 
not quantified. The indicators for measuring progress have not yet been identified. Even if they 
limit it to two indicators per target, there will be 338 indicators to monitor and report. “Having 169 
targets is like having no targets at all” (New York The Economist 2015). Measurability will depend 
on the availability of data and capacity to measure them. (4) Accountability: There was a lack of 
accountability for inputs into MDGs at all levels. This challenge needs to be addressed in SDGs. 
Also, Petersburg (2013) observes other challenges such as dearth of personnel and lack of 
infrastructure. To him, there is dearth of skilled personnel to undertake the task of providing 
coordinated monitoring. Similarly, there is lack of infrastructure to undertake earth observation, 
ground-based monitoring and information processing capabilities required to give better global 
coverage. Technology and data to drive improvement constitute hinderance to SDGs (Dar and 
Khan 2011; Easterly 2009; and Sachs 2012). The gathering of data on a massive scale and the 
analysis of the data requires investigation in technology (Dar and Khan 2011; Easterly 2009; and 
Sachs 2012). The non-availability and reliability of data were the most often reported challenges 
with regards to the implementation of MDGs ((Dar and Khan 2011; Easterly 2009; and Sachs 
2012).    
 
2.13   Summary 
The practice of intergovernmental relations in a political system has been governed by the 
principles of federalism as designed by the foremost American scholar, K.C. Wheare (1963, p.10). 
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His principles of federalism entail the division of powers between the central and the constituent 
units where each sphere is co-ordinate and independent. Although, other scholars of federalism 
based their analysis on Wheare’s principles, they criticised legality and inflexibility associated 
with his definition. The goal of federalism is to accommodate, reconcile and manage social 
diversities in a political system. The researcher discovered that the analysis of federalism by 
Wheare was on his experience and practice of federalism in America in 1963. This is not 
particularly the same in many modern federal systems in America and other federation such as 
Spain, India, Belgium, and Canada.  
The contemporary American federalism has witnessed different phases of development, which 
ranges from dual federalism to ‘cooperative federalism’, ‘coercive federalism’ and ‘creative 
federalism’. The study therefore argues that the historical experience, cultural patterns, political 
environment and the value systems of the society should be the guiding principles in the practice 
of federalism in any political system. This chapter also explores the concept of intergovernmental 
relations (IGR). Literature on IGR lays emphasis on cooperation between the central and the 
subnational units thereby encouraging cooperative relationships and deemphasising the 
hierarchical relationships. The constitution makes provisions for cooperative relationships. 
However, most federal constitutions tend to tilt power towards the centre at the expense of the 
subnational units. The research study claims that there should be a bridge in the gap created in the 
constitution as regards the powers of the levels of government in a federal system. The structural 
imbalance between the central and the constituent units breeds unhealthy rivalry and rancour 
among the levels of government.  
The chapter examines extant literature on the major thematic issues of the study. Furthermore, the 
study examines the nexus between intergovernmental relations and good governance. The section 
was rounded up with the implications and challenges of sustainable development goals on 
intergovernmental relations.  
In most of the previous studies, analysis of intergovernmental relations was reduced to a particular 
regime of the past. This does not provide sufficient explanation of IGR practices under a 
democratic system, especially in the regimes governed by presidential system. An examination of 
the constitutional provisions vis-à-vis the actual practices of IGR in the Second and the Fourth 
Republics is the central focus and scope of this study. Thus, this study is an examination of IGR 
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in the Nigeria’s presidential system of the Second and the Fourth Republics. It aims at interrogating 
the implication of the nature of the contemporary intergovernmental relations on service delivery 
in the selected states. In summary, the justification of this study is to fill the existing gap in the 
literature of comparative study of intergovernmental relations in the Second and the Fourth 
Republics in the selected states.  
The next chapter presents the research methodology that underpins the nature of intergovernmental 
relations in the Second and Fourth Republics. 
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                                                             Chapter Three 
                                                      Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the methodological approach to the study. The section discusses the role 
of methodology in a political science investigation. It further explores the methodological 
approach to the study and the rationale for the methodology adopted. The researcher then examines 
the research methods, population of the study as well as the sample, the sampling techniques, 
sources of data collection, data collection instruments, data analysis and validity of the research 
work. 
3.2 The role of Methodology in a political science investigation 
Political science is an organised body of knowledge, the facts of which have been scientifically 
and systematically observed, collected and classified and from these, facts are formulated and 
proved a series of propositions or principles which form the basis of science (Radosavljevic and 
Lazovic-Jovic 2018). The scientific nature of political science is about investigating relationships 
(Cuba 2002). Political scientist engages in revealing the relationships underlying political events 
and conditions (Becker 1986). Methodology of political sciences deals with a set of specified 
methodological concepts, choice and application of general and social sciences’ methods and the 
construction of new or innovated method which creates a specific method of political sciences 
(Radosavljevic and Lazovic-Jovic 2018). Political methodology deals with the ways that political 
scientists ask and investigate questions (Radosavljevic and Lazovic-Jovic 2018). It offers an array 
of methods for making causal inferences that provide insights into the causes and consequences of 
phenomenon (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady and Collier 2008). Radosavljevic and Lazovic-Jovic 
(2018) observe that the basic tasks of the methodology of political sciences are to discover, develop 
and enable: 1) use of methods for obtaining scientific knowledge about political processes and 
methods of practicing that knowledge in politics; 2) methods of training for use of scientific 
knowledge and method of obtaining scientific knowledge; 3) methods of scientific knowledge and 
politics as a subject matter of science and methods of building and checking the theory of politics 
as a subject matter of political science; 4) check and verify research methods and develop a theory 
thereupon. 
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There is no single method which can come to the rescue of a political scientist to unfold the 
phenomenon of the state and government (Radosavljevic and Lazovic-Jovic 2018). The accepted 
methods of political investigation are the observational method, experimental method, historical 
method, comparative method, the method of analogy, and the philosophical method. 
Radosavljevic and Lazovic-Jovic (2018) has identified the role of methodology in political science 
investigation to include: (1) It makes government to adopt a new policy or enact a new law; (2) 
For the political researcher, every change in the governmental structure is the result of experiment; 
(3) It helps us to know the past and the present so that we can plan for the future; (4) It justifies 
goodness and badness of political actions; and (5) It enables us to determine common causes and 
effects by making a comparative study of the past and the existing political institutions. 
3.3 Methodological Approach to the Study 
In the adoption of a research design for this study, it would be appropriate to clarify the concepts 
of methods and methodology. Methodology is the study of methods to solve the research problem. 
It is the system of learning the way research should be performed systematically (Surbhi 2015). 
Methodology provides techniques for clarifying the theoretical meaning of concepts. It offers an 
array of methods for making causal inferences that provide insights into the causes and 
consequences of concepts (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady and Collier 2008). While causal inference is 
fundamental in political science, making good inferences depend entirely on adequate 
conceptualisation and measurement of the phenomenon under study (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady 
and Collier 2008). Research methodology is the crux of the research report. It forms the basis 
through which the reader assesses the findings and draws conclusions (Eneanya 2012). Through a 
step by step procedure, another researcher could replicate the study in other circumstances 
(Eneanya 2012).  
Research methodology comprises the description of the method of selecting subjects. This deals 
with the population and samples; description of the instrument used such as questionnaire, 
interview (structured or unstructured) and coding sheets for content analysis. Also, the procedure 
the researcher used in collecting and recording the data should be stated. 
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3.4 Research Design 
A research design refers to a blueprint that researcher adopts in order to provide answers to 
research questions. According to Yin (1998), research design ‘deals with a logical problem and 
not a logistical problem’. He stressed that the central role of research design is to minimise the 
chance of drawing incorrect causal inferences from data. In this study, the researcher did not only 
choose a research design that answered the research questions convincingly, but the researcher 
also looked for evidence that has the potential to express our preferred explanation. A research 
design serves as a guide for the researcher on how data would be collected and analysed. Research 
design is a plan that shows how one intends to study an empirical question (Johnson, Reynolds 
and Mycoff 2016). It indicates what specific theory or propositions will be tested, what the 
appropriate “units of analysis are for the tests, what measurements or observations are needed, 
how all this information will be collected, and which analytical and statistical procedures will be 
used to examine the data (Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff 2016)  
3.5 The Rationale for Qualitative Research Design 
There are two approaches that are central to research. These are quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. Quantitative approach entails data generation in quantitative form which can be 
subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis in a formal and rigid fashion (Kothari 2004). According 
to Onyene and Anumnu (1998) quantitative research is concerned with data analysis, the source 
of the data, method of data analysis and presentation. Once any research is empirical and also 
supported by genuine figures, it is grouped as a quantitative research. On the other hand, qualitative 
research applies the process of narrative and descriptive patterns. It surveys people’s opinions 
about an issue that the researcher attempts to address (Onyene and Anumnu 1998) 
In this study, a qualitative research design was used in order to collect data from the participants. 
Qualitative research method focuses on gathering of textual, visual and non-numerical data rather 
than measurements (Babbie 2014). Qualitative research is a scientific method of observation to 
gather non-numerical data (Babbie 2014). It focuses on the human element of the social and natural 
sciences (Given 2008).  
Qualitative approach is concerned with subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviour. 
In this case, research is a function of researcher’s insights and impressions. Such an approach 
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generates results either in non-quantitative form or in a form which are not subjected to rigorous 
quantitative analysis (Kothari 2004). The aim of this type of research is to discuss the underlying 
motives and desires, using in depth interviews for the purpose (Kothari 2004)  
Qualitative methods are best for researching many of the why and how questions of human 
experience in making decisions (Given 2008). The primary aim of qualitative research is to provide 
a complete detailed description of the research topic, to understand and interpret social 
interactions.  
The qualitative research method is descriptive, interpretive and the purpose is to give someone a 
mental picture of what the researcher is seeing (Wilmot 2011, p.1). According to Wilmot (2011, 
p.1), the qualitative research method aims to provide an in-depth understanding of the world as 
seen through the eyes of the people being studied. A Qualitative researcher believes in the 
understanding of a phenomenon or situation or event from exploring the totality of the situation. 
A popular method of qualitative research is the case study (Stake 1995). Qualitative research 
examines in-depth “purposive samples” to better understand a phenomenon (Yin 1989). 
Qualitative research is useful because it provides details about human behaviour, emotion, and 
personality characteristics. The researcher can document the observable behaviour of individuals 
and other information obtained in a natural sense of it. 
The study of the roles of actors at different levels of government vis-à-vis the constitutional 
provisions is better understood through an in-depth interaction with the key players. This would 
help us to uncover the trends of compliance of actors to constitutional provisions. With the research 
questions raised and the interpretive approach adopted, it would be appropriate to adopt qualitative 
methods in the collection of data.     
3.6 Case Study Design 
This is when a researcher examines one or a few cases of a phenomenon in considerable detail, 
typically using several data collection methods, such as personal interviews, document analysis, 
and observation (Skocpol 1979). As a sociologist, Theda Skocpol observes that this type of design 
involves “too many variables and not enough cases.” meaning that the investigator collects lots of 
data on one or a few units. A case study may be useful in assessing whether a statistical correlation 
between independent and dependent variables, discovered using a cross-sectional design with 
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survey data, is really causal (George 1979). By choosing a case in which the appropriate values of 
the independent and dependent variables are present, researchers can try to determine the timing 
of the introduction of the independent variable and how the independent variable actually caused 
the dependent variable (Page and Shapiro 1983). In case study, different data gathering technique 
can be used. These include questionnaire, interview, and observation (Omomia and Omomia 
2018). 
3.7 Research Methods  
Research methods are the methods employed by the researcher to conduct research (Surbhi 2016). 
It can be in form of questionnaire, survey, interview or observation. Research methods are the tools 
and techniques for doing research (Walliman 2011). They are range of tools that are used for 
different types of enquiry (Walliman 2011). The study adopts an interpretive research paradigm, 
based on the assumption that social reality is not singular or objective, but shaped by human 
experiences and social contexts, and is, situated within its socio-historic context by interpretations 
of its various participants (Giorgi and Giorgi 2003). The choice of interpretive research is due to 
the nature of the phenomenon under consideration. In other words, the subject matter of the 
research lies within the domain of human action and requires human experiences and their 
opinions. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to use the positivist research method, intended for 
theory testing. Thus, the outcome of the research would depend on the interpretive ability of the 
researcher to explain complex and social processes as presented by the interviewees (Giorgi and 
Giorgi 2003).  
In this study, descriptive research is adopted. Descriptive research examines existing conditions, 
practices and prevailing beliefs, points of view, attitudes and values (Ifeagwu 2012). Ifeagwu 
posited that “it is concerned with how, what is, or what exists, it is related to some preceding 
events, that is, how the past event affects present conditions”. The main feature of descriptive 
research is that it is able to identify characteristics of the event that is being observed. It is also 
capable of identifying the common relationship that may exist among two or more phenomena 
(Omomia and Omomia 2018). The main thrust of descriptive research is that data are collected in 
order to test the hypotheses and supply the answers to the research questions that are raised in the 
study under consideration (Omomia and Omomia 2018). This type of research is not interested in 
“establishing cause-and-effect relationship” (Adeyemo 2006). In this study, survey research as one 
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of the classifications of descriptive research is adopted due to the interviewing method of data 
collection used. According to Akinboye and Akinboye (1998),descriptive survey design allows the 
“researcher starts inductively from observation and carefully studies the existing attributes of a 
particular event in the real world”. The implication is that the researcher does not attempt to 
manipulate anything, but observes carefully the existing events, takes down information in their 
natural state as at when they occurred with regards to the study (Akinboye and Akinboye 1998).  
3.8 Population 
The target population of the study includes the legislators, politicians, opinion leaders, judicial 
officers, statesmen and the civil society organisations. The researcher is attracted to these 
categories of people in the society because they are relevant to the study, therefore, they would be 
able to provide answers to the research questions. Kahn and Best (1995) define population as “any 
group of individuals that have one or more characteristics in common that are of interest to the 
researcher”. Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff (2016) observe that the important thing about 
population is that it must be carefully and fully defined and that it must be relevant to the research 
questions. In this study, the target population would provide answers to the research questions. 
3.9 Sampling 
Since it was not possible for the researcher to interview every member of the target population in 
the course of the research, therefore, there was the need to select a “few” members of the 
population for further investigation. A sample is any subset of units collected in some manner from 
a population (Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff 2016). The sample size and how its members are 
chosen determine the quality i.e. the accuracy and reliability of inferences about the whole 
population. The important things to clarify are the method of selection and the number of 
observations to be drawn (Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff 2016).The advantages of taking a sample 
are often savings in time and money. Although, the information obtained based on a sample is 
usually less accurate or more subject to error than is information collected from the population 
(Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff 2016).  
3.10 Sampling Technique 
Sampling technique is that “statistical practice concerned with the selection of an unbiased or 
random subset of individual observations within a population of individuals, intended to yield 
some knowledge about the population of concern (Ifeaqwu 2012). On their part, Akinboye and 
Akinboye (1998), stated that, it is the “techniques for selecting samples from a particular 
population”. Nworgu (1991) defined sampling technique as, “a plan specifying how elements will 
be drawn from the population”. For the purpose of this study, the researcher has drawn his sample 
using purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling technique where the 
researcher handpicks the sample based on judgment, since they are typical of what he wants 
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(Omomia and Omomia 2018). The choice of purposive sampling technique was due to the fact that 
the study of intergovernmental relations is situated within the ambit of state actors, politicians, 
opinion leaders, and the civil society. These categories of informants would provide answers to 
the research questions raised.    
3.11 Sources of Data Collection 
In this study, both primary and secondary sources were used in the collection of data. Primary 
source refers to the first-hand information from either an eyewitnesses or original materials or 
documents (Omomia and Omomia 2018). Alagoa (1985) and Afigbo (1990) observe that primary 
sources are seen as reliable because the data generated present direct information from the 
participants or key witnesses, thus the possibility of distortion or exaggeration is removed. 
Secondary sources are the information collected from the “middleman” who passes information to 
the researcher. Secondary sources used in this study include texts, journals, internet materials, 
newspapers, magazines, quotations. The use of secondary source is to complement, enrich and 
validate the information collected through the primary sources. The major advantage of secondary 
source is that they act as a “bridge” in developing hypotheses from the various primary sources 
((Omomia and Omomia 2018). Although, information collected from secondary sources may 
suffer distortion, exaggeration or may not be well presented (Omomia and Omomia 2018). 
3.12 Data Collection Instrument 
The data for this study were collected from texts, journals, internet materials, newspapers, 
magazines, quotations. Also, interviews were the major research instrument to collect primary 
data. In-depth interviews were conducted with the key informants. It is a common practice for 
qualitative researchers to use face-to-face interviewing when conducting semi-structured and in-
depth interviews (Sturges and Hanrahan 2004). Social science has adopted the use of interviewing 
in research design to gather information from the respondents. Similarly, Kvale (1996) 
interestingly, points out that when events are not directly ‘observable’; talking to people would be 
one of the most effective methods for attaining and exploring such constructs.  
The purpose of an interview is to explore the views, experiences, belief and or motivations of 
individuals on specific matters (Silverman 2000). Interview, as a research instrument in qualitative 
study, offers the researchers the opportunity to uncover information that is “probably not 
accessible using techniques such as questionnaires and observations” (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight 
2006, p.172). Interviews are, therefore, most appropriate where there is little knowledge about the 
phenomenon, or where the researcher required detailed insights from the participants (Gill; 
Stewart; Treasure and Chadwick 2008). The use of interview allows questions that are relevant to 
the study to receive prompt and appropriate oral responses (Omomia and Omomia 2018). The 
major strength in receiving prompt and appropriate oral responses from the interviewee is that the 
interviewer is able to access useful information about the interviewee’s attitude, beliefs, values, 
and knowledge (Omomia and Omomia 2018). The study employed the use of semi-structured 
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interview, which allows depth to be achieved by providing the opportunity on the part of the 
interviewer to probe and expand the interviewee’s responses (Rubin and Rubin 2005, p.88).  
The researcher interviewed the key informants including Speakers and Deputy Speakers of the 
legislature, in two of the selected states, three members of the legislature, politicians and opinion 
leaders, in the selected states.  Other people interviewed were the two statesmen who were 
prominent politicians in the Second and Fourth Republics, a judicial officer in the Second Republic 
and a former Attorney-General and Minister of Justice.  
Aside from the members of the legislature, opinion leaders were also interviewed, to gain insights 
from their knowledge and wealth of experience over time as well as their closeness to their 
communities. Two of the four opinion leaders contacted declined for fear of being implicated, in 
spite of the ethical documents made available to them, which indicated that the research was purely 
for academic purpose. The other two opinion leaders gave deeper revelations about the nature of 
services provided by the government. The interview process, which was less formal, spurred the 
interviewees to supply adequate information about their communities and the services enjoyed. 
The Deputy Director, State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) in one of the selected states 
was also interviewed.  
Two top officials of the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP)6 were 
interviewed. The interview with the Deputy Director of SERAP enabled the researcher to elicit 
necessary information in the area of service delivery, which helped in the analysis of the study. He 
also gave insights into SERAP’s role in the activities of the Independent Corrupt Practices and 
other related Offenses (ICPC)7. Aside from the Deputy Director of SERAP, the Lead Partner of 
BudgIT8 was also interviewed.  
The need to validate the information obtained during the interview process spurred me to use 
Archival materials such as government publications, bulletin, official reports, and tax records. 
Such archival materials allow cross-fertilization of information and complemented the information 
                                                          
6 SERAP is a non-governmental organization dedicated to strengthening the socio-economic welfare of Nigerians by 
combatting corruption and promoting transparency and accountability. 
7 The ICPC is an anti-corruption agency that investigates all the allegations of corruption against public officials and 
prosecutes. 
8 Budgit is involved in campaigning to get more transparency in oil and gas industry.  
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gathered from the participants (Jimerson 2002). Jimerson (2002) points out that the essential 
purpose of archival description is to know what is available so that researchers can find it when 
they need it. Description of archival records according to him is the process of analysing, 
organising and recording information that serves to identify, manage and explain the holdings of 
archives repositories (Jimerson 2002). 
The quality of data collected through the interviewing process was due to the key informants who 
were actors of intergovernmental relations in the Second and the Fourth Republics, Therefore, the 
interviewees were able to share information that was useful to answer the research questions.  
3.13 Data Analysis 
Data obtained were analysed qualitatively using content analysis. Content analysis is one of the 
most common methods to analyse qualitative data (Berg 2004; Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Content 
analysis involves in-depth examination and description of what the object that is been studied 
contains. The necessary information for content analysis could be accessed from documents, texts, 
photographs, arts, music (Omomia and Omomia 2018). 
Qualitative data analysis refers to the processes and procedures that are used to analyse data and 
provide some level of explanation, understanding, or interpretation (Berg and Lune 2004). 
Researchers regard content analysis as a flexible method for analysing text data (Cavanagh 1997). 
Content analysis describes a family of analytic approaches ranging from impressionistic, intuitive, 
interpretive analyses to systemic, strict textual analyses (Rosengren 1981). The specific type of 
content analysis approach chosen by a researcher varies with the theoretical and substantive 
interests of the researcher and the problem being studied (Weber 1990). Research using qualitative 
content analysis focuses on the characteristics of language as communication with attention to the 
content or contextual meaning of the text (Budd, Thorp and Donohew 1967; Lindkvist 1981; 
McTavish and Pirro 1990; Tesch 1990). Text data might be in verbal, print, or electronic form and 
might have been obtained from narrative responses, open-ended survey questions, interviews, 
focus groups, observations, or print media such as articles, books, or manuals (Kondracki and 
Wellman 2002). According to Nueman (2000: 292) “content analysis involves gathering and 
analysing of the content of the text, language, words, phrases and symbols. Content analysis is 
used to analyse and interpret verbal data or behavioural data (Berg and Lune 2004). The data 
obtained from the primary and secondary sources are analysed using content analysis.  
Furthermore, the study employs a narrative approach to analyse information obtained from the key 
informants. Narrative analysis is used to analyse text that may come from variety of sources 
including transcripts from interviews, field notes, surveys and other written forms (Leech and 
Onwuegbuzie 2007). It involves reformulating stories presented by people in different context and 
based on their different experiences (Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2007). 
69 
 
3.14 Validity  
The quality of research is measured in its validity. Validity forms an important part of research in 
order to determine whether the research instrument measured what it is supposed to measure. 
Validity refers to the degree of correspondence between the measure and the concept it is thought 
to measure (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Validity involves the relationship between the 
measurement of a concept and the actual presence or amount of the concept itself (Johnson, 
Reynolds and Mycoff 2016). 
Validity has become an essential issue for assessment and for measurement (Gregory, 2000; Linn, 
1998; Mahoney, 2008; Gayand Airasian, 2003; Sullivan, Karisson and Ware, 1995). In this study, 
triangulation method was used to validate the information obtained from various methods. 
Triangulation refers to the combination of two or more data sources, investigators, methodological 
approaches, and theoretical perspectives (Denzin 1970; Kimchi, Polivka and Stevenson 1991). The 
purpose is to capture different dimensions of the same phenomenon (Ambad and Kulkarni 
2013).The study obtained data from both primary and secondary sources. Furthermore, the study 
uses triangulation by conducting interviews with different stakeholders. The stakeholders were the 
legislators, politicians, opinion leaders, and civil society organisations. The selection of the key 
informants with different backgrounds and wealth of experience allows for diverse opinions on 
issues of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Second and the Fourth Republics. The selection 
of the key informants provides for cross fertilisation of ideas which increases the validity of the 
study. Similarly, the study makes use of reports, government documents, and bulletin to 
complement the information obtained through the interviews.     
 
 
3.15 Summary 
In this chapter, the researcher discussed the research methodology adopted for the study. Through 
the adoption of qualitative research design, data for the study were collected through primary and 
secondary sources. Data obtained were analysed qualitatively and the use of content analysis was 
employed to interpret and analyse verbal information obtained from the key informants. Samples 
were drawn from the target population. Purposive sampling technique was adopted to draw sample 
from the target population such as the legislators, politicians, opinion leaders, and the civil society. 
The research instrument used to collect primary data was interview. The use of interview 
complements the data obtained from the secondary source. The validity of the study was based on 
the key informants that were purposively selected for the interview process. The next chapter 
focuses on the contextual and theoretical framework for the study. 
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                                                     Chapter Four 
 
Structure and Authority in the Nigerian Intergovernmental Relationships: Contextual and 
Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
A study of the nature of contemporary intergovernmental relations requires an analysis of the 
authority structure of different political actors that are saddled with different constitutional 
responsibilities as provided in the constitution. Such constitutional provisions delineate a clear 
function of the levels of government. In other words, each level of government has an assigned 
role. In spite of the independent roles of the levels of government, vertical and horizontal 
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interactions exist among the levels of government, therefore, encouraging cooperation rather than 
competition among the levels of government (Van der Waldt and Du Toit 1997).  
The structure of the political system determines the nature of interactions of the political actors at 
different levels of government. According to Fagbadebo (2016, p.103), institutions are key factors 
that define the nature of the society in relation to the exercise of power and authority for the 
promotion of the welfare of the citizens. Sharing of governmental powers involve negotiations, 
bargaining, and compromise among the political actors at the levels of government (Wanyande 
2001). Negotiation and bargaining among the levels of government encourage interaction and 
cooperation among the actors, which the co-ordinate-authority model helps us to adequately 
explain the nature of the relationship among the state actors (Wanyande 2001).    
In this chapter, the researcher used some theories to explain the structure and authority 
relationships among the levels of government in Nigerian federalism with a focus on the Second 
and the Fourth Republics. A single model is not adequate to explain the nature of 
intergovernmental relations in Nigerian polity. This is due to the fact that constitutional 
framework, on the one hand, defines the autonomous nature of the levels of government, while on 
the other hand, the financial incapacitation of the subnational levels of government encouraged 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. The research study  adopted a hybrid of Coordinate-Authority 
model and the Overlapping-Authority model to explain the authority structure and the interplay 
that exist among the political actors at different levels of government in the Second and the Fourth 
Republics.   
4.2 Coordinate-Authority Model 
The major proponent of Overlapping Authority model and Coordinate-Authority model is Deil D. 
Wright (1978, pp.20-29). Other notable scholars that have their works in these models include 
William Anderson (1960), Morton Grodzins (1960), and Daniel Elazar (1962) amongst others. 
Wright depicts that the national government and the subnational units are “independent and 
autonomous” entities. The two levels of government are separated by clearly defined boundaries 
of authority within which each government has absolute sovereignty (Wright 1978). He observes 
that when the respective spheres of action put the national government and the state in conflict, 
they cease to be tangential. In such a case, the Supreme Court in U.S. becomes the arbiter of 
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national or state relations (Wright 1985).  Grodzins (1960) regarded this model as a description of 
American federalism, with his famous analogy of a layered cake, where a distinct and separate 
layer within the cake represents the authorities of each level of government.   
 
The Coordinate-Authority model posits that the central and the state governments have distinct 
constitutional jurisdictions while the local governments are dependent on the state governments 
(Muhammed 2006, p.55). The implication of this is that both the central and the state governments 
are independent within their spheres of jurisdiction (Muhammed 2006). The coordinate authority 
model, according to Ayoade (2005), defines a peripheralised, weak or decentralised federalism, 
reminiscent of the state-centred variant of the Jeffersonian school of thought (Ayoade 2005). The 
centre is weak to strengthen the periphery just as in the early days of the American union (Obianyo 
2005). This model conforms to K. C. Wheare’s principles of federalism that affirm the dual nature 
of federalism rather than the tripartite nature of federalism introduced in Nigerian 1979 and 1999 
constitutions.   
 
The main element in the coordinate-authority model is the autonomous power granted to the 
central and the state governments in such a way that the two levels of government are linked 
tangentially such that no one level of government intrudes on the other (Muhammed 2006). By 
constitutional design, the central and the state governments have certain roles to perform 
independently. The assertion of Dudley about the subordination and agency status of the local 
governments to the state government was given legal pronouncement by Dillion (cited in Dudley 
1968). Dillion notes that: 
It must be taken for settled law, that a municipal corporation possesses and can 
exercise the following powers and no other. First, those granted in express words; 
second, those necessarily implied or necessarily in advent to the powers expressly 
granted, third, those absolutely essential to the declared objects and purposes of the 
corporation not simply convenient, but indispensable, and fourth, any fair doubts 
as to the existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the corporation (cited 
in Dudley 1968).   
 
In terms of federal-state relationships, Akinsanya (2005) observes that the coordinate-authority 
model lays emphasis on the independent and autonomous nature of the central and the state 
governments. The Tarbel’s case (1871), reinforced by the U.S Supreme Court’s decision in 
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National League of Cities V. Usery (1976), embodied this development. The court ruled that the 
U.S Congress did not have the authority requiring states or their local governments to observe 
minimum wage and minimum hour laws. Additionally, the court declared that the federal 
legislation violated the “attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may 
be impaired by the Congress” (Usman and Erunke 2012, p.167). 
 The major criticism of the coordinate-authority model, according to Akinsanya (2005), is the lack 
of socio-political conditions for a stable IGR, a defect that made it inappropriate and undesirable. 
In this case, the complex nature of modern society has made the model become inadequate in 
intergovernmental relations. This is mainly because the two levels of government exercise 
restricted powers within their jurisdictions and act independently without any form of interference. 
Scholars have argued that the development of modern government would be retarded when the 
levels of government act independently, without any interference from any other levels (Olowu 
and Ayo 2001).  
However, the Coordinate-Authority model is found useful because it provides clear boundaries 
between the authority of the subnational and national jurisdiction and shows a seamless 
intergovernmental connection (Wright 1985). The model also helps to understand the tangential 
relationships between the federal and state governments (Muhammed 2006). The coordinate-
Authority model is applicable to the Nigerian Second and the Fourth Republics because federal-
state-local relations is such that power is dispersed between the three levels of government, 
therefore, ensuring that each tier of government had some measure of autonomy within their areas 
of jurisdiction. In the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, the central and the state governments have 
delineated boundaries and functions. The implication of this is that the two levels of governments 
(central and state) have autonomous powers within their areas of jurisdictions. However, the local 
governments are within the confine and dependent on the state governments.   
4.3 Overlapping-Authority Model 
A variant of Co-ordinate-Authority model is the Overlapping-Authority model. Overlapping-
Authority model was first used in the 1970s during the administration of the U.S. President, 
Richard Nixon, to innovate and decentralise decision-making in categorical grant-in-aid 
programmes (Wright 1985, p.59). Overlapping-Authority, as popularised by Wright (1988, p.37), 
was used to include a range of activities and meanings that are neither explicit nor implicit in 
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federalism. These actions include complex multi-unit interactions beyond nation-state 
relationships. This model argues that the two or three levels of government are regarded as equal 
before the law.  
Overlapping-Authority model allows for interdependence and bargaining among the levels of 
government (Usman and Erunke 2012). Akinsanya (2005) has identified three basic characteristics 
of this model. These are: (1) Substantial areas of government operations involve federal, state and 
local units simultaneously; (2) The area of autonomy and full discretion are comparatively small. 
(3) The power and influence available to anyone jurisdiction (official) are significantly small. 
 
The Constitution and the Parliament usually delineate and regulate the activities of all the levels 
of government. In addition, there is an inbuilt cooperation and understanding among the various 
levels of government, such that another tier can perform the functions of other tier of government 
on its behalf (Bello-Imam 1996, p.93). Wright (1978) observes that overlapping-authority model 
assumes that states only exercise those authorities either that have been given them by the national 
government, or for which they have bargained from the national government.  
 
Wright (1978) argues that states do have the constitutional freedom to create their own separate 
programme involving an issue or resource that is not subject to national government approval even 
when the national government has a similar programme to address that same issue or resource. In 
his analysis of intergovernmental relations, Wright uses a Venn diagram to describe the 
interactions between the levels of government. The overlay among the circles conveys three 
characteristics of the model. First, it presents a set of overlaps between national, state and local 
units simultaneously. Second, the areas of autonomy or single-jurisdiction independence and full 
discretion are comparatively small. Third, the power and influence available to anyone level are 
significantly limited (Wright 1978). 
Figure 1 below shows Venn diagram which Wright used to explain the nature of interactions 
among the national, state and local governments. In this model, there is overlapping relationships 
among the levels of government. Also, it presented the relationships where the autonomy and 
discretion in a single jurisdiction are constrained, thereby limiting the power and influence 
available to any one level of government (Wright 1988, p.40). Aside from this, Wright emphasised 
the role of bargaining between actors (Burke 2014).  
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Figure 1: Models of national, state and local relationships.  
Source: Wright 1988: 40 
 
 
Wright (1988, p.49) identifies the major characteristics of Overlapping-Authority. These include 
(1) limited and dispersed power; (2) interdependence; (3) limited areas of autonomy; (4) 
bargaining-exchange relationships; and (5) cooperation and competition. According to Wright, the 
limits produce an authority pattern best described as bargaining. Bargaining takes place between 
the national government and the subnational units where the national government offers several 
assistance programmes to states and localities in exchange for their agreement to implement a 
programme, carry out a project or pursue any one of a wide variety of activities.  
 
76 
 
As part of the agreement, the recipient must usually agree to conditions, such as; the provision of 
matching funds and the satisfaction of accounting, reporting, auditing, and performance 
requirement (Eneanya 2012). Contacts and exchanges between national, states and local officials 
may be cooperative or competitive; the determining factors include the policy issue, the status of 
the officials, the partisan leanings of participants, and the constituency being represented (Eneanya 
2012). Grodzins (1960, p.265) introduces his well-known “marble cake” federalism imagery, 
describing the inseparable mingling of functions throughout the system, where sharing of functions 
goes far beyond the more visible grant-in-aid to include regulations and standards, sharing of 
expertise, and most importantly state and local responsibilities in the development of programmes. 
 
One of the criticisms of overlapping-authority model is that its analysis has a clear bias in the 
direction of cooperation and negotiated agreement. This is not true of the Nigerian situation; rather 
than encouraging co-operation among the levels of government, often, there was unhealthy rivalry 
between the central and the state governments on one hand, and between the state and the local 
governments on the other hand (Usman and Erunke 2012). The central government has used 
concurrent issues to usurp the powers of the state and ensures that power is tilted to the centre 
(Usman and Erunke 2012). In spite of the criticism of Overlapping-Authority model, its relevance 
to the working of modern government cannot be over-emphasised, given the networks of activities 
that are inevitable. The three C’s of Consultation, Cooperation, and Coordination in 
intergovernmental relations have become daunting due to the complexity in the modern 
government which has grown beyond the maintenance of law and order to include efficient and 
effective service delivery (Hague and Harrop 1982, p.182). 
 
Hague and Harrop (1982, p.182) argue that the ‘task of coordination becomes more difficult not 
just because the government is bigger but also because the issue has grown more complex’. The 
overlapping-authority model has been found to be useful in the analysis of intergovernmental 
relations in the modern society, characterised by complex nature and expanded federal-state-local 
relations programmes.  It has moved the field beyond the quotient of actors, broaden the venues 
of decision-making, and allowed networks and collaborating activity, thereby increasing 
performance concerns with third party involvement (Wright 1985). The model also allowed for 
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the transfer of resources across governmental boundaries and reflected interdependency that 
pervaded intergovernmental relations (Wright 1985). 
 
Overlapping-Authority model fits into the Nigerian intergovernmental relations in the Second and 
Fourth Republics because the actors of IGR perform multidimensional functions. Ibok and Ntekim 
(2014) observe that virtually all the tiers of government are involved in all governmental activities.  
In the provision of welfare and infrastructural facilities, the different levels of government inter-
relate in the pursuit of certain programmes of development. Such programmes like Universal Basic 
Education (UBE) and the Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI) are jointly performed by 
the three levels of government. Similarly, the federal government announcement of the federal 
minimum wage of N7500 per month and N5500 for the states without due consultation with the 
states is an indication of the intermingling of functions (Vanguard, 4 May 2000, p.2). 
Several government agencies were also set up to improve IGR. For example, the Independent 
Corrupt Practice Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) 
are to investigate any erring official that is found wanting in the discharge of his or her duties. The 
activities of these agencies are in most cases within the jurisdiction of the executive arm of 
government. 
A hybrid of Coordinate-Authority model and Overlapping-Authority model adopted in this study 
presents two dimensions of authority relationships among the levels of government in Nigeria. At 
one extreme is the clear delineation of powers and responsibilities to the levels of government, 
with each level constitutionally empowers to perform distinct functions within its sphere of 
jurisdiction. At the other extreme is the interaction that takes place among the levels of government 
in order to allow for cooperation and efficiency among the levels of government.  
 
For example, Part 2, Second Schedule of the 1979 constitution and the amended 1999 constitution, 
specifies the concurrent list where both the federal and the state governments can legislate. 
Subjects under the concurrent list are areas where the central and the state governments can interact 
and jointly make policy decisions.  The constitution states that the federal legislation supersedes 
that of the state in matters under concurrent lists, except in specific situations of breaches of the 
rules. Similarly, the Fourth Schedule contains the exclusive functions of the local government as 
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well as participatory state/local government functions (The Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1999).  
 
The two models express the types of authority relationships that can exist between political entities, 
i.e. dominant authority (hierarchy), and equal authority (bargaining). The hybridisation of the two 
models would help us to explore and ascertain the model that best fits the present Nigerian political 
system. The above analysis indicates both the autonomous nature of the levels of government and 
the areas of the intermingling of functions of the levels of government. Thus, Wright’s model of 
intergovernmental relations has not only become relevant but also laid the foundation for the 
development of intergovernmental relations and provided the conceptual basis for moving beyond 
the static views of intergovernmental relations.  
However, the theoretical framework could not cater for the divergence that exists between the 
constitutional provisions and the actual practice. The reason was due to the attitude and behaviours 
of the political actors. The nature of divergence takes the form of flagrant disregard to 
constitutional provisions by the federal and state governments. For example, the federal 
government announced the minimum wage for the states without due consultation with the latter. 
Also, some states like Lagos, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Enugu, Ebonyi and Katsina did not follow the 
due process in the creation of additional local governments. Lagos state government did not seek 
the ratification of National Assembly in the creation of additional local governments.  
Furthermore, divergence existed in the implementation of revenue allocation formula. The 
administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo failed to implement the derivation principle as at 
May 29, 1999 when the principle took effect. Derivation principle was the principle of sharing 
revenue that granted 13 percent of the federation account to the oil producing states. Similarly, 
states have continued to encroach on what supposed to be the exclusive right of the local 
governments. For example, the “State Joint Local Governments Account” was often abused by the 
state governments.  
Finally, most state governments preferred to appoint caretaker committees or administrators to 
replace the elected officials. Therefore, this research work would fill the lacuna that has been 
created.   
 
4.4   Changing Pattern of Fiscal Relations in IGR in Nigeria 
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The changing pattern of federal structure in Nigeria in such areas like allocation of powers to the 
levels of government, and the sharing of federation revenue has serious implications on fiscal 
capability of the constituent units and service delivery. The performance of the assigned 
responsibilities of the constituent units is a function of effective use of resources and the available 
revenues (Fajana 1994, p. 105). Aside from this, the fiscal relations among the levels of 
government is important because there is the need to maintain fiscal balance among the three levels 
of government in order to allow each level has adequate resources to carry out its assigned 
responsibilities.  The working of federalism depends on the efficient and effective fiscal relations 
among the tiers of government. In the words of Fajana (1994), the stability and smooth running of 
a federal set-up depend largely on how well it was able to deal with the problem of the financial 
relations between the constituent units. 
The structure of fiscal federalism in Nigeria, over the years, had engendered underdevelopment at 
the subnational levels of government due to revenue allocation that was tilted towards the centre 
and low revenue raising capacities of the constituent units. In addition, the hierarchical structure 
of the military and its long years of centralised fiscal structure, which tilted more powers and 
revenue to the central government, has generated crisis in intergovernmental fiscal relations 
(Elaigwu 2005, p. 243).     
This has also affected the fiscal capacity of the constituent units. There have been different 
principles on revenue allocation formula in Nigeria. During the Colonial era, government set up 
three Commissions on revenue allocation (Adesina 1998). The Phillipson Commission (1946 and 
1951) was to determine the allocation of national revenue in the three regions of the West, East 
and the North; with the adoption of the principles of derivation and even development (Phillipson 
Commission 1946)..  
In the post-colonial period, three Revenue Allocation Commissions that were established include 
the Raisman (1958), Binns (1964) and Dina (1968) Commissions (Ayua 2001, p.6). These 
commissions operated between 1965 and 1969 with the adoption of allocation criteria such as 
continuity of existing levels of service; basic responsibility of each regional government; 
population; balanced development and derivation (Ayua 2001, p.6). The Raisman Commission 
(1959-1964), introduced the principles of derivation, fiscal autonomy and need as the criteria for 
revenue allocation (Ayua 2001, p. 6). The recommendation of the Raisman Commission was that 
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mineral producing regions should have a lion share of the revenue accruing from the mineral 
wealth. In addition, the Raisman Commission allocation formula was 50 percent to the region of 
origin, 20 percent to the Federal Government and 30 percent to the Distributive Pool Account 
(DPA) in which the state of origin also shared along with keeping personal income tax and 
receiving export duty proceeds on their produce (Ayua 2001, p. 136). 
 With the incursion of the military in politics in 1966 and the subsequent states creation exercise, 
revenue allocation took a new dimension. The Federal Government adopted the option of 
transferring some responsibilities formerly assigned to the states to the centre (Khemani 2001). 
With the adoption of federalism in Nigeria in 1954, the regions had control over mining rents, 
personal income tax and receipts from licenses (Khemani 2001). During this period, centrally 
collected revenues from export, import, and excise duties were distributed to the regions (Khemani 
2001).  
Section 4 Second Schedule of the 1999 constitution (as amended) has made customs and excise 
duties, mines and minerals, taxation of incomes, profits and capital gains to be the exclusive 
functions of the central government (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
Similarly, education and health that used to be the exclusive functions of the subnational units 
have been included in the concurrent legislative list (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999). This situation has reduced the fiscal capacity of the states and increased the states’ 
dependence on the centre. Under the 1970 Decree No. 13, revenue sharing formula for mining, 
rents and royalties was 50 percent to the Distributive Pool Account (DPA), 45 percent to the state 
of derivation and 5 percent to the Federal Government (Ayua 2001, p. 138).  
The financial capacity of the federal government vis-à-vis the states was further strengthened 
through excise duties on tobacco, export duties, import duties (Oyovbaire 1978, p. 254). In 
addition, the federal government took 100 percent of the offshore revenues, which robbed the oil 
producing states of derivation principle (Oyovbaire 1978, p. 254). To enhance the financial 
capability of the federal government at the detriment of the constituent units, the federal military 
government, in 1973, abolished the states ownership and control of Marketing Boards9. 
                                                          
9 Williams, C. 1985. Marketing Board originated in the Second World War and were perpetuated after the war by a 
Labour government so that they might play their part on in meeting British needs. The colonial government to 
resuscitate the economy of Britain and to develop the British African territories of which Nigeria was one established 
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Consequently, government abolished the 100 percent export taxes allocated to the state 
government, but the collection and retention of personal income tax receipts remained under state 
jurisdiction (Ayua 2001, p. 138). 
The Constitutional allocation of revenue between the federal and the constituent units was 
contained in Sections 162-168, Paragraph 11 in the Second Schedule of the 1999 constitution. 
Section 162 (1) provided that the creation of “the Federation Account” into which shall be paid all 
revenues collected by the Government of the Federation. These revenues excluded the proceeds 
from the personal income tax of the personnel of the armed forces of the Federation, the Nigeria 
Police Force, the Ministry or Department of government charged with responsibility for Foreign 
Affairs and the residents of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Section 153 subsection (1) of the 
Constitution established the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) 
to monitor the accruals to and disbursement of the revenues from the Federation Account. The 
Commission also had the power to conduct periodic review of the revenue allocation formulae and 
principles in operation to ensure conformity with changing realities (The Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The RMAFC was expected to advice the President on the 
revenue allocation formula before the latter presented it to the National Assembly for consideration 
based on the prescribed principles of population, equality of States, land mass etc (The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
Another dimension of fiscal federalism in Nigeria is the taxation powers of the levels of 
government. The federal and the state governments have exclusive powers to generate funds 
through taxation as prescribed by the constitution. Although, the constitution granted the federal 
government enormous tax powers than the constituent units, there is no concurrent power to 
generate funds through taxes. According to section 44(3) of the 1999 constitution, taxes such as 
corporate income taxes, customs and excise duties, export duties, stamp duties, and taxes in respect 
of mineral oils and natural gas are the exclusive reserve of the federal government (The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
                                                          
it. In 1954, Nigeria’s Commodity Marketing Boards were regionalized as regional marketing boards, providing a fiscal 
base for the politicians to whom control of the new regional governments was now devolved. They used them to pay 
for schools and roads, to fund their private business activities and to pay for the electioneering campaigns of their 
political parties.  
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Constitutionally, local governments have limited taxation powers as contained in Section 7, Fourth 
Schedule of 1999 Constitution. Such powers, among others, include motor park duties, property 
taxes, market fees, fees from licensing of bicycles, trucks.10 Section 164 (1) of the 1999 
constitution provided that the Federation may make grants to a State to supplement the revenue of 
that State in such sum and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the 
National Assembly (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Such federal 
grants-in-aid are to bridge the gap in the provision of services to the people of different states.  
4.5 Features of Federalism in Nigeria’s Second Republic (1979-1983) and the Fourth       
Republic (1999-2007): A Comparative Analysis 
One of the features of Nigerian Federalism in the Second Republic was the adoption of a written 
constitution. A constitution is a document having a special legal sanctity, which sets out the 
framework and the principal functions of the organs of the government within the state and 
declares the principles by which those organs must operate (Bradlay and Ewing 1997, p.4). The 
constitution is a political and legal document that spells out the form and scope of the powers of 
the state (Bradlay and Ewing 1997, p.4). In practical terms, a constitution, defines the territory and 
population to which it applies and prescribes the sovereign power in the state. It also defines the 
mode, powers and functions of government; and   establishes the organs of the government. A 
constitution defines the nature, powers and functions of government, as well as the relationships 
among them, and determines the obligations and rights of citizens and the relationships among the 
state, government, civil society, and citizens (Alemeka 2000).  
According to Nwabueze, it was expected that national or regional government under federalism 
should have separate constitutions each. This was the case in the older federations such as the 
United States of America, Australia, and Nigeria in the First Republic (Nwabueze 2004). The 
separateness and independence of each government imply that the division of powers between 
them are embodied in a written constitution (Nwabueze 2004).  One of the respondents considered 
the federal arrangement of the Second Republic, where the levels of government had a single 
constitution, as a negation of the principle of true federalism (Personal Interview VII, June 4, 
                                                          
10 Paragraph D, Part 11, Second Schedule of the Constitution empowers the National Assembly to exercise its powers 
to impose certain specified taxes or duties, to provide that the collection of such taxes or duties be “carried out by the 
Government of a State or other authority of a State”, with a provision that such taxes or duties not be levied on the 
same person by more than one state. See also Section 165. 
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2018). He observed further that each level of government was supposed to have a separate 
constitution, as it was the case with the First Republic (Personal Interview VII, June 4, 2018). 
The law that established Nigeria as a federation was contained in Part 1 Section (2) subsection 2 
of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which stated that Nigeria should be a 
Federation consisting of States and a Federal Capital Territory. The 1979 constitution provided a 
nineteen (19) state-federal structure. The nineteen states federal structure as contained in the 
constitution specified the Capital City and the Local Government areas of each state. According 
to Part 1, Section 3 subsection 2, each State of Nigeria named in the first column of Part 1 of the 
First Schedule to this Constitution shall consist of the area shown opposite thereto in the second 
column of that Schedule (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979). 
Furthermore, the federal structure in the Second Republic did not specify the number of local 
government areas in the federation but rather listed the local government areas in each state and 
the State’s Headquarters (First Schedule, Part 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1979). Constitutional division of powers characterised Nigerian federalism during the 
Second Republic. In this case, there were two legislative lists, the Exclusive legislative list11 , and 
the Concurrent legislative list12. The Exclusive legislative lists were areas that the central 
government has reserved powers. The Concurrent list contained a list of functions that both the 
federal and state governments could legislate.  Under the Concurrent list, the constitution provided 
that whenever there was conflict between the federal and the state on issues of concurrent list, the 
laws of the federal must prevail over the laws of the state (The Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1979).  
The 1979 Constitutional provisions relating to the division of powers among the three levels of 
government were contained in Chapter 1 Part 11 Section 4 subsection 1-7 and Section 7.  
Section 4 subsection 1-7 stated that: 
                                                          
11 Section 4, Second Schedule Part 1 of the 1979 Constitution contained the Exclusive legislative lists. Exclusive 
legislative lists are legislative powers reserved for the central government. 
12 Section 4, Second Schedule Part 11 of the 1979 Constitution specified the Concurrent legislative lists. Concurrent 
legislative lists are powers granted to both the federal and state governments to act on. The Constitution provides that 
if there is any conflict between the federal and the state governments on matters of concurrent functions, the federal 
law must prevail over the state law. 
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The legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be vested in a 
National Assembly who has the power to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of the country. The National Assembly power shall prevail over the 
State House of Assembly on Concurrent matters. Similarly, the legislative powers 
of a State of the Federation shall be vested in the House of Assembly of the State 
(The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979). 
In line with the above constitutional provisions, the Second Schedule Part 1 of the 1979 
Constitution listed 66 items in the Exclusive legislative list as the reserved powers of the central 
government and 28 items in the Concurrent legislative list as areas of jurisdiction of the both the 
central and the state governments. This is the evidence that federal structure during the Second 
Republic tilted powers to the federal government while the subnational units were empowered 
with lesser powers (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979). 
According to the interview the researcher had with a legislative member in one of the selected 
states, the interviewee observed that federalism gave too much powers to the centre, to the extent 
that if not checked, would completely ground to a halt the other tiers of government (Personal 
Interview VIII, June 19, 2018). In a similar dimension, another legislative member observed that 
most of the powers under the Concurrent legislative list were domiciled at the centre, leaving the 
subnational levels of government with powers that the central government could revise easily 
(Personal Interview VII, June 4, 2018).  
Part 11 Section 7 of the 1979 Constitution stipulated the local government system. According to 
Section 7: 
The system of local government by democratically elected local government 
councils is under this Constitution guaranteed; and accordingly, the Government of 
every State shall, subject to section 8 of this Constitution, ensure their existence 
under a Law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance, 
and functions of such councils (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1979). 
Local government council during the Second Republic was the creation of the state government. 
The implication of this was that local government councils were not constitutionally granted 
autonomy. This was contrary to the principle of federalism postulated by K.C. Wheare, which 
stressed that each level of government would be coordinate within its area of jurisdiction (Wheare 
1964). 
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Another feature of federalism in the Second Republic was the presence of the Supreme Court that 
exercises judicial powers. According to Part 11 Section 6 subsection 1-6 of the 1979 Constitution, 
the judicial power was vested in the courts of law, to arbitrate disputes between persons, or between 
government and authority and to any person in Nigeria (The Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, 1979). 
The judiciary, by implication, is the organ of government, saddled with the responsibility of 
adjudication and settlement of disputes among the levels of government. It vested the judicial 
powers of the federation in the courts established therein for the federation. It also vested the 
judicial powers of a state in the courts established therein for the state (Bello 2014). The Nigerian 
courts13 have, checked both the Executive and the legislature, in many cases, from exceeding the 
constitutional powers. For example, the Attorney General Ondo State Vs Attorney General of the 
Federation and 35 others14 the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional, null and void, Sect. 
26 (3) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 prescribed that the 
prosecution of an offense be concluded, and judgment delivered within 90 working days of 
commencement of the prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the section infringed on the 
principle of separation of powers, as it was a direct interference on the powers of the judiciary by 
the National Assembly as to when the court should conclude particular matters.15 Another example 
was the case of the Attorney General of Lagos State Vs Attorney General of the Federation16. The 
same Supreme Court observed  
Nigeria is a federation and operates a federal constitution. An important attribute 
of a federal constitution is that there is a division of power between the centre and 
the states. The powers and roles given to each of the governments are defined and 
set out in the constitution. None of the government is allowed to step out its 
assigned field. If it does, whether it does outside its assigned field will be 
unconstitutional and will be declared null and void by the court.”17  
Thus, the court of law has become the body that settles disputes among individuals, between 
individuals and government, among the levels of government in a federal system. In an interview 
                                                          
13 What this means is that the judiciary has been vested with the power to ensure due observance of the constitution 
and that the judiciary has the power to pronounce on non-compliance by any of the governments of the federation. 
14 2002 9 NWLR, Pt. 772, p.222 
15 2002 9 NWLR, PP. 473-479 
16 2002 9 NWLR, P. 905 paragraph H 
17 2009 9 NWLR, p. 905 paragraph H 
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with one of the key informants who happened to be the Second Republic Minister of Justice, he 
remarked that any pronouncement of the constitution must be obeyed. The erstwhile Minister of 
Justice described African countries as the least obedient to the rule of law. To him, the Supreme 
Court is the final arbiter of law (Personal Interview IV, November 29, 2017). 
In addition, the levels of government in a federation had some measures of financial self-
sufficiency. In view of this, the constitution empowered the National Assembly to prescribe the 
distribution of revenue among the levels of government through the Federation Account subject to 
the recommendation of RMAFC. The Federation Account replaced the Distributable Pool Account 
(DPA) that was in use in the First Republic. The Federal Account was to constitute of all revenues 
collected by the federal government. This was specified in section 149 of the 1979 constitution. 
According to this section: 
The Federation shall maintain a special account to be called “the Federation 
Account” into which shall be paid all revenue collected by the government of the 
federation, except the proceeds from the personal income tax of the personnel of 
the armed forces of the federation, the Nigerian police force, the ministry or 
department of government charged with responsibility for external affair and the 
residents of the federal capital territory” (The Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1979). 
Section 149 subsections 2-7 further stated that: 
This section presents the distribution of federal revenue among the levels of 
government in accordance with the prescription of the National Assembly. The 
amount standing to the credit of the State Governments shall be distributed among 
the states in the manner prescribed by the National Assembly. Each State shall 
maintain “State Joint Local Government Account” into which shall be paid all 
allocations to the local government councils (The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1979).    
The implication is that the amount that would be available to the federal government as 
independent or exclusive revenue are those arising from income tax of the military, police, external 
affairs, workers and the residents of the FCT. All other federally collected revenue was to be paid 
into the Federation Account and shared between the central, state and local governments based on 
a formula to be approved by the National Assembly (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1979). 
87 
 
 Okigbo (1987, p. 207) observed that the Second Republic fiscal relations and structure put the 
states at an advantage because it gave them independent revenue from Personal income tax, stamp 
duties, and profit taxes, in addition to their share of the Federation Account. The federal 
government, on the other hand, depends almost wholly only on its share of the Federation Account. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the areas of independent revenue allowed the states are 
insignificant, considering the size of the states (Okigbo 1987, p. 27). 
Federalism during the Fourth Republic has thirty-six States structure, a Federal Capital Territory 
and seven hundred and sixty-eight local government areas (The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999). Chapter 1, Part 1 Section 2-6 stated: 
Nigeria shall be a Federation consisting of thirty-six States, a Federal Capital 
Territory, seven hundred and sixty-eight local government areas and six area 
councils as shown in Part 11 of that Schedule (The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
The 1999 Constitution provided for two legislative lists: the Exclusive legislative list and the 
Concurrent Legislative list. The Exclusive legislative list has 68 items while the Concurrent 
legislative list has 30 items (Part 1 and Part 11 Second Schedule of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999). The legislative powers of the federal government under the Exclusive 
legislative list, as well as the extent of federal and state legislative powers under the Concurrent 
legislative list had the same structure with the 1979 Constitution (Chapter 1, Part 11 Section 4 
subsection 1-7 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
A member of the legislature observed that the trend of power in the Fourth Republic favoured the 
centre than the subnational levels, as the federal structure allowed the federal government to have 
more functions to perform under the Exclusive list, and still have domineering power over the 
constituent units under the Concurrent list (Personal Interview X, July 13, 2018). In addition, the 
interviewee remarked that federal arrangement during the Fourth Republic was centripetal rather 
than centrifugal (Personal Interview X, July 13, 2018). The structure of local government council 
under the Fourth Republic remains the same as the Second Republic. Chapter 1 Part 11 Section 7 
of the 1999 Constitution describes the system of local government18. 
                                                          
18 The system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is under this Constitution 
guaranteed; and accordingly, the Government of every State shall, subject to section 8 of this Constitution, ensure 
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Federalism in the Fourth Republic provided that public revenue should be distributed among the 
levels of government. As a divergence from what operated during the Second Republic, on revenue 
allocation, Section 15319 of the constitution established certain Federal Executive Bodies. One of 
these was the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC)20. The power 
of RMAFC include monitoring the accruals to and disbursement of revenue from the Federation 
Account, periodic review of the revenue allocation formulae and principles in operation to ensure 
conformity with changing realities. It also has the power to advise the Federal and State 
Governments on fiscal efficiency and revenue generation drives and could determine the 
appropriate remuneration for political office holders (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999).  
The RMAFC was a federal body set up as a modification to Revenue Allocation in the Fourth 
Republic. Revenue allocation formula formulated in 1992 which was later inherited in 1999 was 
Federal Government (48.5%), State Government (24%), Local Government Councils (20%), 
Special Fund (7.5%) (FCT 1%, Ecology 2%, Stabilisation 1.5%, National resources 3%). 
Subsequent revenue allocation formula adopted were Federal Government (56%), State 
Government (24%), Local Government Councils (20%); Federal Government (54.68%), State 
Government (24.72%), Local Government Councils (20.60%); Federal Government (52.68%), 
State Government (26.72%), Local Government Councils (20.60%) in May 2002, July 2002 and 
March 2004 respectively (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Fiscal 
federalism in the Fourth Republic was lopsided. This creates injustice and unfairness in the fiscal 
federal arrangement among the levels of government. A politician in the Fourth Republic observed 
that revenue allocation formula is lopsided because the bulk of federation revenue was allocated 
to the central government (Personal Interview 11, November 3, 2017).      
                                                          
their existence under a Law, which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of 
such councils. 
19 There shall be established for the Federation the following bodies, namely- Code of Conduct Bureau, Council of 
State, Federal Character Commission, Federal Civil Service Commission, Federal Judicial Service Commission, 
Independent National Electoral Commission, National Defence Council, National Economic Council, National 
Judicial Council, National Population Commission, National Security Council, Nigeria Police Council, Police Service 
Commission, and Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
20 The Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission shall comprise the following members- a Chairman; 
and one member from each State of the Federation and the Federal Capital, Abuja who in the opinion of the President 
are persons of unquestionable integrity with requisite qualifications and experience. 
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The injustice and unfairness in the fiscal federal arrangement among the levels of government was 
more pronounced when the military government of General Sani Abacha created 774 local 
governments by fiat (Nigerian Tribune August 2, 2017). This was because there were no census 
figures that would allow a fair allotment of the local governments to all the states and the federal 
capital territory (Nigerian Tribune August 2, 2017). Consequently, some states have more local 
governments than others.  In this case, the local governments of many states with sparse population 
continued to enjoy the huge surplus of revenue allocation, while the local governments of some 
states with dense population continued to suffer (Nigerian Tribune August 2, 2017).  For instance, 
Akwa Ibom State, with a population of 3,920,208 has 32 local governments, while Lagos State, 
with a population of 9,013,634, has 20 local governments. Likewise, Osun State, with a population 
of 3,423,535 has 30 local governments, while Kaduna State, with a population of 6,066,662, has 
23 local governments.  
The disparities in most of the allotments of the local governments were patently indefensible 
(Nigerian Tribune August 2, 2017). The principle of derivation also featured prominently in the 
Fourth Republic. In this case, the oil producing states insisted on the removal of the distinction 
between on-shore (on land) and offshore (in sea) revenue by the central government (Okereke 
2012).  They therefore demanded for the payment of 13% of all revenues generated from the crude 
oil produced in each state of the states (Okereke 2012). Consequently, the principle of derivation 
was added to the revenue allocation formula, in March 2004, with 13% allocated to the oil-
producing states. 
A cursory analysis of features of federalism in the Second and the Fourth Republics reveals that 
the federal arrangements were products of the military, which is centripetal in nature rather than 
centrifugal. This arrangement contradicts the major tenets of a true federalism. The federal 
arrangements in the two Republics produced a single document for the central authority and the 
subnational levels. The implication of this federal arrangement was that power was tilted towards 
the centre. Similarly, the bulk of federal revenue was allocated to the centre thereby making the 
subnational levels to depend on the central government. Thus, the constituent units of the 
federation have increasingly lost their autonomy. They hardly qualify to be called “federating 
units” because, in practice, they are a little better than administrative extensions of the federal 
government (Osaghae 1991). 
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Osaghae (1991) observed further that the several years of military rule strengthened the authority 
of the federal government and led to the subordination of state government in several requests, as 
is consistent with military organisational norms of the unity of command and hierarchical 
authority. An interviewee attributed the inequitable revenue sharing formula in the country to the 
military, which was due to their centralised and command structure (Personal Interview VII, June 
4, 2018). In addition, the administration of local government councils in the Second and the Fourth 
Republics was based on Caretaker Committees system. As it happened after the 1979 general 
election, the political parties in 2002 agreed not to conduct elections to the local government. The 
Caretaker committees consist of party loyalists who were rewarded for their contributions to the 
party21.  
The federal arrangement in the two Republics allow the states to derive their existence, structures, 
institutions, processes and resources from the federal government and the Federal Government is 
empowered as chief guardian for its continuance and force, including the constitutional use of 
violence against violators of its essential provisions22. The governments of the states are distinct 
and separate and are independent of the federal centre in election and performance-in-office and 
political parties, in legislative competence and executive administrative machinery.23  Yet, the 
Constitution also incorporates provisions, on issues such as the state of emergency and resource 
allocation, for example, which demonstrate clearly once more that in the Nigerian Federation, 
States are autonomous, yet they are inextricably dependent upon the federal government.24  
 
Nevertheless, federalism in the Fourth Republic has some features that make it different from the 
Second Republic. First is the expanded structure of the state in the Fourth Republic. The thirty-six 
states structure of federalism in the Fourth Republic which came into being through the creation 
of twenty-one (21) states in 1987, thirty states (30) in 1991 and thirty-six states (36) in 1996 
allowed for more participation of subnational units in government compared to the nineteen (19) 
states structure of the Second Republic. Second is the restructuring of public revenue distribution  
(i.e. Federation Account) in the Fourth Republic. There is the establishment of Revenue 
                                                          
21 See the report captioned ‘Parties agree to shift LG polls: States may set up caretaker committees’, The Punch (19 
April 2002): p.1. On the same page, see another report ‘INEC gets N7bn for voter register revision’. 
22 See the Second Schedule to the 1979 and 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
23 See Section 219 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
24 See Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
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Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) saddled with the responsibility of 
monitoring the accruals to and disbursement of revenue from the Federation Account; and 
reviewing from time to time, the revenue allocation formulae and principles in operation to ensure 
conformity with changing realities (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
The RMAFC was not in existence during the Second Republic. Third, the principle of derivation 
that was not recognised in the Second Republic was introduced in the Fourth Republic as a 
revenue-sharing formula. With the principle of derivation, the oil-producing states were 
constitutionally allocated 13% revenue from the Federation Account (The Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Fourth, is the increased number of local governments in the 
Fourth Republic. Local government in the Second Republic was three hundred and one (301) while 
the number was increased to seven hundred and sixty-eight (768) in the Fourth Republic.  
Similarly, there was the suspension and removal from office of the local government Chairmen by 
the state governments, particularly the Kaduna and Zamfara states’ governments suspended a 
number of local government Chairmen. This action made the local government Chairmen take 
legal action against the thirty-six states governors and their Assemblies (Fadeyi 2001). Subsequent 
to the federal government modification of Revenue Act of 1981, which increased federal allocation 
to local government from 8% to 10%, many state governments found it difficult to disburse the 
amount due to the local governments (Muhammed 2006).  
 
By constitutional design, the state and the local governments maintain joint account called “State-
Joint Local Government Account” which enables the state government to keep and later disburse 
the local share of federal revenue. The 10% allocation to local government is meant to execute the 
various expenditures at the local level. However, the withholding of the 10% due to the local 
government by the state government has hampered effective service delivery at the local level. In 
spite of the fact that there was a constitutional provision for such disbursement in accordance with 
Section 149 (4) and (5) of the 1979 constitution, yet many state Governors failed in their 
responsibilities (Ayeni and Olowu 1988, pp.197-218). This analysis is a clear indication that the 
political actors of the Second and the Fourth Republics did not adhere to the constitutional 
provisions in the performance of their responsibilities.    
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4.6 Intergovernmental Bodies in Nigeria  
Intergovernmental relation has become a body for promoting cooperation, manage conflictual 
relationships among the levels of government, and ensure efficient service delivery to the people. 
In order to promote cooperation and attain efficient service delivery, constitutional institutions, 
statutory institutions and informal/adhoc institutions are established (Bello 2014). 
4.6.1 Constitutional Institutions 
These are institutions of intergovernmental relations that are embodied in the constitution. They 
include: 
The National Assembly: Section 47 of the 1999 constitution states that there shall be a National 
Assembly comprising the House of Senate (Upper House) and the House of Representative (Lower 
House). Representation into the House of Senate is based on equality of state i.e. each state has 
three representatives and one representing the federal capital territory, Abuja. Representation into 
the House of Representative is based on population. The National Assembly legislates over the 
appropriation bill, approves the ministerial nominees of the President, and performs oversight 
functions (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The National Assembly 
failure in its oversight functions reflect in the inadequate legislative checks on the excesses of the 
executive, coupled with a symbolic relationship between the legislature and the executive, 
underpinned by the politics of the belly (Bayart 1993), promotes the pursuit of personal and 
communal goals at the expense of the public good.  
The Supreme Court: This is the final arbiter of law that settles conflict between individuals, groups, 
and government or between the levels of government. Section 23 of 1999 constitution states that 
there shall be a Supreme Court (SC) consisting of the Chief Justice of Nigeria and other Justices 
of the Supreme Court which must not exceed twenty one. The Chief Justice shall be appointed by 
the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, subject to confirmation by 
the Senate. The SC shall be duly constituted if it consists of not less than five Justices of the SC 
(The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Supreme Court in the Fourth Republic 
has not been alive to its responsibility because some levels of government still disobey the court 
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order. In case of Lagos State Vs Federal Government on the withholding of monthly allocation of 
Lagos state by the federal government. The SC ruled that the federal government has no right to 
withhold Lagos state government allocation. In spite of the ruling, the federal government refused 
to release the monthly allocation due to the state government, thereby violating the court order. 
This was an indication that the Supreme Court was ineffective in the discharge of its duties. 
The Council of States: This is an advisory body to the President in the exercise of his powers with 
respect to National population Commission, Award of national honours, Independent National 
Electoral Commission, National Judicial Council. The members of Council of States cut across 
the federation, thereby reflecting the nature of intergovernmental relations. The Council of States 
comprises of all the Governors of the states, the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of 
Representative, all former Chief Justices among others (The Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1999). 
The Federal Character Commission: Section 14(3-4) of the 1999 constitution states that the 
composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its 
affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the 
need to promote national unity (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The 
commission is empowered to work out an equitable formula subject to the approval of the National 
Assembly for the distribution of all cadres of posts in the public service of the Federation and of 
the States, the armed forces of the Federation, the Nigeria Police Force and other government 
security agencies, government owned companies and parastatals of the states (The Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
The implementation of federal character principle has not been effective in Nigerian federal 
system. For example, the recruitment exercise conducted in 2014 by the Nigeria Immigration 
Service demonstrated how the MDAs flouted the federal character principle (Daily Post, 18 April 
2018). The Chairman Committee on Interior, Mr. Adams Jagaba, uncovered how some states were 
unduly favoured, disclosing that 500 people were recruited from a particular local government 
(Daily Post, 18 April 2018). Although, appointments into public offices largely complied to due 
process, such appointments were lopsided and not a true reflection of the country’s constitutionally 
supported federal character principles.  
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The Independent National Electoral Commission: The Independent National Electoral 
Commission consists of the Chief Electoral Commissioner who is the Chairman, and twelve 
National Electoral Commissioners. Members of the commission are people of unquestionable 
character in the society. Also, each state of the federation and the federal capital territory, Abuja 
has one Resident Electoral Commissioner. The functions of the commission are to organise, 
undertake and supervise all elections. Also, it registers political parties and monitors its operation. 
In 1999, Peoples Democratic Party, Alliance for Democracy and All Nigeria Peoples Party were 
the major parties that started the Fourth Republic on May 29, 1999. In the elections of 2003, 
2007and 20011, INEC registered more than 51 political parties (Olaniyi 2011). In 2019 general 
election, 91 political parties were registered by INEC (Punch March 7 2019). 
The National Economic Council: The council comprises of the Vice-President, the Governor of 
each state and the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria. The National Economic Council shall 
have power to advise the President concerning the economic affairs of the Federation, and in 
particular on measures necessary for the co-ordination of the economic planning efforts (The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
The National Judicial Council: The National Judicial Council shall have power to recommend to 
the President from among the list of persons submitted to it by the Federal Judicial Service 
Commission, persons for appointment to the offices of the Chief Justice of Nigeria, the Justices of 
the Supreme Court, the President and Justices of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Judge and Judges 
of the Federal High Court. Also, it has power to recommend to the President the removal from 
office of the judicial officers (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
The National Population Commission: The National Population Commission shall have power to 
undertake periodical enumeration of population, establish and maintain machinery for continuous 
and universal registration of births and deaths throughout the federation (The Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The National Population Commission has been faced with 
inadequate resources or fund to implement the population policies. Inadequate resources have 
distorted the population census that ought to have been conducted in 2001 following the ten year 
interval of Nigeria’s population census in 1991. Therefore, the policy objectives of regular data 
collection, monitoring and evaluation have not been achieved (Turnwait and Odeyemi 2017).   
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Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission: This body is to advise the federal and 
state governments on fiscal efficiency and methods by which their revenue can be increased. Also, 
it determines the remuneration appropriate for political office holders 
4.6.2 Statutory Agencies 
Statutory agencies are inter-governmental institutions that are backed by law and are mostly 
established during the military rule (Bello 2014). These include: 
The Directorate of Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure: The Directorate of Foods, Roads and 
Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI) was established for the mobilisation of rural communities and the 
development of the rural areas in Nigeria (Eze 1997). It is conceived as a development strategy to 
turn the rural areas into urban areas through the rapid distribution of social amenities (Eze 1997). 
DFFRI is involved in the area of food and agricultural activities, rural industrialisation, rural 
technology and resource development and exploitation is tagged “promotion for productive 
activities” (Koniyan 1987). State governments were to contribute 25% of the total funds for DFFRI 
projects while the rest come from the federal government (Bello 2014). DFFRI at any state do not 
in itself carry out any projects. Projects to be executed are done by allied agencies associated with 
rural development such as local governments, rural development authorities, and state rural 
electrification boards (Agbese 1988). 
The operation of DFRRI shows that the directorate has not provided the people in the rural areas 
with functional and drinkable water (Muoghalu 1992). In other words, there is poor infrastructural 
development in the rural areas. Generally, agricultural productivity has not been enhanced. The 
agency exhibited performance for five years, after which it became bureaucratised and suffered 
from corruption on the part of the operators at the state and local levels (Muoghalu 1992). DFFRI 
has not been able to improve the standard of living of rural dwellers because of poor 
implementation of the programmes, top-down approach, inadequate community participation, and 
neglect of community structural approach (Oshinfowokan 2018).The quality of amenities provided 
posed a lot of problems, which reduced the impact of the Directorate on the rural communities 
(Oshinfowokan 2018). 
The National Council on Intergovernmental Relations (NCIR): The agency was established in 
1992 to monitor the operation of the federal system, giving continuing attention to 
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intergovernmental relations in the Nigerian federal system. It is concerned with conducting 
research and recommends solutions to intergovernmental relations problems. A major challenge 
of NCIR was bureaucratic suffocation, which often starved it of funds. Also, NCIR had no 
independent source of funds in order to mediate among the tiers of government (Dlakwa 2004:77). 
4.6.3 Adhoc Committees or Informal Bodies 
These are useful in bringing together officials at the federal, state and local levels particularly on 
policy issues. Also, they help to smothen intergovernmental relations and encourage co-operation 
among the constituent units of the federation (Bello 2014). There are several meetings that take 
place among Ministers at federal and state levels in order to bring federal and state executives 
together to harmonise policies in the interest of the country (Bello 2014). 
 
 
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, the researcher has discussed the contextual and theoretical framework of the 
structure and authority in Nigeria’s intergovernmental relations. The study was anchored on hybrid 
of two models: the coordinate-authority model and overlapping-authority model. In the analysis 
of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Second and the Fourth Republics, the research study 
discovered that a single model is not adequate in explaining the authority structure and 
relationships of the polity, hence, the hybrid of two models (Coordinate-Authority model and 
Overlapping-Authority model). The research study found out that the actual practice of 
intergovernmental relations in the two Republics in Nigeria was quite different from the 
constitutional provisions.  
This was quite evident in the use of power by the political actors especially when they acted outside 
their jurisdictions. The researcher also examined the changing pattern of fiscal relations in IGR in 
Nigeria, in areas like allocation of powers to the levels of government and the sharing of federation 
revenue. These two areas have serious implications on fiscal capabilities of the constituent units 
and service delivery. The research study further made a comparative analysis of the features of 
federalism in the two Republics. The researcher argues that federalism in the two Republics was a 
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product of the military, which is centripetal in nature rather than centrifugal. However, the two 
Republics have some differences due to their changing structures. The thirty-six states structure in 
the Fourth Republic compared to the nineteen-state structure of the Second Republic enlarged the 
participation of people at the subnational levels of government. Similarly, the introduction of 
RMAFC in the Fourth Republic speeds up the disbursement of Federation revenue to the tiers of 
government. The section also explores key intergovernmental relations’ bodies with a view to 
understand its composition and effectiveness. In the next chapter, the researcher discusses 
intergovernmental relations and constitutional provisions in Nigeria. 
  
 
 
 
                                                          Chapter Five 
                            Intergovernmental Relations and Constitutional Provisions in Nigeria 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the development of intergovernmental relations and the changing patterns 
Nigerian federalism as well as its implications on service delivery. An investigation into the roles 
of the different actors at different levels of government demands an exploration of historical 
background of intergovernmental relations as well as the need to understand the development of 
federal system of Nigeria. In order to understand the nature of intergovernmental relations and 
patterns of federal arrangement, it is pertinent to consider the diverse groups of people and their 
peculiarities within the ambient of culture, language, religion, and the value system. 
The colonial constitution of 1954, under the leadership of Lyttleton, provided the foundation for a 
federal system of government in Nigeria, with the creation of a central government and 
autonomous regions. The constitutional provision strengthens the powers of the regional 
governments and the legislatures in relations to the central government (Ezera 1960, p.96). In this 
case, the regions were recognised as constituent units (Muhammed 2006). However, the 1957 
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Constitutional Conference held in London and the Willink Commission report of 1958 altered 
Nigeria’s political structure and thereafter, the nature of intergovernmental relations. The sudden 
change in the structure of government from unitary system to federal system brought a change in 
the nature of interactions among the levels of government from two levels of interaction to four 
levels of interaction (Philips 1980, p.157). 
The incursion of the military government on January 15, 1966, brought a new face-lift in Nigeria’s 
intergovernmental relations. Interestingly, the military rule that lasted for thirteen years improved 
intergovernmental relations, in such a way that the regional governments were subordinated to the 
federal military government. This was because there was no constitution to delineate powers. Thus, 
the Supreme Military Council became the highest decision-making body in the country. The return 
to democratic rule in 1979 was a major step in the promotion of democratic governance in the 
country (Lafenwa and Oluwalogbon 2014). Under the presidential constitution, there was a clear 
definition of functions, powers, and interrelationships of the three arms of government (Lafenwa 
and Oluwalogbon 2014). The essence was to promote harmonious relationships with the legal basis 
for efficient administration of the country among the branches of government (Lafenwa and 
Oluwalogbon 2014). 
The collapse of the Second Republic in 1983 culminated into several years of military rule. One 
of the areas that the military has improved intergovernmental relations is its effort to bridge the 
structural imbalance by increasing the number of states from 19 to 30-state structure (Aikhomu 
1993). The government also created additional local governments to make 589 in order to bring 
government closer to the people and enhance political participation (Aikhomu 1993). The Fourth 
Republic that began on May 29, 1999, under the leadership of President Obasanjo witnessed 
flagrant abuse of constitutional powers on issues of tax jurisdiction and revenue sharing formula, 
which has engendered conflictual relationships among the levels of government. The unresolved 
issue of revenue sharing formula and tax jurisdiction among others has created a structural 
imbalance in Nigeria’s polity (Muhammed 2006). Furthermore, Oyediran (2007, p. 63) observes 
that the ‘structures set out by the 1999 Constitution are strongly criticised. The institution is to 
provide the shortest cut to dictatorship. It did not give room for a decentralised state’ (Oyediran 
2007, p. 63)This chapter has five sections. The first section considers the evolution of 
intergovernmental relations from the colonial period to the post-colonial period. This is followed 
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by the 1979 and 1999 constitutional provisions vis-a-vis the practices of intergovernmental 
relations in Nigeria’s Second and the Fourth Republics. The research study argues that the 
historical and political experiences of Nigeria determined the structure of federalism and the nature 
of intergovernmental relations. Overtime, fiscal federalism in the country has reflected the 
historical structure of the tiers of government. Section three presents an empirical analysis of 
intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Second Republic. The fourth section explores the analysis 
of intergovernmental relations in the Fourth Republic. This was followed by the changing pattern 
of Nigerian fiscal federalism and its implications on service delivery. 
 5.2    Evolution of Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria 
The evolution of intergovernmental relation in Nigeria could be traced to the colonial period when 
the British government in 1914 amalgamated the colony of Lagos, the Southern Protectorates and 
the Northern Protectorate to become a national entity (Afigbo 1998).  The amalgamation gave the 
colonial administration an impetus to have control over the territory of Nigeria through the 
adoption of a unitary system of government. Through the British policy of indirect rule system, a 
policy where the British made use of the traditional rulers to serve as intermediaries between the 
indigenous people and the colonial rulers, the idea of intergovernmental relations took off (Afigbo 
1998). The division of the country into the Northern and the Southern regions during the pre-
colonial Nigeria engendered mutual interdependence (Afigbo 1998).  
The 1914 Nigerian Council had a feature of national-state relation of intergovernmental relations 
due to a number of officials that were involved such as the Governor-General at the centre, assisted 
at the regions by the Lieutenant Governors and other officials such as the Residents, and 
Divisional/District officers (Adamolekun 1986, pp. 34-35). Therefore, intergovernmental relations 
kicked off from the indirect rule policy adopted by the British government. Intergovernmental 
relation during Fredrick Lugard administration was limited to the national and local relations 
because it was concerned with the maintenance of law and order consistent with colonial 
exploitation (Muhammed 2006). The unitary nature of the government during Lugard’s 
administration also made the native authorities to become appendages and agents of the colonial 
government (Olusanya 1980, p. 520; Oyediran 1979, p. 3). With the introduction of the Arthur 
Richards Constitution in 1946, regionalism replaced the hitherto unitary system (Olusanya 1980, 
p. 520; Oyediran 1979, p. 3). Although, the Richards Constitution did not provide for national-
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state relations, it however made the legislatures at the regions to serve as intermediary between the 
central legislative council and the Native Authorities (Muhammed 2006).  
The 1951 Macpherson Constitution was different from the 1922 and 1946 Constitutions. There 
was a clear delineated administrative and political structure of the tiers of government (Ezera 1960, 
p. 95). Representation of the Ministers at the central House of Representatives were done by the 
regional legislatures through the electoral college, although, this was subject to the approval of the 
Governor (Oyediran 1979, p. 5; Keay and Thomas 1986, p. 180). Intergovernmental relation 
during the colonial period was described as “interlocking” simply because state-local relation was 
conditioned by the subordinate status of the local government authorities (Olusanya 1980). For 
example, the Lieutenant Governor at the region could not assent to a bill unless the Governor-
General gave approval to such bill (Olusanya 1980). Local government during this period was an 
agent of the state government. Section 121 (1) of the Order-in-Council empowered the Governor-
General to scrutinise all regional legislations.  
The Governor may from time to time give to the Lieutenant Governor such 
directions with respect to the exercise of the executive authority of the Region as 
he may decide are desirable and in particular, and without prejudice to the 
generality of the foregoing, may give such directions for the purpose of ensuring 
compliance with the provision of section 120 of this Order (cf. Olusanya 1980, 
p.533).  
The 1954 Lyttleton Constitution was unique in terms of intergovernmental relations. First, it 
provided federalism for the country with the existence of a central government and autonomous 
regions (Ezera 1960, p. 96). Second, it strengthened the powers of the regional governments and 
the legislatures in relations to the central government (Ezera 1960, p. 96). The 1954 constitution 
introduced the Nigerianisation of the public service, regionalisation of the judiciary and the public 
service (Ngou 1989, p. 86). The constitution provided exclusive and residual legislative lists, and 
any matter not contained in these two lists were contained in the residual list of the regions. The 
implication of this for intergovernmental relations was that the regions were recognised as 
constitutional entities, although, in case of conflict between the federal and regional governments 
on concurrent matters, the federal law would prevail over the regional law (Muhammed, 2006). 
Another level of intergovernmental relation was the creation of Lagos as the Federal Territory. 
However, national-local interaction was made difficult because with the coalition government that 
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was formed at the federal level, the Lagos City Council could not control the majority of seats 
(Muhammed 2006). 
There was a dramatic change in intergovernmental relations in 1957 after the adoption of 
federalism in the country. The 1957 Constitutional Conference25 and the Willink Commission26 
Report of 1958 on the issue of minorities introduced a new level of intergovernmental relations.  
The government established the Niger Delta Board as a public corporation responsible directly to 
the Prime Minister27. Niger Delta Board (NDB) was set up in 1961, to address the minority status, 
agitations and the perceived marginalisation of the people of Delta (Longe, Omole, Adewumi and 
Ogbiye 2010). The role of NDB in intergovernmental relations was to allay the fears of the 
minority groups in the oil rich communities, and to ensure that the oil wealth impacted on the lives 
of the communities (Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2017). The changing pattern of institutional structure from 
unitary to federal system accounted for the changes in the degree of interactions of the levels of 
government (Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2017). Therefore, the formal and simple interaction of the level 
of IGR metamorphosed to a complex interaction among the levels of intergovernmental relations. 
IGR transformed from two levels of interaction (i.e. national-local and local-local), to four (i.e. 
national-regional, regional-regional, regional-local, and local-local) (Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2017). 
Philips (1980, p. 157) provides the reasons for the four levels of interactions of IGR in Nigeria 
instead of the six interactional levels that is applicable to a federal system.  
 (1) local government issues during this period remained the exclusive preserve of 
the regional governments, with the federal government having no say in the local 
government affairs; (2) The new interactions, particularly in areas of functions and 
finance started having formal features; (3) The interactions revolve around the 
modern institutions such as the legislative, the executive and the judiciary in 
functions and finances; (4) The change from  unitary to federalism which had earlier 
being smooth and cooperative turned to conflictual relationships between the levels 
of government in virtually all areas of interactions (Philips 1980, p. 157).  
                                                          
25 The 1957 Constitutional Conference met in London under the Chairmanship of the Colonial Secretary. Major 
decisions reached included self-government to be gramted to the Eastern and Western regions, on August 1957, while 
that of the North would be in 1959.  Eastern region was to be given a bicameral legislature with the addition of House 
of Chiefs; Southern Cameroon to be raised to a regional status; a bicameral legislature to be established with the 
second chamber known as the Senate; and Membership of House of Representative to be increased to 320. 
26 Willink Commission was set up to investigate the fears of the minority group in Nigeria. The Commission was 
headed by Sir Henry Willink to recommend a date for independence; suggest an equitable revenue allocation formula; 
create new regions in Nigeria; and recommend solutions to the problem of the minorities. 
27 Niger Delta Development Authority Act 1962 and Section 159 of the federation of Nigeria 1960 
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Intergovernmental fiscal relations revolved around the federal-regional/state on one hand, and 
state-local relation on the other hand. Two major problems are peculiar to the federal-regional/state 
fiscal relations. First, is the tax jurisdiction, and, second, is the revenue allocation.  
These were the two dimensions of conflict in intergovernmental fiscal relations (Akume 2014). 
Firstly, the federal government claimed domineering power over important tax sources and has the 
larger share of the country’s revenues. Second, there was conflict over unequitable sharing of 
revenues by the states from the Distributable Pool Account of the federation (Akume 2014). The 
conflicting nature of fiscal intergovernmental relations in Nigeria has been responsible for the 
setting up of various Commissions by the previous governments to discuss and adopt the best 
revenue sharing formula. The Commissions came up with the principles of need, population, even 
development, derivation etc. Sir Sydney Phillipson Commission of 1946 was based on the 
principle of derivation and even progress. The commission recommended that revenue should be 
allocated in such a way that existing levels of regional services were maintained whilst allowance 
should be made for reasonable expansion (Philipson 1946).  
The Hicks Phillipson Commission (1951) recommended that revenue in Nigeria should be 
allocated on the principles of derivation, need and national interest (Hicks Commission 1951).  Sir 
Louis Chick Commission of 1953 was required to provide to the regions and the centre an adequate 
measure of fiscal autonomy. The apparent imposition on Chick of the principle of derivation left 
the impression that some well-placed and powerful groups and politicians might have greatly 
influenced Chick’s machinery (Chick’s Report 1953). The Raisman Commission (1958) 
recommended the creation of Distribution Pool Account (DPA) with fixed regional proportional 
shares, favoured the principles of derivation, fiscal autonomy, population and even development 
for revenue sharing (Raisman Commission, 1958). It allocated 40% to the North, the East 31%, 
the West 24% and Southern Cameroon 5% (Raisman Commission 1958). 
The Binns Commission (1964) adopted the Raisman principles but altered the shares of the regions 
in the following order. The North was 42%, East was 30%, West was 20%, and Mid-west was 5%. 
The Dina’s Commission (1968) report, which was rejected by the government recommended 
derivation, need and balanced development tax efforts (Binns Commission 1964). The Aboyade 
Technical Committee (1977) report was rejected on the ground that it was too technical. It 
recommended the principles of equality of access to development opportunities (25%), national 
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minimum standards for national integration (22%), Absorptive capacity (20%), Independent 
revenue effort (18%) and fiscal efficiency (15%). The commission allocated 57% of the federal 
revenue to the federal government, 30% to state government, 10% to local government and 3% to 
a special fund (Berg and Pattillo 1999). The Okigbo Commission (1980) known as the Presidential 
Commission recommended the principles of equality (40%), population (40%), social 
development (15%) and internal revenue effort (5%). The commission allocated 53% of the federal 
revenue to the federal government, 30% to the State, 10% to local government and 7% to a special 
fund (Berg and Pattillo 1999). There were two epochs of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria: 
The colonial period and the post-colonial period. 
 
 
5.2.1 The Colonial Period 
The British colonial government in 1914 merged the Lagos colony, the Northern and Southern 
Protectorates to become a political entity. The undue merging of the different entities that existed 
prior to the advent of colonial rule gave the British government to have control over the territory 
of Nigeria. The 1914 Nigerian Council had a feature of the national-state relation of 
intergovernmental relations due to a number of officials that were involved such as the Governor-
General at the centre, assisted at the regions by the Lieutenant Governors and other officials such 
as the Residents, and Divisional/District officers (Adamolekun 1986, pp. 34-35). Therefore, 
intergovernmental relations kicked off from the indirect rule policy adopted by the British 
government. Intergovernmental relations during Fredrick Lugard administration were limited to 
the national and local relations because it was concerned with the maintenance of law and order 
consistent with colonial exploitation (Muhammed 2006). The unitary nature of the government 
during Lugard’s administration also made the native authorities to become appendages and agents 
of the colonial government.  
With the introduction of the Arthur Richards Constitution in 1946, the adoption of regionalism 
replaced the hitherto unitary system (Olusanya 1980, p. 520; Oyediran 1979, p. 3). Although the 
Richards Constitution did not provide for national-state relations, it, however, made the 
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legislatures at the regions to serve as an intermediary between the central legislative council and 
the Native Authorities (Muhammed 2006).  
The 1951 Macpherson Constitution was different from the 1922 and 1946 Constitutions. There 
was a clear delineated administrative and political structure of the tiers of government (Ezera 1960, 
p.95). This is the constitutional basis for the interactions of the two levels of government because 
the Regional legislatures had some measures of legislative powers and each region had an 
Executive council (Muhammed 2006, p.77). Representation of the Ministers at the central House 
of Representatives was done by the regional legislatures through the Electoral College subject to 
the approval of the Governor (Oyediran 1979, p.5).  
The conflicting nature of fiscal intergovernmental relations in Nigeria has been responsible for the 
setting up of various Commissions by the previous governments to discuss and adopt the best 
revenue sharing formula. The Commissions came up with the principles of need, population, even 
development, derivation etc. The Phillipson Commission (1946) recommended derivation and 
even development as the main principles of revenue allocation. The Hicks Phillipson Commission 
(1951) recommended that revenue in Nigeria should be allocated on the principles of derivation, 
need and national interest. The Chicks Commission (1953) recommended derivation and fiscal 
autonomy.  
5.2.2 The Post-colonial Period 
The 1960 Independence Constitution marked the beginning of the post-colonial period. Under the 
Constitution, section 65 granted the federal government the power to ensure peace and good 
governance during an emergency period.28 The federal government exercised this power during 
the Western Regional crisis in May 1962. Similarly, the legislature at the centre was empowered 
to legislate for the country or any part thereof on residual matters for the execution of treaty, 
convention or agreement between Nigeria and another country (The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1960). In this case, the cooperation of the national and the regional 
                                                          
28 Section 65(3) of 1960 Independence Constitution defined “period of emergency” as any period during which the 
Federation is at war; there is in force a resolution passed by each House of Parliament declaring that a state of public 
emergency exists; there is in force a resolution of each House of Parliament by the votes of not less than two thirds of 
all the members of the House declaring that democratic institutions in Nigeria are threatened by subversion. The period 
of emergency is used to suspend or change the functions of any branch of government; and gives the government the 
power to suspend certain rights or freedom normally guaranteed by the government. 
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governments were required for the implementation of the treaties and amendment of section 108 
of the constitution.29 Contrary to the 1954 Constitution, which gave the regions legislative 
independence, and the supremacy of the regional laws over the central law, decentralisation 
allowed each region to have its own constitution, which must not be at variant with the federal 
constitution (Ayoade 1996, pp. 52-53).  
The decentralisation of the civil service and marketing board, which was welcomed by the regions, 
also generated agitation of the minority interests. This agitation by the minority groups often led 
to conflict in intergovernmental relations in the regions, the result of which was the military coup 
of January 15, 1966 (Muhammed 2006). 
It is interesting to know that IGR during the military rule had considerable improvement. In view 
of this, the federal government, through the state governments, released grants of N100 million 
and N250 million to the local government in 1976 and 1978 respectively (Ekpo and Ndebbio 
1998). The grant released by the federal government to the local governments was to enable the 
local governments to meet part of their recurrent and capital expenditures (Ekpo and Ndebbio 
1998) Intergovernmental relation during the military regime centred on the hierarchical structure 
that was based on a unitary system. There was no existence of the constitution to delineate powers 
at the levels of government but rather the supreme military council, which was the highest 
decision-making body (Ekpo and Ndebbio 1998). 
The intergovernmental relation among the levels of government in the Second Republic was tense 
due to the conflictual relationships between the federal and the state governments on the revenue 
sharing formula (Muhammed 2006). In addition, the state refused to conduct the election at the 
local government in accordance with Section 7(1) of the 1979 constitution30. The Dasuki 
Committee, appointed by the Buhari administration in 1984, observed that the master-servant 
relationship between the state and the local governments was due to the excessive control of the 
state over local government affairs (Muhammed 2006).  
                                                          
29 Section 69 of the constitution of the Federation of Nigeria, 1960. 
30 Section 7 stipulates that the system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is 
under this constitution guaranteed; and accordingly, the Government of every State shall. Subject to section 8 of this 
Constitution, ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance 
and functions of such councils. 
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The hierarchical structure of federalism in Nigeria, where the federal government was saddled with 
too much responsibility, such as foreign affairs, foreign trade, national defence, and internal 
security, made the three levels of government sought for cooperation in the delivery of domestic 
programmes to the populace (Aikhomu 1993). The military government, in a bid to achieve 
structural balance in the country, increased the number of states from 19 to 30-state structure 
(Aikhomu 1993). The government also created additional local governments to make 589 in order 
to bring government closer to the people and enhance political participation (Aikhomu 1993). With 
the autonomy granted to the local government as a third-tier level of administration31, some local 
governments overemphasised this autonomy to the extent that it caused friction and conflict 
between the states (Aikhomu 1993). This has drawn the attention of the federal government to 
resolve the conflict between some states and local governments in order to ensure harmonious 
cooperation for effective service delivery to the public (Aikhomu 1993).  
The introduction of the unitary system by the military in 1966, and its command structure tilted 
powers to the centre in such a way that the federal government became more powerful. However, 
the end of the civil war changed the pattern of control over the national resources. The Federal 
Government took over the control of national resources (Muhammed 2006). This development 
changed the nature of IGR in favour of the federal government. There is no doubt that the presence 
of the military in Nigerian politics has greatly enhanced intergovernmental relations through states 
creation, local government reforms and the establishment of institutions like the Directorate of 
Food Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) and the National 
Council of Intergovernmental Relations (NCIR) (Muhammed 2006).  
The Nigerian Fourth Republic that started with the Obasanjo administration in 1999 witnessed 
conflictual and consensus relationship among the levels of government particularly in areas of 
revenue sharing and tax jurisdiction (Muhammed 2006). Conflictual relationships manifested 
among the federal, state and local governments over what proportion of national revenues to 
allocate to each of these three tiers of government (Muhammed 2006). Contentious issues included 
the criteria to use in sharing or distributing the federal revenue to the two sub-national 
governments. First, between the oil-producing states on the one hand, and the federal government 
                                                          
31 The 1976 local government reform made the local government to become the third-tier system of administration 
with autonomous powers granted to the local government for the first time in the history of local government 
administration in Nigeria. 
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and many of the states, which did not produce oil on the other hand, and second, the proportion of 
the revenue to share in the federation (Muhammed 2006).  
5.3 Constitutional Provisions and the Practices of Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria’s 
Second and Fourth Republics 
The Constitution is an embodiment of rules and regulations that guides the operation of the 
government and the governed. Chapter One, Part 1 of both the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions 
affirmed the supremacy of the constitutions and the binding force it has on all authorities and 
persons that are within the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (The Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The 1979 and the 1999 Nigerian constitutions shared some 
common features.   
Part 1, Section 1(2) of the 1999 constitution, prescribes that Nigerian citizens shall be governed in 
accordance with the provision of the constitution and that no other law shall prevail over the 
constitution (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). With the above 
provisions, political leaders were bound to act in accordance with the constitutional provisions. 
This section explores the provisions of the 1979 and the 1999 Constitutions with a view to 
identifying areas of divergence between the constitutional provisions and the actual practices of 
government. 
Constitutional provision on state creation in Nigeria is contained in Part 1 Section 3 (1) of the 1999 
Constitution. The section listed all the thirty-six (36) States and their capital cities. Part 1 Section 
3(6) of the Constitution also stipulates that there should be seven hundred and sixty-eight local 
government areas in Nigeria. The second column of Part 1and II of the First Schedule to the 
Constitution contains the list of the local governments and the six area councils in the Federal 
Capital territory (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The 1979 
Constitution had similar provisions that listed the number of states as well as the local 
governments.   
However, there was flagrant disregard to the constitutional provisions in the Second and the Fourth 
Republics by the actors of the constitution on the creation of local government. The Second 
Republic Constitution had some flaws regarding local government creation as it empowered the 
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state government to set up local governments. According to Part 11, Section 7 of the 1979 
constitution:  
The system of local government by democratically elected local government 
councils is under this Constitution guaranteed; and accordingly, the Government of 
every State shall ensure their existence under a law which provides for the 
establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils (The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979). 
 Because of this, there was abuse of local government creation in the Second Republic. In view of 
this, Ukiwo (2006, p. 10) describes the situation thus: 
The worst violations of the autonomy of local councils however stemmed from 
political machinations. The politicians realised they could trade local councils for 
votes as there were agitations across the country for more local government areas 
as local elites eyed local councils which now had guaranteed funding. Politicians 
also realised they could balkanise local governments for electoral purposes. As 
elections approached, most state governments dissolved local councils and 
appointed loyal party members who were expected to deliver votes in the locality. 
Little wonder, the local government councils were deeply involved in the large-
scale electoral fraud of 1983 (Ukiwo 2006, p. 10). 
 
Similarly, the Fourth Republic witnessed abuse of state power in the creation of local government. 
In the first four years of democratic regime of Olusegun Obasanjo, states like Ebonyi, Lagos, Akwa 
Ibom, Bayelsa, Enugu and Katsina embarked on creation of local council development areas. 
Although, Lagos state was able to retain and maintain the local council development areas 
(LCDAs) it created, the situation led to conflict between Lagos State and the federal government 
when the latter withheld the monthly allocation due to the local governments. This resulted into 
litigation between the federal and Lagos State, and the court ruled that, even though Lagos State 
has constitutional power to establish local governments (Section 7(1), Lagos State did not follow 
the constitutional procedure for the creation of local government, because such creation of local 
government requires ratification by National Assembly. In other words, Lagos State did not follow 
the due process of creating new local governments as stipulated under Section 8 of the 1999 
Constitution (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
Second Schedule Section 4 Part 1, Part 11 and the Fourth Schedule stipulate the exclusive 
legislative list, concurrent legislative list and the functions of local government councils 
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respectively. The 1979 constitution has 66 items while the 1999 constitution has 68 items in the 
exclusive legislative list. The 1979 constitution has 28 items in the concurrent legislative list while 
the 1999 constitution contains 30 items in the concurrent legislative list. Section 7 of the Fourth 
Schedule specifies the functions of a local government council (The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
The constitution is clear on the modality for sharing the national revenue. Section 162 (3) states 
that revenue from the Federation Account shall be shared among the Federal, State and Local 
governments as prescribed by the National Assembly. One of the principles of revenue sharing is 
derivation, which the constitution granted the littoral states (oil producing states) 13% of the 
federation account (Section 162(2) of the 1999 constitution (The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999). The administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo in the Fourth 
Republic failed to execute the derivation principle as at May 29, 1999 when the derivation principle 
took effect (Edevbie 2000). The President delayed the implementation of derivation principle until 
January 2000 (Edevbie 2000).  
Section 162 (5) stipulates that the revenue accrue to the local governments from the Federation 
Account shall be allocated to the states for the benefit of their local government councils as 
prescribed by the National Assembly. On the “State Joint Local Government Account” Section 
162 (6) stipulates that each state shall maintain a special account called “State Joint Local 
Government Account” into which shall be paid all allocations to the local government councils of 
the State from the Federation Account and from the Government of the State. Similarly, Section 
162 (7) indicates that each state shall pay to local government councils in its area of jurisdiction 
such proportion of its total revenue on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the 
National Assembly (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
The above provision, also found in Section 149 (1-6) of the 1979 Constitution, was not followed 
by the levels of government, particularly the state government as regard the “State Joint Local 
Government Account”. During the Second Republic, the state was silent on the constitutional 
provisions relating to the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) and therefore did not 
implement the constitutional provisions (Onuigbo 2015). In line with this, the guidelines for the 
1979 local government reforms stated that, “the states have continued to encroach upon what 
would have been the exclusive preserve of local governments (The Constitution of the Federal 
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Republic of Nigeria 1979). The situation was not different from the Fourth Republic when the 
country returned to democratic governance in 1999. At the wake of democratic rule in 1999, some 
interest groups challenged the State Governors who later set up the joint account system in their 
states (ThisDay 21 July 2006).  
The constitution empowered state governments to conduct elections for the composition of the 
local government councils32. There was flagrant violation of this aspect of the constitutional 
provision by the level of government. Some governors preferred to appoint caretaker committees 
or administrators to replace the elected officials. This unconstitutional act prompted the federal 
government to direct the Minister of State for Finance to stop federal allocations to those states 
that did not follow due process in creating local governments (Onuigbo 2015). 
Constitutionally, there was no concurrent power of taxation (Nasir 2014, p. 88), an indication that 
each level of government has tax powers. The tax revenue that assigned to the federal government 
includes corporate income taxes, customs and excise duties, export duties, stamp duties, and taxes 
in respect of oil and solid minerals33. The States have power to raise revenue from capital gains, 
stamp duties, land registration fees, license fees in accordance with Part 11 Second Schedule, 
Paragraph D of 1999 constitution34. Similarly, the revenue taxing power of Local Government 
includes collection of rates, radio and television licenses, licensing of bicycles, canoes, 
wheelbarrows, marketing license fees and motor park duties (The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999). As regards the practice of taxing jurisdiction vis-à-vis the assignment 
of responsibilities among the levels of government, there is often fiscal imbalance due to the 
divergence between the constitutional functions and fiscal resources (Bello-Imam and Agba 2004). 
Bello-Imam and Agba observed that a substantial portion of federation account allocated to the 
central government at the detriment of the subnational levels has made it difficult for the 
                                                          
32 The system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is under this Constitution 
guaranteed; and accordingly, the Government of every State shall, subject to section 8 of this Constitution, ensure 
their existence under a Law, which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of 
such councils. 
33 Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral 
oils and natural gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as 
may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
34 The National Assembly may, subject to such conditions as it may prescribe, provide that the collection of any such 
tax or duty or the administration of the law imposing it shall be carried out by the Government of a State or other 
authority of a State. 
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constituent units to discharge its constitutional responsibilities. Supporting this view, Ekpo (1994) 
remarks that fiscal law in Nigeria have given more tax powers to the federal and state than the 
local governments.   
 
Table 5: Local Government creation during the Fourth Republic 
  
 Source: Danjuma and Muhammad, 2013. 
 
5.4 Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria’s Second Republic: Empirical Analysis 
The Second Republic marked the beginning of democratic governance in Nigeria with the election 
of Alhaji Shehu Shagari as the Presidential candidate under the platform of the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN). Prior to this period (i.e. the Second Republic), Nigeria witnessed thirteen years of 
military interregnum where the soldiers used decrees and edicts to administer the affair of the 
country. In spite of this, intergovernmental relations during this period had considerable 
improvement. This was because each regional head was responsible and answerable to the federal 
military government in such a way that the regional governments were subordinated to the federal 
military government. During this period, the federal military government, through the state 
governments, released grants of N100 million, N250 million and N150 million to the local 
governments in 1976, 1977 and 1978 respectively (Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic 
State Old Local 
Government 
New Local 
Government 
Total 
Lagos 20 37 57 
Kebbi 20 20 40 
Ebonyi 13 23 34 
Katsina 34 30 64 
Nasarawa 13 16 29 
Niger 25 17 42 
Yobe 17 23 40 
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Development 1999). The money was to enable local governments to meet part of their recurrent 
and capital expenditures. The command and hierarchical structure of the military, which was 
purely unitary in nature, was the basis of intergovernmental relations during the military period. 
There was no constitution to delineate powers at the levels of government but the Supreme Military 
Council (SMC) became the highest decision-making body.   
In the Second Republic (1979-1983), the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was the governing party 
at the federal level, while the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) was the party that ruled in Lagos state. 
In this case, one would have expected a negative relationship between the Lagos state and the 
federal governments. In spite of this, Lagos state tried to forge a cordial relationship with the 
federal government (Personal Interview IX, July 5, 2018). According to one of the key informants, 
the then Governor of Lagos State, Alhaji Lateef Jakande, on monthly or bimonthly, would see the 
President to discuss issues affecting the state, which recorded quite a number of successes 
(Personal Interview IX, July 5, 2018). One of the areas of successes was the presidential approval; 
of a special provision of N20 million for Lagos state (Personal Interview IX, July 5, 2018). 
The most remarkable success of the cordial relationship between the federal and Lagos State 
governments was in 1983 when Lagos state decided to introduce Metroline project, a light rail 
project from Yaba to Marina, Lagos. President Shehu Shagari who also invited the Vice President, 
Alex Ekwueme to the occasion performed the ground-breaking ceremony. In addition, the federal 
government also approved the foreign exchange for the execution of the project (Personal 
Interview IX, July 5, 2018).  
In accordance with the constitutional role of the state in the creation of local governments, Lagos 
state complied with the constitutional provision in the Second Republic. Part 11, Section 7 of the 
1979 constitution, guaranteed a democratically elected system of local government councils.  
Accordingly, the Government of every state was mandated to ensure their existence under a law, 
which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance, and functions of such 
councils (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979). In view of this provision, 
Lagos State created additional fifteen (15) local governments making twenty-three (23) local 
governments in the state. However, in the Fourth Republic, Lagos state did not follow the due 
process in the creation of additional 37 local governments. The creation of local government by 
Lagos state in the Fourth Republic was considered inchoate because it requires one-step to 
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complete the process of the LG creation. The National Assembly was supposed to ratify the 37 
local governments created by the state. In this case, the action of Lagos state in the creation of 
additional local governments was declared illegal by the apex court. 
One of the respondents observed that intergovernmental relations existed between the state and 
local governments. According to him, all local governments would present their budget proposals 
to the state executive council for approval. (Personal Interview IX, July 5, 2018). To show its 
commitment to the local governments within its jurisdiction, Lagos state gave matching grants to 
the Community Development Association (CDA) during the Second Republic. Any Community 
Development Association that was able to provide 50% of the project fund received a 50% 
matching grant from the state government (Personal Interview IX, July 5, 2018). The above 
analysis indicated that there was a cordial relationship between the three levels of government in 
the Second Republic.  
Another respondent observed a high level of party discipline, in the Second Republic, as a factor 
that encouraged effective IGR in the state. According to him, the relationship among the levels of 
government was more cordial because the agitation for resources, which constituted a threat to 
federalism, was not as pronounced as in the Fourth Republic (Personal Interview VI, February 26, 
2018). Another important aspect of intergovernmental relations is the fiscal relations among the 
three levels of government. Fiscal federalism is the assignment of revenue collection of taxing and 
spending powers between and among the federal and state governments (Onuigbo 2015). Revenue 
allocation is generally a complex exercise as it involves both equity and efficiency issues and the 
value judgment of the government (Olalokun 1979; Olowononi 1998). Thus, political 
considerations have always influenced the economics of revenue allocations in most federations 
of the world, inclusive of Nigeria.  
The controversy that surrounded revenue allocation in Nigeria made previous governments to set 
up a series of commissions and committees to devise acceptable revenue sharing formula. Since 
1946, there had been seventeen (17) different revenue sharing formulae. None has been found 
satisfactory by everybody, and none has generated more controversy than the last one (National 
Constitutional Conference 2007). These commissions and committees had come up with principles 
of needs, even development, and minimum responsibility, derivation etc. Sir Sydney Philipson 
Commission of 1946, for instance, recommended that revenues be allocated in such a way that the 
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existing levels of regional services were maintained whilst allowance should be made for 
reasonable expansion (National Constitutional Conference 2007). 
In 1953, the Nigerian government accepted another report by Sir Louis Chick. Chick was required 
to recommend adequate measure of fiscal autonomy. According to the National Constitutional 
Conference “the apparent imposition on Sir Chick of the principle of derivation left the impression 
that some well-placed and powerful political groups and politicians might have greatly influenced 
Chick’s machinery” (National Constitutional Conference 2007). The regionalisation of Marketing 
Board by the 1954 constitution strengthened regional finances and enhanced the fiscal powers of 
the regions, which could fix produce prices and imposed sales tax to make use of the marketing 
board surplus without restriction (Okeke 2001). The Marketing Board limited the extent to which 
the federal government could use export taxes as a tool of fiscal policy and introduced a new 
dimension into regional financial disparity since a region’s financial position depended 
significantly on the exportability of its products and the state of the world produce market (Okeke 
2001). 
Derivation principle was dominant in the Phillipson commission (1946), Hicks-Phillipson 
commission (1951), Chick commission (1953), Raisman commission (1958), Binns commission 
(1964), and Dina committee (1968). Derivation principle had been highly contentious in the 
country’s fiscal federalism since the discovery of oil in 1958. The derivation principle sought to 
allocate natural resource (oil and gas) revenues accruable to the federation’s account on the basis 
perceived to be equitable, given particular considerations to the resource-producing states and 
regions (Aluko 2012). 
Prior to the promulgation of Decree No. 6 of 1975, 90 percent of duties from motor fuel were given 
to the state of consumption while the rest was paid into the Distributable Pool Account (DPA) 
(Omitola 2016). On-shore oil production allocated 45 % of mining rents, and royalties to the state 
of production while the DPA received 50% and 5% was to the federal government (Omitola 2016). 
With the promulgation of the Decree No.6 of 1975, there was increase in the revenue giving to the 
federal government and a reduction in the amount released to the federating states (Obi 1998). 
Subsequent revenue allocations have been in favour of the central government. For example, the 
Aboyade Technical Committee recommended FG (57%), SG (30%), LG (10%); The Okigbo 
115 
 
Presidential Commission recommended FG (53%), SG (30%), LG (10%); and Okigbo Revenue 
Allocation Act recommended FG (55%), SG (30.5%), LG (10%).  
The revenue allocation arrangements relied on the principle of derivation and, to a lesser extent on 
need. On the other hand, 100 percent of mining rents and royalties from offshore oil production as 
well as 50 percent of excise duties went to the federal government with the remaining 50 percent 
of the latter paid into the DPA (Obi 1998). Thus, revenue sharing was reversed by Decree No. 6 
of 1975, which increased the revenue giving to the Federal Government, while reducing those of 
the federating states. The period witnessed a progressive reduction of the principle of derivation 
and the strengthening of the principles of needs and population (Obi 1998). 
In order to return the country to a democratically elected government in 1979, Muritala/Obasanjo 
administration appointed Professor Aboyade Technical Committee on revenue allocation to 
examine the existing sharing formula. The Aboyade Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation 
recommended the establishment of a “Federation Account.” This was common pool into which all 
federally collected revenues, except the personal income tax of members of the armed forces, and 
the Nigeria Police, external affairs staff, and residents and non-residents of the Federal Capital 
Territory, would be paid and shared among the three tiers of government (Aboyade Technical 
Committee Report 1980). The disbursement of the Federation Account was done using the 
following percentages: Federal Government (57%), State Government (30%), Local Government 
(10%), and Special Grants Accounts (3%) (Aboyade Technical Committee Report 1980).  
In addition to the 10 percent allocated to the local governments, the committee recommended that 
each state was to contribute 10 percent of its total revenue to the share of its constituent local 
governments. Five principles were introduced for the sharing of revenue from the State Joint Local 
Government Account. These are equality and access to development opportunities (25%), National 
Minimum Standard for National Integration (22%), Absorptive Capacity (20%), Independent 
Revenue and Minimum Tax efforts (18%) and Fiscal Efficiency (15%) (Aboyade Technical 
Committee Report 1980). 
The Okigbo Presidential Commission that followed recommended that the Federation Account 
should be shared as follows: Federal Government (53%), State Government (30%), Local 
Government (10%), and Special Funds (7%). Special Funds were to be allocated as follows: Initial 
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Development of the FCT (2.5%), Mineral Producing Areas (2.0%), Ecological and other disasters 
(1.0%), Revenue Equalisation Fund (1.5%) (Okigbo Report 1980). On the principles to use in 
horizontal allocation (i.e. sharing of revenues among the states), the commission recommended 
the following criteria: population (40%), National Minimum Standard for Integration (40%), 
Social Development (15%), and Internal Revenue Effort (5%) (Okigbo Report 1980). The report 
of the Okigbo Commission formed the basis of the 1981 Revenue Allocation Act. The Act made 
slight changes on the commission’s recommendation and the structure of the revenue allocation 
system that emerged was Federal Government (55%), State Government (30.5%), Local 
Government (10%), and Special Grants (4.5%) (Okigbo Report 1980).      
The principle of derivation has often generated controversy between the federal and the 
subnational units. The first governor of Rivers State, Retired Commander Alfred Diete-Spiff, 
speaking in 1990, gave vent to the seething discontent in the oil-producing areas when he called 
for an urgent review of the revenue allocation formula because “we in the oil-producing areas are 
being denied our legitimate rights”. Speaking on the issue in Kano, Alfred Diete-Spiff said that:  
He was not satisfied with the level of development in the oil-producing areas, 
adding that the best way to redress the “injustices” is for the principle of derivation 
and equality of states to be given more weight in any revenue sharing formula that 
is subsequently devised for the country, as the present one symbolises for the 
deprived areas, the instrument for their cheating (Newswatch 1990, p.38). 
According to the former governor, when the groundnut pyramids were everywhere in Kano, and 
there was a cocoa boom in the West, it was good for the principle of derivation to be considered. 
It is, however, sad that how that it is oil boom we have jettisoned derivation for population ratio 
which is encouraging the marginalisation of the oil area as well as turning the people into second-
class citizens” (Okeke 2001). 
In the words of Victor Ayeni and Dele Olowu: 
The process of revenue allocation is an unending one involving intense political 
bargaining, negotiation and coalition function amongst units via their 
representatives. The actors juggle and rationalise principles in order to ensure for 
themselves a substantial share of national resources (Ayeni and Olowu 1988, 
p.187). 
Revenue allocation in Nigeria has also generated antagonism between the state and the federal 
government. For example, Oyo State government under the leadership of late Chief Bola Ige 
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decided to close Igbeti Marble plant (jointly owned by private investors and Oyo State 
Government) because his government should have the exclusive control of mining and minerals 
in the states. Also, the then Ondo State Governor, Michael Ajasin’s decision to explore oil in Ondo 
State despite the fact that oil prospecting was legally a federal monopoly. This was evidence of 
antagonism between the federal and state governments, which was rooted in economic interest, 
political party conflicts and policy differences (Graf 1988, p.137).  
The Chairman of the committee on economy, finance and distribution of power for the Constitution 
Drafting Committee, Dr P.N. Okigbo, on May 29, 1978 pointed out that recommendation was 
made to the Constituent Assembly since the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) did not have 
sufficient time to look into the matter (Government White Paper 1978, p.3). Table 6 below gives 
a summary of Okigbo’s recommendation, the adjustments in the Government’s White Paper 
(G.W.P) and subsequent amendment in the 1981 Act and the 1984 Decree. 
Table 6: Vertical allocation: The Okigbo’s Government White Paper: 1981 Act and 1984 
Decree. 
Government Okigbo Government 
White Paper 
1981 Act 1984 Decree 
Amendment 
Federal 
Government 
53.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 
State 
Government 
30.0 30.0 30.5 32.5a 
Local 
Government 
10.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 
Mineral 
producing states-
Derivation 
- 2.0 2.0 20.0b 
Development of 
Federal Capital 
Territory (F.C.T) 
2.5 - - - 
Development of 
mineral 
producing areas 
2.0 1.5 1.5 1.5c 
General 
ecological 
problems 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Revenue 
Equalises 
1.5 - - - 
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Source: National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission Report; vol. 11, 1989: 
81 
  By constitutional design Section, 7(6) of the 1979 constitution states that: 
Subject to the provisions of this constitution, the National Assembly shall make 
provisions for statutory allocation of public revenue to local government councils 
in the federation; and the House of Assembly of a State shall make provisions for 
statutory allocation of public revenue to local government councils within the state 
(The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979). 
 Similar provisions are also contained in Section 149 subsection 2-7 of the 1979 constitution as 
follows: 
(2) Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall be distributed among the 
federal and state governments, and the local government councils in each state, on such terms and 
in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
In line with subsection (2) above, Table 7 shows the process of monthly allocation of revenue from 
the federation account. 
Table 7: Process of Monthly Allocation of revenue from Federation Account 
Institution Role 
Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal 
Commission 
Monitor revenue accruals into and 
disbursements from the federation account. It, 
therefore, determines the allocation indices. 
Central Bank of Nigeria A custodian of the federation account 
Federation Accounts allocation committee It determines monthly disbursement from the 
federation account. It comprises of a 
representative of the federal, 36 states 
government, RMAFC, and other revenue 
agencies etc. 
State Joint Local Government Account It determines monthly, disbursement from the 
State Joint Local Government Account. It 
comprises of representatives of the state and 
local governments. 
Source: Kabir A Bashir (2008), Workshop paper. 
(3) Any amount standing to the credit of the states in the Federation Account shall be distributed 
among the states on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly   
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(4) The amount standing to the credit of local government councils in the Federation Account shall 
be allocated to the states for the benefit of their local government councils on such terms and in 
such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly 
(5) Each state shall maintain a special account to be called “State Joint Local Government 
Account” into which shall be paid all allocations to the local government councils of the state from 
the Federation Account and from the government of the state. 
(6) Each state shall pay to local government councils in its area of jurisdiction such proportion of 
its total revenue on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
(7) The amount standing to the credit of the local government councils of a state shall be distributed 
among the local government councils of that state on such terms and in such manner as may be 
prescribed by the House of Assembly of the State.    
The above shows that areas of fiscal relationships among the levels of government are 
constitutionally defined to avoid any conflict of interests, yet actors at different levels of 
government abuse this constitutional provision for their personal interests. Therefore, rather than 
having cooperation among the levels of government, IGR has been conflictual.    
The fiscal arrangement is considered the most contentious issue in Nigerian federalism. There is 
often structural fiscal imbalance both vertically and horizontally among the levels of government. 
Vertical revenue imbalance occurs when the federal government appropriates more revenue than 
its fair share from the federation accounts while horizontal imbalance exists with unequal fiscal 
capacity among states (Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide 1988). Derivation principle, which dominated 
the horizontal revenue allocation scheme between the late 1940s and mid-1960s, exacerbated the 
horizontal imbalance (Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide 1988).  
  Since the discovery of oil in 1958, the derivation principle seeks to allocate natural resources (oil 
and gas) revenues accruable to the Federation’s Account.  
Table 8 shows the oil revenue sharing formula in Nigeria among the three tiers of government 
between 1958 and 2001. The table indicates that the federal government receives the bulk of oil 
revenue on yearly basis, leaving the state and local governments with lower oil revenue.  After the 
first military intervention in 1966, revenue allocation from oil has been tilted towards the federal 
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government. The state and local governments’ share of oil revenue has dwindled. Thus, revenue 
allocation formula favours the federal government at the expense of the constituent units. This 
analysis is in tandem with the opinion of one of the key informants who described the system of 
revenue allocation in Nigeria as ‘fiscal centralism’ (where revenue allocations are concentrated at 
the centre) rather than the system of fiscal federalism (decentralised and devolved revenue 
allocation) (Personal Interview VII, June 4, 2018).        
 
Table 8: Oil revenue sharing formula in Nigeria among the tiers of government, 1958-2001 
Year Federal State Local Special 
project 
Derivation 
formula 
1958 40% 60% 0% 0% 50% 
1968 80% 20% 0% 0% 10% 
1977 75% 22% 3% 0% 10% 
1982 55% 32.5% 10% 2.5% 10% 
1989 50% 24% 15% 11% 10% 
1995 48.5% 24% 20% 7.5% 13% 
2001 48.5% 24% 20% 7.5% 13% 
Source: Barkan (2001), State and Local Governance in Nigeria Public Sector and capacity building 
programme organised for the Africa region by the World Bank. 
Section 4 of the 1979 constitution states that amount standing to the credit of local government 
councils in the Federation Account shall be allocated to the states for the benefit of their local 
government councils on such terms and in such manner as prescribed by the National Assembly. 
Table 9 presents the federal statutory allocation of revenue to local governments between 1976 
and 1992 (N million). The Federal statutory allocation of revenue to local governments in 1979 
was N261.4 million. This increased to N352.6 million, N1085.0 million, N1081.7 million and 
N976.9 million in 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983 respectively.  A drastic change in percentage of 
federal allocation occurred in 1981 and negative percentage change in 1982 and 1983. This 
analysis revealed that federal allocation to local governments in the Second Republic was 
relatively low. 
Table 9: Nigeria: Federal statutory allocations of revenue to local governments, 1976-1992 
(N’ million) 
121 
 
Year Federal 
Allocation (N 
million) 
% change in 
Federal 
Allocation 
Federal Revenue 
(N million) 
Federal 
Allocation/Federal 
Revenue% 
1976 100.0 - 6765.9 1.5 
1977 250.0 150.0 8042.2 3.1 
1978 150.0 40.0 7469.3 2.0 
1979 261.4 74.3 10913.5 2.4 
1980 352.6 34.9 15234.0 2.3 
1981 1085.0 207.8 12190.2 8.9 
1982 1081.7 -0.3 11764.4 9.2 
1983 976.9 -9.7 10508.7 9.3 
1984 1061.5 8.7 11766.8 9.0 
1985 1327.5 25.1 14680.8 9.0 
1986 1166.9 -12.1 12837.6 9.1 
1987 2117.8 81.5 25099.8 8.4 
1988 2727.1 28.8 27310.8 10.0 
1989 3399.8 24.7 50272.1 6.8 
1990 7680.0 125.9 66895.4 11.5 
1991 10764.8 40.2 78640.7 13.7 
1992 16488.0 53.2 138617.0 11.9 
 Source: Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Lagos. 
5.5 Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Empirical Analysis 
The annulment of June 12, 1993 election led to the collapse of the Third Republic in Nigeria. 
General Abdulsalam later led a transition government that ushered a democratically elected 
government on May 29, 1999. The relationship between the levels of government in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic was described as a conflictual relationship. This is because the levels of 
government had always been at loggerheads with one another. Area of conflict ranges from the 
constitutional power of the federal government to resource control and local government creation.  
Conflict existed between the federal government and Lagos State government on local government 
creation. Lagos State had earlier created additional thirty-seven (37) Local Government Council 
Development Areas (LGCDAs) from the existing recognised local government in the state. This 
action made the federal government under the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo to 
withhold the monthly allocation due to the local governments in Lagos State. This invariably led 
to litigation between the federal government and Lagos state.  
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The Supreme Court ruled that the action of the state government in the creation of the local 
government areas was not illegal, but since the require approval and ratification by the National 
Assembly had not been obtained by the state, the creation of such local governments remain 
inchoate, pending ratification by the National Assembly (The Nation, 11 August 2009). A 
respondent observed that Lagos State House of Assembly was right in creating local government, 
but the process was inchoate (not completed) because there was no approval from the National 
Assembly. The court decided that federal government had no right to withhold the state fund 
because the money belongs to the people (Personal Interview IX, July 5, 2018).  
The newly created local government councils by the then Lagos State government under the 
democratic leadership of governor Bola Tinubu caused constitutional conflict between Lagos state 
and the Federal governments. In this, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adu wrote a letter conveying 
the position of the federal government on the creation of additional 37 Local Government Council 
Development Areas to the constitutionally recognised 20 Local Governments in Lagos State to 
Governor Babatunde Raji Fashola (SAN). In the four-page letter dated 14 July 2009, the President 
urged the state government to effect an immediate reversal to the original 20 councils (ThisDay, 
30 July 2009). The Yar-Adua’s administration alleged Lagos State of violating the 1999 
Constitutional procedures of creating a new local government in Nigeria. The federal government 
made its stand known to the public of the consequent effect of the illegal creation of 37 local 
governments in Lagos State. The federal government allegation against Lagos State was premised 
on the following grounds: 
 
That the 37 local governments created by the Lagos State were not in accordance 
with the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The federal 
government pointed constitutional order for the creation of an additional new local 
government by the Lagos State that the Lagos State government refused to 
recognise the judgment of the High court of Lagos State pronounced on June 9, 
2008 (ThisDay, 30 July 2009). 
The federal government further supported its claim with the constitutional provision of First 
Schedule, Part 1 Section 3 of 1999 Constitution, which listed the names of the recognised local 
governments in Lagos state (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
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The Federal Government also contended that Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Local Government Areas 
Law No. 5 of 2002 of Lagos State, were in contravention of section 3(6) and Part 1 of the First 
Schedule to the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and therefore are 
unconstitutional and invalid.  The federal Government, therefore, sought for an injunction that 
would restrain the Lagos state Governor, the Lagos State House of Assembly or any functionaries 
or agencies of the Lagos state government from maintaining, financing and recognising any local 
government in Lagos State apart from the ones created under Schedule 1 of the 1999 constitution 
(ThisDay, 30 July 2009). 
Another case was the state government action towards the local governments, which had resulted 
in unpleasant relations between the states and local governments. For example, some of the local 
government chairmen were removed from office. For instance, the governor of Kaduna State, as 
well as his Zamfara counterpart, suspended some local government Chairmen. This infuriated the 
local government Chairmen. Consequently, the chairmen went to court to challenge the actions of 
the thirty-six governors and their state assemblies (Fadeyi 2001 cited in Chiamogu, Onwughalu 
and Chiamogu 2012). In Ondo State, the governor removed six local government Chairmen. These 
included Chief Dupe Ogundiminegba (Ose local government), Chief Gilbert Adepoju (Ondo East 
local government), Chief Adedayo Adesida (Ondo West local government), Chief Saka 
Oloeunyomi (Odigbo local government), Chief Ayeni Olayeye (Okitipupa local government), and 
Dr. Francis Ajih (Ese Odo local government) (Olasupo 2014). 
In Edo State, some council Chairmen were suspended and removed. The Chairman of Owan West 
local government council, Mr. Godwin Aigbodion was initially suspended and removed after 
alleged allegations of wrongdoing were established. The removal was a sequel to the consideration 
of the report of the House Committee on Local Government’s Commission of Enquiry into 
Aigbodion’s alleged gross misconduct (Owegie 2015). The committee in its report said it 
discovered that the suspended Chairman lack the basic competence to head the council. The 
committee also discovered that the Chairman’s financial recklessness plunged the council into 
huge debt (Owegie 2015).  
In a similar case, the governor, Adams Oshiomhole, suspended the Vice-Chairman of Etsako West 
Local Government, Mr. Alhassan Mohammed, few minutes after swearing him as the Chairman. 
The Edo State House of Assembly also approved the suspension of four Local Government 
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Chairmen in the state. The affected local government chairmen and their respective councils are 
Osaro Obazee (Oredo); Victor Enobakhare (Egor); Roland Ibierutomwen (Orhiomwon) and 
Emmanuel Momoh (Etsako Central) (Owegie 2015). Their suspension followed a request by 
Governor Adams Oshiomhole following financial recklessness levied against them resulting in 
their inability to pay council workers their salaries. According to the letter, Oshiomhole listed non-
payment of salaries without proper explanation; illegal employment; diversion of funds; lack of 
due process in the award of contracts and inability to account for internally generated revenue, as 
the reasons behind the suspension of the former council Chairmen (Owegie 2015). 
Less than 24 hours after the Edo State government suspended four local government Chairmen for 
two months over poor performance, the State House of Assembly announced the suspension of the 
Chairman of Akoko-Edo Local Government Council, Mr. Akeredolu Folorunsho over alleged 
misappropriation of public funds (Owegie 2015). 
The Chairman of Ughelli North Local Government, George Osikorobia was suspended for three 
reasons First, “refusal to render income and expenditure accounts to the legislative house as 
prescribed by Section 70(5) of the local government law, 1999 of Delta State. Second, he was 
suspended for “violating section 61 (1 and 4) of the local government law”. Third, in spite of 
resolutions, invitations, reminders, and summons on him by the house, the Chairman ignored 
(Umanah 2000, p.35). 
In Epe local government of Lagos State, the Chairman of the council that was found guilty of 
highhandedness against the legislature had to be suspended by the state governor. The legislature 
accused him of “authoritarian style” in the way he took “over the jobs of supervisory councillors 
and running the council like his personal household (Aiyetan 2001, p.48). 
A similar accusation of highhandedness was levied against Gilbert Nnaji, Chairman of Enugu East 
Local Government in Enugu State. It was only in rare cases where the removal of local government 
Chairmen was done without external interference of the state government or any godfather. In this 
case, the legislative council may demonstrate its independence of the external forces by removing 
its leader. For example, in Lagos State, “the leader of Ifako-Ijaye Local Government legislative 
House, Honourable Fadare was removed on September 8, 2009 (Okwuofo 2009, p.12). Less than 
a month thereafter, at a plenary session of the council, held on 29th September 2009 at the chamber, 
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Iju Areas office, a legislative member “Honourable Babajide Atala, moved the motion that the 
House revert to the status quo” (Okwuofo 2009, p.12).          
In addition, there was a dispute between the federal government and Lagos State, over which of 
the Town Planning Authorities should exercise town planning powers, over the 45.72 metres land, 
which runs parallel to both sides of the federal highways under loops formed by bridges as well as 
under the bridges (Abiodun 2003, p.43 cited in Bamgbose 2008). In Lagos state, such highways 
are Kingsway Road in Ikoyi, Western Avenue in Surulere, old Agege Motor Road among others. 
Since the land in question had been acquired by the Federal Government, the Federal 
Government’s town planning authority thought that it was under its jurisdiction to exercise relevant 
town planning powers which should include approving building plans for all forms of development 
within such law (Abiodun 2003: 43 cited in Bamgbose 2008). 
The Lagos State Urban and Regional Planning Board (LASURPB) argued among other things that 
under the 1999 constitution, town planning was a residual matter within the exclusive legislative 
and executive competence of the state. In order to assert the level of government that has the 
constitutional right over the land, Lagos state sued the federal government in the Supreme Court 
on Wednesday, March 20, 2002. Fifteen months later, judgment was delivered in favour of Lagos 
State. 
Delivering the judgment, the Supreme Court declared  
Town planning and the regulation of physical development of the land was the 
exclusive responsibility of the state government in whose territory the land lay. 
Henceforth, the Federal Government should not engage itself in giving building 
permits, licenses or approval over federal land in any state territory except without 
the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) (Abiodun 2003: 43 cited in Bamgbose 2008). 
A former Minister in the Second Republic corroborated this assertion of the Supreme Court in the 
course of the interview the researcher had with him when he concluded that the conflict between 
the federal, state and local governments is a constitutional issue (Personal Interview IV, November 
29, 2017). Any pronouncement of the constitution must be obeyed (Personal Interview IV, 
November 29, 2017). Whenever there was a conflict, the levels of government must go to the 
Supreme Court to resolve it. The Supreme Court is the first and the last to resolve conflict (Personal 
Interview IV, November 29, 2017). 
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Another conflictual relationship was between the federal government and the eight littoral states 
like Ondo, Akwa-Ibom, Rivers, Lagos, Delta, Ogun, Bayelsa, and Cross-River that embarked on 
resource control conflicts. The rudiment of the conflict is the agitation for the derivation principle35 
in revenue allocation. The litigants demanded the application of derivation in revenue allocation. 
The states demanded that the revenue from offshore resources should be paid into Federation 
Account but 13% of it should be set aside for them while 87% should go to all the states and local 
governments as well as the federal government (Sagay 2001). Table 10 gives the summary of the 
derivation formula adopted in Nigeria since 1960. 
Table 10: Derivation Formula in Nigeria (1960 to date) 
Years Producing States (%) Federal Government 
(%) 
Distributable Pool 
(%)* 
1960-67 50 20 30 
1967-69 50 - 50 
1969-71 45 - 55 
1971-75 45 minus off-shore 
proceeds 
- 55 plus off-shore 
proceeds 
1975-79 20 minus off-shore 
proceeds 
- 80 plus off-shore 
proceeds 
1979-81 - - 100 
1982-92 1 and half - 98 and half 
1992-99 3 - 97 
1999 to date 13 - 87 
Source: Adapted from Sagay, 2001. *Beginning from 1967, the federal government shared from 
the Distributable Pool. 
Some factors were responsible for the demand for resource control36.  First, was the injustice and 
inequity that characterised the distribution of natural resources, particularly oil revenue. Second, 
was the decision to jettison derivation as a fundamental principle of revenue allocation, which 
reduced the amount of funds going to the pauperised oil-producing areas. The third factor was the 
lack of infrastructural development in the oil-producing areas. Fourth, was a new democratic 
                                                          
35 The derivation principle seeks to allocate natural resource (oil and gas) revenues accruable to the Federation Account 
on the basis that is perceived to be equitable, given particular consideration to the resource producing states and 
regions.  
36 Resource control became a prominent issue in federal-state relations in Obasanjo’s administration, with the littoral 
states (Aka Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, Ogun, Ondo, and Rivers) claiming that the natural resources 
located offshore ought to be treated or regarded as located within their respective states. 
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dispensation, which allowed for overt airing of grievances that were suppressed, violently, under 
military rule. Fifth, was the introduction of Sharia judicial system by a few Northern states which 
was seen by the southern states as a major test for the Federal Constitution. 
The federal government approached the Supreme Court to seek an interpretation of the state’s 
boundary that extended to continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. The government 
sought to know whether the money derived from mineral exploration from such zones should be 
shared to the littoral states (Sagay 2001). However, eleven of the thirty-six states raised 
preliminary objections, challenging the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear the suit. Their 
contention was that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court did not extend to the realm of 
international law and it had no power to entertain the claims of the federal government (Sagay 
2001).  
The states further claimed that the action was premature because the President had not presented 
any proposal for revenue sharing formula before the National Assembly in accordance with section 
162 subsection 2 of the constitution.  The section stated 
The President, upon the receipt of advice from the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation 
and Fiscal Commission, shall table before the National Assembly proposals for 
revenue allocation from the Federation Account, and in determining the formula, 
the National Assembly shall take into account, the allocation principles especially 
those of population, equality of States, internal revenue generation, land mass, 
terrain as well as population density. 
The above analysis is the evidence that the judiciary awoke to its constitutional duties as contained 
in Part 1 Section 232 and 233 of the 1999 constitution by entrusting democratic stability through 
adjudication and settlement of disputes between the federal and the constituent units (The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).     
Prior to the Fourth Republic, constitutional provisions did not back up Revenue Allocation. 
Therefore, distribution of revenue was through decrees and edicts. Table 11 gives the summary of 
revenue allocation after the Second Republic.  
Table 11: Summary of Revenue Allocation from 1988-1993 (IN BILLIONS) 
Allocations 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
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Federal 
Government 
13.92 
(55%) 
14.91 
(55%) 
22.71 
(50%) 
31.86 
(50%) 
47.1 (50%) 58.2 
(48.5%) 
State 
Government 
8.23 
(32.5%) 
8.807 
(32.5%) 
13.63 
(30%) 
19.18 
(30%) 
23.58 
(25%) 
28.8 (24%) 
Local 
Government 
2.53 (10%) 2.71 (10%) 6.81 (15%) 9.59 (15%) 18.87 
(20%) 
24.0 (20%) 
Source: First Bank: Monthly Business and Economic Reports for 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992 
and 1993. 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are the percentages of allocation. 
Fiscal relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic had its root from the constitution. Section 162 
Subsection 1-8 of the 1999 Constitution contained the allocation of Federal Revenue among the 
three levels of government. According to Section 162: 
(1)  All revenues collected by the Government shall be paid into “the Federation 
Account” and the President upon the receipt from the Revenue Mobilisation 
Allocation and Fiscal Commission, shall table before the National Assembly 
proposals for revenue allocation. The amount standing to the credit of the Federation 
shall be distributed among the Federal, State and Local governments as prescribed 
by the National Assembly (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999).   
 
Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) was empowered to monitor 
the accruals to and disbursement of revenue from the Federation Account. It has the constitutional 
mandate to review, from time to time, the revenue allocation formulae and principles in operation 
to ensure conformity with changing realities. Aside from this, RMAFC has the power to advise 
the Federal and State Governments on fiscal efficiency and methods by which their revenue could 
be increased, and it determines the remuneration that are appropriate for political office holders, 
including the President, Vice President, Governors, Deputy Governors. It is mandatory for the 
Commission to discharge such other functions as are conferred on the Commission by this 
Constitution or any Act of the National Assembly. 
The Fourth Republic inherited the 1992 revenue sharing formula with the following features: 
Federal Government (48.5%), State Government (24%), Local Government Councils (20%) and 
Special Funds (7.5%) out of which FCT had (1%), Ecology (2%), Stabilisation (1.5%) and 
National Resources (3%). The first proposal under the administration of President Olusegun 
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Obasanjo submitted to the National Assembly from RMAFC had as proposal Federal Government 
(41.3%), State Government (31%), Local Government Councils (16%) and Special Funds (11.7%) 
(i.e. FCT 1.2%, Ecology 1%, National Resources 1%, Agriculture and Solid Mineral Development 
1.5% and Basic Education 7%) (Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission 1999).  
Before the National Assembly could debate on the proposal, there was a Supreme Court verdict in 
April 2002 on the Resource control Summit that nullified a provision of special funds in any given 
Revenue Allocation Formula (Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission 1999). 
The formula in operation in 1992 automatically gave way as President Obasanjo invoked an 
Executive Order in May 2002 to redistribute the formula to reflect the verdict (Revenue 
Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission 1999). The Executive Order, which was 
acceptable by law, gave Federal Government 56%, State Government 24% and Local Government 
Councils 20%. An outcry by other tiers of government on the distribution made the President 
review the Executive Order in July 2002 with some adjustments bringing the revenue formula to 
Federal Government 54.68%, State Government 24.72% and Local Government Councils 20.60%. 
Another Executive Order increased state allocation to 26.72% and Federal Government to 52.68% 
(Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission 1999). 
Another proposal was submitted in September 2004 by RMAFC, which was recommended by the 
National Assembly, with Federal Government 53.69%, State Government 31.10%, and Local 
Government Councils 15.21% (Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission 1999). 
In the real sense of it, 6.5% built in the allocation of Federal, Government was to cater for Special 
Funds thereby leaving the Federal Government with 47.19% (Revenue Mobilisation Allocation 
and Fiscal Commission, 1999).  
Table 12 presents a summary of the vertical allocation of the Federation Account from 1981 to 
2004. From the 1999 Constitution, the 13% Derivation provision was accounted for before the 
revenue is allocated into the Federation Account. The current revenue formula is based on the 
modified grant from the Federal Ministry of Finance, which came to effect in March 2004. The 
horizontal allocation indices for sharing revenue among states and local government councils are 
Equality, Population, Internal Revenue, Landmass, Rural Roads, Inland Water Way, Education, 
Health, and potable water. 
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Table 12: Vertical allocation of the Federation Account from 1981 to 2004 
Items Initial 
1981 
Act 1/ 
Revised 
1981 
Act 
1990 January 
1992 
June 
1992 
to 
April 
2002 
May 
2002 (1st 
Executive 
Order) * 
July 2002 
(2nd 
Executive 
Order) * 
March 
2004 
(Modified 
from 
FMF) 2/* 
Federal 
Government 
55 55 50 50 48.5 56 54.68 52.68 
State 
Government 
26.5 30.5 30 25 24 24 24.72 26.72 
Local 
Government 
10 10 15 20 20 20 20.6 20.6 
Special Funds 8.5 4.5 5 5 7.5 - - - 
A) Derivation 
(Oil 
producing 
states) 
2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 
B) 
Development 
of mineral 
producing 
areas 
3 1.5 1.5 1.5 3 0 0 0 
C) Initial 
development 
of FCT, 
Abuja 
2.5 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
D) General 
ecological 
problems 
1 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 
E) 
Stabilisation 
0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 
F) Savings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G) Other 
special 
projects 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
    Source: Adapted from Ojo, 2010. 
Table 13 below presents the horizontal revenue allocation formula between 1970 and 2004. 
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Table 13: Horizontal revenue allocation formula between 1970 and 2004 
Principles 1970
-80 
(%) 
Initia
l 
1981 
Act 
(%) 
Revise
d 1981 
Act (%) 
199
0 to 
199
5 
(%) 
Proposals 
of 
NRMAF
C (%) 
Proposals 
of NCC 
Committe
e on 
Revenue 
Allocation 
Current 
Formul
a (%) 
Septembe
r 2004 
Proposal 
(%) 
Equality of 
states 
(Minimum 
responsibilit
y of 
Government 
50 50 40 40 40 30 40 45.23 
Population 50 40 40 30 30 40 30 25.6 
Population 
density 
0 0 0 0 0 10 0 1.45 
Internal 
Revenue 
Generation 
effort 
0 0 5 10 20 10 10 8.31 
Land mass 0 10 0 10 0 10 10 5.35 
Social 
Developmen
t Factor  
0 0 15 10 10 0 10 8.71 
Education - - - - - - 4 3 
Health - - - - - - 3 3 
Rural 
Road/Inland 
Water way 
- - - - - - - 1.21 
Water - - - - - - 3 1.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Adapted from Ojo 2010 
Revenue allocation formula adopted in the Fourth Republic met with mixed reaction from the state 
governors. Most of the state governors claimed that allocation from the Federation Account to the 
states was inadequate and this led to their refusal to pay the N18,000 minimum wage approved by 
the federal government. States that have found it difficult to pay the new wage include Oyo, Ekiti, 
Ogun, Kwara, Osun, Niger, Kogi, Benue, Sokoto, Yobe, Abia, Imo, Enugu, Ebonyi, Adamawa, 
and Borno. For example, Ekiti State Governor, Dr Kayode Fayemi, had explained that his 
administration would not be able to pay N18,000 minimum wage.     
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An analysis of Revenue Allocation Formula in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic reveals that the bulk of 
the ‘Federation Account’ was allocated to the federal government. In an interview with one of the 
key informants, who happened to be the Speaker of a state House of Assembly, he observed that 
the power given to the federal government is too much (Personal Interview VI, February 26, 2018). 
All politics are local, and developments are local. Giving highest power to the federal government 
makes the state to be worried about the relation. Resource allocation makes it difficult for the state 
to rely on the administration of the federal government and this hinders the development of the 
state (Personal Interview VI, February 26, 2018). 
In corroborating the submission of the Speaker, a one-time politician of the Second Republic who 
also served in the Fourth Republic stressed that the parameters used in sharing the federal 
allocation are faulty (Personal Interview II, November 3, 2017). To him, the three tiers of 
government were not properly defined. For example, the creation of local government is subject 
to the state government and the state government (Personal Interview II, November 3, 2017) has 
usurped most of the revenue powers of the local governments. 
Tax assignments to the various levels of government have also constituted 
important areas of revenue accruing to the central and the constituent units. Both 
the 1979 and 1999 constitutions assigned taxes or duties jurisdictions to the levels 
of government. Section 150 subsection (a) and (b) of the 1979 Constitution; and 
Section 163 subsection (a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution described the allocation 
of other revenues in form of taxes or duties to the levels of government. According 
to Section 163 subsection (a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended):Where 
under an Act of the National Assembly, tax or duty is imposed in respect of any of 
the matters specified in item D of Part 11 of the Second Schedule to this 
Constitution, the net proceeds of such tax or duty shall be distributed among the 
States on the basis of derivation and accordingly-where such tax or duty is collected 
by the Government of a State or other authority of the State, the net proceeds shall 
be treated as part of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of that State; where such tax 
or duty is collected by the Government of the Federation or other authority of the 
Federation, there shall be paid to each State at such times as the National Assembly 
may prescribe a sum equal to the proportion of the net proceeds of such tax or duty 
that are derived from that State (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999). 
Table 14 gives the summary of tax assignments to the various levels of government. It shows 
clearly that the most important taxes fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government. These 
taxes include import duties, mining taxes, petroleum profit tax and altogether account for the total 
national recurrent revenue (Adesopo, Agbola and Akinlo 2004, pp.184-185). Thus, tax assignment 
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in Nigeria indicates a centralisation of fiscal policies (Adesopo, Agbola and Akinlo 2004, pp.184-
185).   
Table 14:  Tax assignments to the various levels of government 
Type of Tax Law Administration and 
collection 
Right to revenue 
Import duties Federal Federal Federation Account 
Excise duties Federal Federal Federation Account 
Export duties Federal Federal Federation Account 
Mining, rents, and 
royalties 
Federal  Federal Federation Account 
Petroleum profit tax Federal Federal Federation Account 
Company income tax Federal Federal Federation Account 
Capital gains tax Federal Federal State 
Personal income tax Federal Federal State 
Personal income tax*, 
Licensing fees on 
television and 
wireless 
Federal Federal Federal 
Radio Federal Local Local 
Stamp duties Federal Federal/State Local 
Capital transfer tax Federal State State 
Value added tax Federal Federal Federal/State/Local 
Pool betting and other 
betting taxes 
State State State 
Motor vehicle and 
driver’s license 
State State State 
Entertainment tax State State State 
Land registration and 
survey fees 
State State State 
Property taxes and 
survey fees 
State Local Local 
Market and trading 
license and fees 
State Local Local 
  Source: Asadurian et al 2006 
*armed forces, external affairs, non-residents, residents of the FCT, and Nigerian police 
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5.6 Changing Pattern of Nigerian Fiscal Federalism and its implications on service delivery  
The changing pattern of federal structure in Nigeria has serious implications on the financial 
capability of the constituent units to deliver services. In the interview the researcher had with one 
of the respondents, the latter emphasised that service delivery was a function of the availability of 
fund especially internally generated revenue (Personal Interview IX, July 5, 2018). According to 
the interviewee, Lagos state has resources that produce a large quantum of the fund (Personal 
Interview IX, July 5, 2018). Corroborating the opinion expressed by the interviewee, one-time 
politician of the Second Republic observed that: 
There is under-utilisation of resources at the state and local level levels because 
most states and local governments are not ready to tap their resources. This is 
because the monthly allocation did not encourage the constituentunits to explore 
their revenue base (Personal Interview II, November 3, 2017). 
Service delivery of the levels of government is a function of tax-raising powers and revenue 
allocation. Both the 1979 and 1999 Nigerian constitutions are very clear about the powers of the 
three levels of government to raise revenue through taxes. The Second Schedule Part 1 contains 
the tax-raising powers of the federal government, and Part II Section 7 has the tax-raising powers 
of the state government. Section 7 Fourth Schedule contains the tax-raising powers of the Local 
government (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The federal and state 
governments have exclusive powers to generate funds through taxation as prescribed by the 
constitution. Although the constitution granted the federal government enormous tax powers than 
the constituent units, there is no concurrent power to generate funds through taxes.  
According to section 44(3) of the 1999 constitution, taxes such as corporate income taxes, customs, 
and excise duties, export duties, stamp duties, and taxes in respect of mineral oils and natural gas 
are the exclusive reserve of the federal government (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999). Constitutionally, local governments have limited taxation powers as contained in 
Section 7, Fourth Schedule of 1999 Constitution. Such powers, among others, include motor park 
duties, property taxes, market fees, fees from licensing of bicycles, trucks.37 Internally generated 
                                                          
37 Paragraph D, Part 11, Second Schedule of the Constitution empowers the National Assembly to exercise its powers 
to impose certain specified taxes or duties, to provide that the collection of such taxes or duties be “carried out by the 
Government of a State or other authority of a State”, with a provision that such taxes or duties not be levied on the 
same person by more than one state. See also Section 165. 
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revenues, through taxation and other levies, are sources of finance that determined, in part, the 
service delivery capacity of a state.  Internally generated revenues are those revenue sources 
generated within the jurisdiction of the states and local governments.  
Table 15 depicts the total revenue and internal revenue generated in the South west geopolitical 
zone. Lagos state has the highest internally generated revenue of N714.3 billion between 2007 and 
2011, while the Ekiti state had the lowest internally generated revenue of N15.9 billion. The 
internally generated revenue as a percentage of total revenue in Lagos and Ekiti states were 36.7% 
and 7.9% respectively. Ondo state had the lowest internal generated revenue as a percentage of 
total revenue of 7.2%. This was an indication that Lagos state would have a greater capacity to 
deliver services than other states due to the availability of funds.  
The trend for all the states with the exception of Lagos state was dwindling internally generated 
revenue. In the South West zone, the five selected states with the exception of Lagos state rely 
heavily on revenue from the federal government. The Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report 
points out that the internally generated revenue of Ekiti, Lagos, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo during the 
period 2007-2011 were 7.9%, 36.7%, 7.2%, 14.9% and 15.5% of the total revenue respectively. 
The analysis shows that Lagos state has the capacity to harness resources within the state, which 
has accounted for higher internal revenue. Therefore, Lagos state has the financial capacity to 
deliver services to the people than other states in the South West geopolitical zone. The low 
internal generated revenue of Ekiti, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states would affect their capacities to 
deliver services to the citizens.  
Table 15: Total revenue and internally generated revenue for South West Nigeria, 2007-2011 
States Total Revenue (N’ 
billion) 
Internally generated 
revenue (N’ billion) 
Internally generated 
revenue as % of total 
revenue 
Ekiti 201.0 15.9 7.9 
Lagos 1944.6 714.3 36.7 
Ogun 338.6 67.9 20.1 
Ondo 231.8 16.6 7.2 
Osun 256.2 38.2 14.9 
Oyo 354.6 54.8 15.5 
Total 3326.8 907.7 27.2 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports, 2007-2011  
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Table 16 shows total revenue and internally generated revenue for the South-south geopolitical 
zone. Rivers state had the highest internal generated revenue of N258.0 billion with Bayelsa having 
the lowest internally generated revenue of N23.7 billion. Between 2007 and 2011, the internally 
generated revenue as a percentage of total revenue for all the states was 9.54%, an indication that 
the bulk of revenue for the states was from the federation account. Similarly, Rivers had the highest 
total revenue of N1724.1b and Cross River had the lowest total revenue of N311.0b. The 
implication of this was that service delivery would be poor in the states with low internal generated 
revenue. All the six states in the South-South geopolitical zone had low internal generated revenue 
as a percentage of total revenue.   
Table 16: Total revenue and internally generated revenue for South-South Nigeria, 2007-
2011 
States Total Revenue (N’ 
billion)  
Internally generated 
revenue (N’ billion) 
Internally generated 
revenue as % of total 
revenue 
Akwa Ibom 1103.2 54.9 5.0 
Bayelsa 728.5 23.7 3.3 
Cross River 311.0 28.8 9.3 
Delta 916.7 74.4 8.1 
Edo 342.6 49.5 14.4 
Rivers 1724.1 258.0 15.0 
Total 5126.1 489.3 9.54 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports (2007-2011) 
Table 17 presents the total revenue and internally generated revenue for the South east geopolitical 
zone. It showed that Abia had the highest total revenue and internally generated revenue of 
N390.1b and N70.2b respectively. The lowest total revenue and internally generated revenue was 
Ebonyi state with N183.8b and N9.4b respectively. The trend was that there was relatively low 
internally generated revenue as a percentage of total revenue for all the states during the period. In 
all these states, the low internal revenue base would affect service delivery. 
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Table 17: Total revenue and internally generated revenue for South East Nigeria, 2007-2011 
States Total Revenue (N’ 
billion) 
Internally generated 
revenue (N’ billion) 
Internally generated 
revenue as % of total 
revenue 
Abia 390.1 70.2 18.0 
Anambra 292.5 27.8 9.5 
Ebonyi 183.8 9.4 5.1 
Enugu 217.2 17.0 7.8 
Imo 295.9 25.8 8.7 
Total 1379.5 150.2 10.8 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports (2007-2011). 
Table 18 presents the total revenue and internally generated revenue of states in the North West 
geopolitical zone from 2007 to 2011. Kano state had the highest total revenue of N422.8 while 
Katsina state had the lowest total revenue of N226.6. The highest internal generated revenue was 
Sokoto state with N83.6b and the lowest was Katsina with N13.2b. 
Table 18: Total revenue and internally generated revenue for North West Nigeria, 2007-2011 
States Total Revenue (N’ 
billion) 
Internally generated 
revenue (N’ billion) 
Internally generated 
revenue as % of total 
revenue 
Jigawa 311.2 28.4 9.1 
Kaduna 418.3 45.0 10.8 
Kano 422.8 49.5 11.7 
Katsina 226.6 13.2 5.8 
Kebbi 235.7 17.8 7.6 
Sokoto 382.0 83.6 21.9 
Zamfara 268.8 25.0 9.3 
Total 1996.6 262.5 76.2 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports (2007-2011) 
Table 19 depicts that the Bauchi state had the highest total revenue of N349.8b with Yobe state 
having the lowest total revenue of N202.4b. The highest internally generated revenue was Gombe 
state with N35.8b while the lowest was Yobe state with N6.7b. The analysis showed that all the 
states in North east with the exception of Gombe had low internal generated revenue. 
Table 19: Total revenue and internally generated revenue for North East Nigeria, 2007-2011 
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State Total Revenue (N’ 
billion) 
Internally generated 
revenue (N’ billion) 
Internally generated 
revenue as % of total 
revenue 
Adamawa 251.5 15.8 6.3 
Bauchi 349.8 12.7 3.6 
Borno 280.2 26.8 9.6 
Gombe 283.3 35.8 12.6 
Taraba 240.0 13.0 5.4 
Yobe 202.4 6.7 3.3 
Total 1607.2 110.8 6.8 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports (2007-2011) 
In Table 20, Benue state had the highest total revenue of N296.5b while Nasarawa had the lowest 
total revenue of N193.4b.  Kwara and Nasarawa states had the highest and lowest internally 
generated revenue of N37.8 and N12.7b respectively. A common trend for all the states was low 
internally generated revenue as a percentage of total revenue. 
Table 20: Total revenue and internally generated revenue for North Central Nigeria, 2007-
2011 
State Total revenue 
generated (N’ billion) 
Internally generated 
revenue (N’ billion) 
Internally generated 
revenue as % of total 
revenue 
Benue 296.5 27.2 9.2 
Kogi 262.8 32.8 12.5 
Kwara 278.9 37.8 13.6 
Nasarawa 193.4 12.7 6.6 
Niger 284.2 24.9 8.8 
Plateau 231.8 16.6 7.2 
Total 1547.6 152 9.8 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports (2007-2011) 
Table 21 indicates the internally generated revenue of the states in the six geopolitical zones in 
Nigeria from 2011 to 2017. There were variations in the internally generated revenue between the 
Southern and Northern states between 2011 and 2017. The three geopolitical zones in the Southern 
states generated N3519.6 billion while the three Northern geopolitical zones generated N785 
billion. This showed a very wide gap in the internally generated revenue of the Northern and 
Southern Nigeria.  
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The states in the southwest had the highest internal generated revenue in the southern states with 
Lagos state having N1670.7b and Ekiti state with the lowest of N20.3b. In this case, Lagos state 
was the highest performing state while Ekiti state was the lowest-performing state in revenue 
generation between 2011 and 2017. This made Lagos state to be the most viable state not only in 
the southwest but also in the country. There was a steady increase in the revenue generation from 
N202b in 2011 to N301b in 2016.  Comparatively, Oyo state was an average performing state 
during this period, with a steady rise in revenue in 2011, and it reached its peak in 2014, while 
Ekiti state was the low performing state with an average of N2.9b. The Northwest geopolitical 
zone had the highest revenue generation in the Northern states with N342.8b while the Northeast 
zone had the lowest of N154.9b.   
The above analysis reveals that states in the southern geopolitical zone had the drive to generate 
their revenue from citizens’ taxes rather than depending on the federal allocation. Of utmost 
importance in the southwest was Lagos state that generated a steady increase in internal revenue. 
Other states as Ekiti, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo that had low internally generated revenue might 
have depended on federal allocation.  
Table 21: Internally generated revenue for the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria, 2011-2017  
States 2011(N
’b) 
2012(N
’b) 
2013(N
’b) 
2014(N
’b) 
2015(N
’b) 
2016(N
’b) 
2017(N
’b) 
TOTAL(
N’b) 
South 
West 
        
Ekiti 2.3 3.3 2.7 3.3 3.9 2.6 2.2 20.3 
Lagos 202 219 236 276 268 301 168.7 1670.7 
Ogun 10.2 12.2 13.6 17.5 34.5 56.5 39.3 183.8 
Ondo 8.2 10.0 10.9 11.4 10.0 7.5 5.0 63 
Osun 7.4 5.9 7.7 8.6 8.0 8.5 4.2 50.3 
Oyo 8.5 14.1 15.2 16.2 15.7 15.7 10.7 96.1 
Total 238.6 264.5 286.1 333 340.1 391.8 230.1 2084.2 
South 
East 
        
Abia 11.8 16.5 12.1 12.0 13.7 13.7 7.0  
Anambr
a 
6.0 7.1 8.4 10.1 14.6 14.6 -  
Ebonyi 2.2 8.0 10.2 11.0 11.0 11.0 3.7  
Enugu 7.0 12.0 20.0 19.0 18.0 12.0 12.0  
Imo 5.2 6.0 7.2 8.9 5.8 5.9 4.2  
Total 32.2 49.6 57.9 61 63.1 57.2 26.9 347.9 
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South-
South 
        
Akwa 
Ibom 
11.0 13.0 15.0 15.0 14.0 16.0 7.0  
Bayelsa 3.0 4.0 10.8 10.0 8.2 7.5   
Cross 
River 
9.0 12.0 12.5 15.9 13.3 13.9 6.8  
Delta 34.9 45.0 50.9 42.2 40.9 44.7 25.0  
Edo 17.7 18.8 18.4 17.6 19.2 20.3 13.7  
Rivers 52.2 66.0 87.8 89.5 82.4 82.4 -  
Total 127.8 158.8 195.4 190.2 178 184.8 52.5 1087.5 
North 
West 
        
Jigawa 1.8 7.2 9.7 6.3 5.4 3.1 3.0  
Kaduna 9.9 11.6 10.5 12.5 11.5 15.8 9.1  
Kano 6.0 11.6 17.9 13.8 13.8 34.4 11.0  
Katsina 4.0 5.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 2.7  
Kebbi 4.4 5.6 3.1 3.9 3.3 3.4 2.8  
Sokoto 4.1 4.0 5.4 5.3 6.5 6.5 3.9  
Zamfar
a 
1.6 2.9 3.8 3.9 2.0 4.5 2.3  
Total 31.8 47.9 56.4 51.7 47.5 72.7 34.8 342.8 
North 
East 
        
Adama
wa 
4.9 4.0 4.7 4.7 4.8 7.0 2.9  
Bauchi 4.9 4.2 4,8 4.8 5.0 5.0 3.2  
Borno 2.7 2.3 2.0 2.9 3.3 2.8 2.6  
Gombe 3.3 3.2 3.7 5.9 4.4 5.4 1.0  
Taraba 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.6 2.9  
Yobe 2.9 1.9 3.8 3.8 2.3 3.6 1.6  
Total 21.6 18.9 22.4 25.5 23.9 28.4 14.2 154.9 
North 
Central 
        
Benue 11.5 8.9 8.1 8.7 7.3 8.2 7.9  
Kogi 2.1 3.7 5.1 6.4 6.1 7.7 4.9  
Kwara 8.5 11.3 13.5 12.5 7.7 16.6 10.4  
Nasarra
wa 
4.6 4.6 4.9 4.7 4.5 2.0 3.0  
Niger 3.5 3.9 4.3 5.8 5.8 5.0 3.9  
Plateau 4.3 6.0 8.0 8.9 6.7 9.9 5.9  
Total 34.5 38.4 43.9 47 38.1 49.4 36 287.3 
         
Source: National Bureau of statistics/Joint Tax Board/State Boards of internal revenue, 2011-2017 
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Aside from the internal generated revenue, which served as a determinant of the fiscal capacity of 
the states to deliver services, federation allocation of revenue to the constituent units could also 
determine the level of service delivery of the constituentunits. Here, fiscal federalism in Nigeria 
has undergone structural changes and has affected the states’ performance in service delivery. 
Quite a number of commissions have been set up to deliberate on the acceptable revenue formula. 
These commissions have not been able to arrive at an acceptable formula for revenue sharing in 
the country. 
Under the 1970 Decree No. 13, revenue sharing formula for mining, rents, and royalties was 50 
percent to the Distributive Pool Account (DPA), 45 percent to the state of derivation and 5 percent 
to the Federal Government (Ayua 2001, p.138). The financial capacity of the federal government 
vis-à-vis the states was further strengthened through excise duties on tobacco, export duties, import 
duties (Oyovbaire 1978, p.254). In addition, the federal government took 100 percent of the 
offshore revenues, which robbed the oil-producing states of the derivation principle (Oyovbaire 
1978, p.254).  
By constitutional design, Sections 162-168, Paragraph 11 in the Second Schedule of the 1999 
constitution (as amended) describes the revenue allocation to the levels of government. Section 
162 (1) provided that the creation of “the Federation Account” into which shall be paid all revenues 
collected by the Government of the Federation (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999). These revenues excluded the proceeds from the personal income tax of the 
personnel of the armed forces of the Federation, the Nigeria Police Force, the Ministry or 
Department of government charged with responsibility for Foreign Affairs and the residents of the 
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Section 153 subsection (1) of the 1999 Constitution established 
the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) to monitor the accruals to 
and disbursement of the revenues from the Federation Account (The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
The Commission also had the power to conduct periodic review of the revenue allocation formulae 
and principles in operation to ensure conformity with changing realities (The Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The RMAFC was expected to advise the President on the 
revenue allocation formula before the latter presented it to the National Assembly for consideration 
based on the prescribed principles of population, equality of States, land mass etc (The 
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Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The table below presents the percentage of 
revenue allocation to the levels of government from 1979 to 2002. 
Table 22 showed the revenue allocation from the Federation Account to the federal, state and local 
governments. The trend of revenue allocation revealed that the federal government has a 
substantial percentage of revenue while the constituentunits have lower percentages of revenue 
allocation from the Federation Account.  
In most cases, more than half of the Federation Account was allocated to the federal government, 
leaving the state and the local governments with the relatively lower amount. In spite of the fact 
that service delivery rests more on the constituentunits than the federal government, revenue 
allocation in Nigerian federalism still tilted revenue to the central government at the detriment of 
the subnational levels of government.  
Table 22: Percentage of revenue allocation to the levels of government, 1979 to 2002 
States 1979 1983 198
5 
1988 1989 199
0 
199
1 
199
2 
1993 1999 2002 
to date 
Federal 
governme
nt 
55% 55% 50
% 
55% 55% 50
% 
50
% 
50
% 
48.5
% 
48.5
% 
52.68
% 
State 
governme
nt 
30.5
% 
32.5
% 
30
% 
32.5
% 
32.5
% 
30
% 
30
% 
25
% 
24% 24% 26.72
% 
Local 
governme
nt 
10% 10% 15
% 
10% 10% 15
% 
15
% 
20
% 
20% 20% 20.60
% 
 Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2018 
The lopsided nature of fiscal relationship among the levels of government has created a fiscal 
imbalance in Nigerian federalism. The implication of this is that revenue allocation of the 
constituent units cannot match with the constitutionally assigned responsibilities. Hence, the 
constituent units are incapacitated to deliver services to the people. A key informant has observed 
that the central government is the major constraint to the distribution of fund to the state and local 
governments (Personal Interview VIII, June 19, 2018). 
An official with a civil society observes that allocation to the National Assembly is very high in 
the Fourth Republic as it was the case with the Second Republic (Personal interview 1, November 
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2, 2017). In another interview with one-time politician of the Second Republic who represented 
Somolu Local Government in Lagos State, pointed out that the parameters used in sharing the 
federal allocation are faulty (Personal Interview 11, November 3, 2017). This submission was in 
line with the opinion of the Speaker, Osun State House of Assembly  
The power given to the federal government is too much. All politics are local, and 
developments are local. Giving highest power to the federal government makes the 
state to be worried about the relation. Resource allocation makes it difficult for the 
state to rely on the administration of the federal government and this hinders the 
development of the state”. (Personal Interview VI, February 26, 2018). 
In addition, the structural arrangement of federalism through state creation has limited the financial 
capacity of the states to deliver services. The idea of state creation started after the military 
intervention in 1966. In his submission, one-time politician of the Second Republic observed that 
many states are not worthy of being a state because they are unable to deliver their services 
(Personal Interview IV, November 29, 2017). In another interview with the Speaker of a State 
House of Assembly, he observed that: 
Fiscal incapacitation of the states was due to corruption at the different levels of 
government in the Second and the Fourth Republics.  To him, the individual has 
more resources than the state (Personal Interview VI, February 26, 2018). 
 
5.7 Summary 
In this chapter, the research study examined intergovernmental relations and constitutional 
provisions in Nigeria. The study traced the evolution of IGR from the colonial period, with the 
amalgamation of the Colony of Lagos, the Southern Protectorate and the Northern Protectorate, to 
the post-colonial period. The study further observed that the amalgamation of the Northern and 
Southern Protectorates gave the colonial government impetus to control the territory through the 
adoption of unitary system. The study also considered IGR during the post-colonial period and 
pointed out that there was considerable improvement of IGR during the military rule. The research 
study explored the provisions of the 1979 and the 1999 constitutions with a view to identifying 
areas of divergence between the constitutional provisions and the actual practices of government. 
It was discovered that flagrant abuse of constitutional power existed among the actors of the 
constitution in the Second and the Fourth Republics. In other words, the operators of the 
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constitution deviated from the constitutional provisions. The next chapter is on empirical analysis 
of service delivery in the selected states in the South West, Nigeria 
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                                                       Chapter Six 
Empirical Analysis of Service Delivery in the Selected States, and Constitutional Provisions 
and Practices of government in Nigeria’s Second Republic, 1979-1983 and Fourth Republic, 
1999-2007 
6.1            Introduction 
An inquiry into the service delivery requires an examination of the activities of service providers, 
the end users of services and the executors of the services at the subnational units of government. 
A synergy between the services provided and the services required by the citizens would provide 
a guide for the nature of intergovernmental relations between the federal and the subnational levels 
of government. The existence and functioning of a nation and its government are based on orderly 
human interaction, and the provision of a systematic mode of delivery for a wide array of services, 
ranging from purely governance services to the provision of a variety of social services (Ujo 2015). 
The state provides a social framework that aims at satisfying the social wants, claim, demands, 
and expectations involved in the existence of a civilised society (Ujo 2015).  
 
Democratic societies provide a number of rights for the citizens, and, in return, the state expects 
certain basic duties and responsibilities from the citizen. This would create symbiotic relationships 
with legitimate expectations, by the citizens, from the government for efficient and effective 
delivery of a minimum basket of goods and services (Kabiru 2014).  
In this chapter, the researcher presents an analysis of healthcare service delivery in some of the 
selected states. The research study claims that healthcare service delivery is one way of measuring 
the performance of government at any level. In other words, it shows the degree of responsibility 
of the government to the people. This study claims here that effective service delivery in the health 
sector is a function of adequate infrastructure, diagnostic medical equipment, drugs, and well-
trained medical personnel. This chapter discovers that there are disparities among the states in the 
delivery of health services to the people. In the first section, the researcher provides an analysis of 
different healthcare services rendered to the people by the government. The study claims that 
budgetary allocations to the health sector, to some extent, determined the service delivery to the 
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people. The chapter explores empirical data of budgetary allocation to the health sector and 
discovers a relatively low percentage share of the health sector in the federation allocation.  
The study supports the “Abuja Declaration” where the Heads of State of member countries of the 
African Union pledged to commit at least 15 percent of their annual budgets to improve their health 
sector (Adepoju 2017). In the second section of this chapter, the study explores service delivery in 
education in some of the selected states. The Universal Primary Education (UPE) and Universal 
Basic Education (UBE) are efforts made by the federal government to resolve the imbalance in the 
education system of the country. This study argues that through the UBE federal government 
programme, primary schools’ enrolment has increased tremendously. The study supports this 
claim with empirical data of pupils and teachers’ enrolment in the selected states. The chapter 
presents data on UBE intervention or counterpart fund and gives an empirical analysis of projects 
executed by the State Universal Basic Education Boards (SUBEB). Finally, the study explores 
how states creation in Nigeria has constrained effective service delivery in Osun, Oyo, Ondo, Ekiti 
and Lagos states. 
The drafters of the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions anticipated the need for a strong and united 
political entity at all levels of government. The Constitutions defined the functions and 
responsibilities of the central government and those of the constituent units. The 1999 Constitution 
provided measures for ensuring functional interactions among the levels of government in the area 
of tax assignment and expenditure obligations, revenue allocation and fiscal transfer, state-local 
government joint account, local government elections, and federal character.  The drafters of the 
two Constitutions also made provisions to cater for the diversities of the people, their history, and 
culture, with a view to guarding against the threats of disunity and peace (Oni and Ayomola 2013). 
In this chapter, the researcher argues that constitutional provisions are not in tandem with the 
practices adopted by the operators and actors. There have been flagrant abuses of constitutional 
provisions by the operators. In other words, the operators of the constitution have not adhered 
strictly to its provisions and this has led to conflictual relationships among the levels of 
government. 
In this chapter, the research study examines the constitutional provisions that relate to 
intergovernmental relations. The chapter then explores the major features of these constitutional 
provisions and analyse their applications by the operators. The study discovered that the operators 
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violated some of these provisions in the exercise of the powers of the state.  The research study 
claims that the exercise of the powers of the actors of intergovernmental relations was not in 
tandem with the constitutional provisions. Although, appointments into public offices largely 
complied to   due process, such appointments were often lopsided and not a true reflection of the 
country’s constitutionally supported federal character principles.    
6.2 Healthcare Service Delivery 
In September 2000, the UN Millennium Summit rolled out the eight-point goals, Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) for poverty reduction and social progress to attain by the year 2015. 
The MDGs goals are: (1) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) to achieve universal primary 
education; (3) to promote gender equality and empower women; (4) to reduce child mortality; (5) 
to improve maternal health; (6) to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) to ensure 
environmental sustainability; and (8) to develop a global partnership for development (UNDP 
2005). Three out of these were health-related, while three others were on health and nutrition (Oyo 
State Comprehensive Health Bulletin 2008).  
Health is not just the absence of infirmity or illness but also the presence of physical, social, 
psychological, and mental well-being. The development of a country or state is sustained in 
situations where the citizens are healthy (Oyo State Comprehensive Health Bulletin 2008). Healthy 
individuals produce healthy children who grow up to become healthy and productive adults in 
improving the social and economic development of a state (Oyo State Comprehensive Health 
Bulletin 2008).   
Healthcare service delivery is one of the means of measuring the performance of government at 
any level. In 2001, Nigeria hosted the Heads of State of member countries of the African Union, 
where they made the “Abuja Declaration”. The leaders pledged to commit at least 15 percent of 
their annual budgets to improve their health sector (Adepoju 2017).  
Similarly, the National Health Act, signed into law in December 2014 by former President 
Goodluck Jonathan, stipulated that one percent of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the federal 
government should be set aside to finance health initiatives in the country (National Health Act 
2014). The tenet of the Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in the post-2015 development agenda 
re-emphasised distributional equity and efficiency in healthcare service delivery, through the 
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provision of technical and financial support to healthcare facilities at all levels of administering 
services (National Health Act 2014). Healthcare system required adequate infrastructure to 
enhance efficient and effective delivery of services. Such infrastructure defines the quality of 
services provided based on their relatively adjudged qualitative characteristics (National Health 
Act 2014). 
The performance and the quality of healthcare service delivery in the selected states were 
measured, using certain health Service Delivery Indicators (SDI) such as accuracy of diagnostics, 
compliance with basic clinical guidelines, health staff, availability of drugs and medical 
equipment, infrastructure among others. Equipment and drugs are part of the requirements for a 
minimum healthcare service delivery by Primary Healthcare in Nigeria, as recommended by the 
World Health Organisation (National Primary Healthcare Development Agency and World Health 
Organisation 2015). Healthcare service delivery has become the responsibility of the federal, state 
and local governments as well as religious organisations and individuals (National Population 
Commission 2000). At the state level, the government provides referral health services to patients 
from the primary level of health care (SERAP 2016). The next section focuses on health service 
delivery in Osun state. 
6.2.1 Healthcare Service Delivery in Osun State 
One of the key indicators to development of any country is the accessibility of individuals to 
healthcare facilities. It is in the light of this that the various levels of government (the federal, state 
and local) have recognised the importance of healthcare facilities for sustainable development. In 
Osun state, there exists the distribution of healthcare facilities across the local government council 
areas. Healthcare facilities are divided into two. Primary and Secondary Healthcare Centres. 
Primary Healthcare Centre (PHC) is a whole-of-society approach to health and well-being centred 
on the needs and preferences of individuals, families and communities (World Health 
Organisation, 2019). It addresses the broader determinants of health and focuses on the 
comprehensive and interrelated aspects of physical, mental and social health and well-being 
(World Health Organisation, 2019). According to WHO Declaration, primary health care is 
essential healthcare based on practical, scientifically, sound and socially acceptable methods and 
technology (Papanikolaou and Zygiaris, 2014). PHC is considered to be a critical base for 
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extending care to communities and vulnerable groups (Maisey, Steel, Marsh, Gillam and 
Fleetcroft, 2008). 
Secondary Healthcare Centre refers to a second tier of health system, in which patients from 
primary healthcare are referred to specialists in higher hospitals for treatment. It is the specialized, 
ambulatory, medical services and common place hospital care (outpatient and inpatient services) 
(Oster 2016). Access is often via referral from primary healthcare services (WHO, 2009). They 
are hospitals and out-patients specialist’s clinics to which people go, after referral from primary 
healthcare services (WHO 2015).    
There are thirty (30) local government areas in the state, with 787 Primary Healthcare Centres 
established to deliver basic health services for the people. In 2018, Ife South Local Government 
had the highest number of Primary Healthcare Centres (PHC) with 58 while   Ila Local Government 
had the lowest with eleven (11). Table 23 indicates the number of Primary Healthcare located in 
Osun State as at 2018. The table shows that Primary Healthcare facilities were unevenly distributed 
in the state. Ila, Ede North, Ifelodun, Ilesa East, Olorunda, Orolu, and Osogbo local governments, 
had a relatively lower number of PHC. 
Table 23: Primary Healthcare in Osun State, 2018       
Local Government Number of Primary Healthcare 
Ola Oluwa 32 
Atakumosa East 55 
Atakumosa West 28 
Ayedade 33 
Ayedire 24 
Boluwaduro 20 
Boripe 23 
Ede North 17 
Ede South 22 
Egbedore 26 
Ejigbo 34 
Ife Central 21 
Ife East 33 
Ife North 29 
Ife South 58 
Ifedayo 23 
Ifelodun 16 
Ila 11 
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Ilesa East 12 
Ilesa West 24 
Irepodun 17 
Irewole 31 
Isokan 21 
Iwo 30 
Obokun 39 
Odo-Otin 26 
Olorunda 17 
Oriade 37 
Orolu 14 
Osogbo 14 
Total 787 
Source: Osun State Ministry of Health (2018) 
The tenet of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in the post-2015 development agenda laid 
emphasis on equity in the distribution of PHC facilities (Norheim 2015 and Sengupta 2013). The 
pattern of distribution of Primary Healthcare facilities in Osun state showed inequality in the 
distribution of PHC facilities among the local governments in the state. The inequality is an 
indication of poor health service delivery in the state. The distributional pattern showed 
considerable gaps among the local governments in the state in term of number of the PHC facilities 
provided. The inequality in the PHC facilities in the local governments represents a divergence of 
political actors from the constitutional provisions. The attitude of the political actors in healthcare 
service delivery in the state contravenes Chapter 11, Section 17 3(d) of the 1999 constitution which 
states that the state shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are adequate medical and 
health facilities for all persons (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).    
Table 24 shows secondary healthcare in Osun state in 2018. There are fifty (55) secondary 
healthcare Centres located in nine (9) zones in the state. Osogbo zone has the highest with ten (10) 
secondary healthcare services while there are four (4) secondary healthcare services each in Iwo, 
Ede and Ikire zones. The distributional pattern of SHC in the state is as a result of rural-urban 
dichotomy (Ajala, Sanni and Adeyinka 2005). General consensus among researchers investigating 
the relationship is that fewer people are willing to patronise a particular facility as the distance 
from it increases (Shanon and Dever 1974; Iyun 1978; Olayiwola 1990; Aloba 1995; Olatubara 
1996; Ibikunle 1997; Ajala et al 2004). Therefore, the distributional pattern of SHC in Osun state 
is connected to the population of the rural and urban areas in the state.    
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Table 24: Secondary Healthcare (SHC)in Osun State, 2018 
Zone Number of Secondary Healthcare 
Osogbo 10 
Ilesa 7 
Iwo 4 
Ikirun 6 
Ede 4 
Ife 7 
Ila Orangun 6 
Ikire 4 
Obokun 7 
Total 55 
Source: Osun State Ministry of Health (2018) 
Table 25 shows the types of secondary healthcare facilities available to Osun state. These facilities 
included State hospitals, General hospitals, Comprehensive health centres, and Government health 
clinics. There was asteady increase in the number of Secondary Healthcare Facilities in the state 
between 2013 and 2018. The steady increase in SHC was not unconnected to the interactions 
between the state and the local governments. Patients from PHC are referred to the State Hospitals, 
General Hospitals, Comprehensive health centres and Health clinics for further treatment.  
Table 25: Number of Secondary Health Care Facilities in Osun State 2007-2018 
Types of 
Facilities 
Year 
 200
7 
200
8 
200
9 
201
0 
201
1 
201
2 
201
3 
201
4 
201
5 
201
6 
201
7 
201
8 
State 
Hospitals 
8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
General 
Hospitals 
3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Comprehensi
ve Health 
Centers 
38 38 38 34 34 34 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Government 
Health 
Clinics 
6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Grand Total 55 55 55 55 55 55 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Source: Osun State Hospitals Management Board 2018 
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In Table 26, quite a number of people benefited from the free health care services rendered at the 
state-owned secondary healthcare facilities. Between 2007 and 2017, a total of 4,761,209; 368,980; 
73,198; 39,902; 1,246,209; 173,889; and 21,329 enjoyed free healthcare services in O.P.D; 
Antenatal; Admission, Deliveries, Immunisation, Family planning, and Surgical operation 
respectively. The highest healthcare services that people benefited from were O.P.D while the 
lowest was the surgical operation.   
Table 26: Number of beneficiaries of free Health Care Services rendered at the Osun state-
owned Secondary HealthCare Facilities 2007-2017  
Year O.P.D. 
Attendanc
e 
Ante-
Natal 
Cases 
Admission
s 
Deliverie
s 
Immunisatio
n 
Family 
Plannin
g 
Surgical 
Operatio
n 
2007 409893 30892 5801 3282 113183 9305 790 
2008 495988 35817 8133 3870 118348 10643 1218 
2009 533298 35346 9665 4266 100701 13024 1394 
2010 581862 39051 10118 4935 119729 12248 2620 
2011 131791 20989 2755 1578 99307 9568 1070 
2012 493963 39869 8211 4529 116407 11327 2972 
2013 634896 45647 9342 4950 130756 15306 4088 
2014 571143 44784 7608 4522 110607 29961 2721 
2015 227456 18956 2362 1544 69558 19180 980 
2016 315267 29586 4176 3048 130982 27477 1031 
2017 365652 28043 5027 3378 136631 15850 2445 
GRAN
D 
TOTAL 
4761209 36898
0 
73198 39902 1246209 173889 21329 
Source: Osun State Hospitals Management Board 
In Table 27, Osun state secondary healthcare provided different kinds of immunisation 
programmes to the people. The table shows that 202,472; 404526; 94,191; 169,408; 193,488; 
83,621; 41,189; 43,321; 12,312; and 1,681 people were immunised from BCG/OPV, OPV/DPT, 
Measles, IT, Hepatitis, Yellow fever, Vitamin A, PCV, IPV, and CSM Vaccine respectively. 
 
Table 27: Immunisation given at the Osun State Secondary HealthCare facilities including 
the number of beneficiaries 2007-2017  
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Year BCG/
OPV 
OPV/
DPT 
MEAS
LES 
IT HEPAT
ITIS 
YELL
OW 
FEVE
R 
VITA
MIN A 
PC
V 
IPV CSM 
VACC
INE 
2007 19494 38772 10002 1414
6 
22081 8688 0 0 0 0 
2008 19886 41630 10515 1464
4 
22849 8824 0 0 0 0 
2009 16724 34947 7083 1578
9 
20016 6142 0 0 0 0 
2010 19669 42497 10444 1456
2 
23046 8784 727 0 0 0 
2011 12223 37320 6791 1330
0 
21978 6604 1091 0 0 0 
2012 28926 30423 8771 1658
9 
23943 6596 1159 0 0 0 
2013 19481 43855 9601 1927
0 
23861 8881 5807 0 0 0 
2014 18598 35829 8324 2033
4 
10926 8376 8220 0 0 0 
2015 10706 23340 5154 1137
9 
5957 5046 3490 230
4 
144
4 
738 
2016 19343 39312 8841 1952
6 
9191 7477 6457 165
59 
339
9 
877 
2017 17422 36601 8665 9869 9640 8203 14238 244
58 
746
9 
66 
GRA
ND 
TOT
AL 
20247
2 
40452
6 
94191 1694
08 
193488 83621 41189 433
21 
123
12 
1681 
Source: Osun State Hospitals Management Board 2017 
Table 28 presents the number of patients treated with different cases of diseases. Cases of malaria 
constitute the highest number with 218,589 in 2008 and the lowest of 111,879 in 2007. The case 
of hypertension increased tremendously from 15815 in 2007 to 46289 in 2009. Cases of measles 
patients decreased from 2,463 in 2007 to 168 in 2011.  
Table 28: Number of patients treated with different cases of sickness (Diseases) at the Osun 
state Secondary HealthCare facilities (2007-2011) 
Types of 
Diseases 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Malaria 111879 218589 204238 200748 161397 
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Severe Malaria 0 0 0 0  
Malaria in 
Pregnancy 
801 791 569 641 583 
Measles 2463 1256 547 372 168 
HIV/AIDS 24 272 365 2861 4238 
Hepatitis B 6 0 3 8  
Diarrhoea 
Simple Without 
Blood 
4619 7264 8770 7495 2535 
Diarrhoea 
Simple With 
Blood 
753 1896 1198 1048 497 
Cholera 59 49 5 22  
Pneumonia 653 1093 2452 1122 553 
Typhoid Fever 1267 1470 1502 61 474 
Tuberculosis 164 409 493 569 257 
STD/STI 
(DISEASE) 
524 196 176 715 299 
Gonorrhoea 5 9 101 28 0 
Chicken Pox 33 67 - -  
Poliomyelitis 4 - - -  
Diabetes 
Malaitus 
524 352 4727 449 1159 
Malnutrition 188 30 261 28 7 
Rickets 0 0 0 0 0 
Sickle Cell 
Disease (SCD) 
316 268 250 165 203 
Tetanus 0 0 0 0  
Tetanus 
Neonatal 
0 0 0 0  
Chronic 
Osteomylitis 
845 710 2282 1505 0 
Arthritis 1370 1829 1722 1403 324 
Osteo Artaritis 376 342 383 404 276 
Cataract 48 111 163 172 253 
Glycoma 110 121 123 110 238 
Conjuctivitis 48 105 92 94 381 
Other Eye 
Conditions 
747 353 325 304 718 
Onchocerchiasis 824 9 9 34 28 
Schistosomiasis 59 91 515 71 77 
Deodenal Ulcer 242 373 1082 698 0 
Gastric Ulcer 465 313 800 387  
Pud 954 720 481 554 668 
Gastroenteritis 674 760 551 397 576 
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Ca Colon 3 0 2 0  
Simple Goitre 24    39 
Appendicitis     253 
Simple Breast 
Lump 
50  12  73 
CA Breast 
(CORCINOMA) 
9  22  10 
Chickenpox 33 67    
Hypertension 15815 35258 46289 2594 15580 
Urti 4227 3505 63705 48165 0 
Cough 2807 9748 7099 4819 5216 
Cerebrospitanal 
Menigitis 
0 0 77 9 76 
Rta 1195 3161 928 1453  
 Source: Osun State Hospitals Management Board 
Table 29 shows the decrease in Malaria patients from 185,946 in 2013 to 50,364 in 2017. Cases 
of hypertension increased steadily from 13,052 in 2016 to 19,699 in 2017. Asthmatic patients 
increased from 249 in 2012 to 1,040 in 2014 and decline to 356 in 2017. 
Table 29: Number of patients treated with different cases of sickness (diseases) at the Osun 
state secondary HealthCare facilities (2012-2017) 
Diseases 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Malaria 180887 185946 135129 38270 45382 50364 
Severe Malaria      329 
Malaria in 
Pregnancy 
239 895 4051 1310 1332 1041 
Measles 740 1504 990 138 121 93 
HIV/AIDS 5727 7694 5442 5430 12958 14445 
Hepatitis B   187 47 165 186 
Diarrhoea 
Simple without 
Blood 
6459 7419 6222 1318 1268 1528 
Diarrhoea 
Simple with 
Blood 
688 632 1356 645 295 267 
Cholera   12 23 1 12 
Pneumonia 619 1123 1862 286 160 316 
Typhoid Fever 1474 1917 2637 403 1247 1381 
Tuberculosis 1203 1268 1056 621 1544 4008 
STD/STI 
(DISEASE) 
563 2059 1255 436 284 489 
Gonorrhoea 4 30 86 21 36 88 
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Chickenpox       
Poliomyelitis   1    
Diabetes 
Malaitus 
4947 3395 3241 1649 1807 1727 
Malnutrition 29 2608 1395 278 22 29 
Rickets 0 3 0 102 1 6 
Sickle Cell 
Disease (SCD) 
189 219  176 174 309 
Tetanus 3    5 6 
Tetanus Neonatal  1 9    
Chronic 
Osteomylitis 
28 750 215 62 17 9 
Arthritis 341 340 3674 1206 2315 2428 
Osteo Arthritis 506 351 2680 841 747 267 
Cataract 375 727 1814 774 933 1121 
Glycoma 0 344 538 168 330 345 
Conjuctivitis 79 526 3071 933 1794 1456 
Other eye 
conditions 
408 10 1531 497 926 2637 
Onchocerchiasis 0 6 41 6 26 19 
Schistosomiasis 127 129 106 30 100 54 
Deodenal Ulcer 505 744 360 135 121 142 
Gastric Ulcer 1328 1536 990 244 58 245 
Pud 1317 2082 4976 1252 1546 2290 
Gastroenteritis 481 1770 3917 590 500 506 
Ga Colon       
Simple Goitre 32 64 88 0 4 23 
Appendicitis 202 197 337 49 94 212 
Simple Breast 
Lump 
48 309 511 91 136 185 
CA Breast 
(Corcinoma) 
11 534 40 2 17 24 
Chickenpox 165 90     
Rashes 249 15     
Other skin 
conditions 
  2114 531 684 882 
Ca Cervix   5 3 2 12 
Hypertension 42108 48842 31303 8657 13052 19699 
Asthma 249 575 1040 297 311 356 
Anaemia 68 150 423 62 96 157 
Chd   7 0 6  
Stroke   538    
G6PD 
(Deficiency) 
  6    
BPH 138 98 628 40 97 206 
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Lipoma 94 300 404 78 46 167 
Hydrocele 80 330 483 189 82 174 
Urti 21226 36518 36682 5855 6950 10477 
Cough 5642 8916 4105 1325 552 430 
Cerebrospinal 
Meningitis 
0 10    5 
R/Linguina 
Hernia 
558 2000 1417 366 372 1185 
Lumber 
Spondylosis 
149 252 779 208 97 0 
Fibroid 60 468 439 172 82 231 
Dog-Bite 24 23 54 5 18 56 
Snake-Bite 7 22 0 0 0  
Mental 
Conditions 
 45 1163 457 359 2453 
RTA 2011 3265 2596 470 697 941 
Home Accident   201 30 87 58 
Other Accident   125 28 86 130 
Threatened 
Abortion 
57 151 230 51 42 141 
Source: Osun State Hospitals Management Board 
The data presented showed that all the local government councils in the state had both primary and 
secondary healthcare facilities. Although, healthcare facilities were not evenly distributed, 
particularly the PHC. For example, the number of PHC facilities was high in Atakumosa East and 
Ife South local government council areas. It was low in Ila,Ede North, Ifelodun, Ilesa East, 
Olorunda, Orolu, and Osogbo local government council areas.  
The zoning of SHC facilities in Osun state showed inequality in the distribution of health facilities. 
It also means that accessibility to healthcare facilities was difficult for the people. The distribution 
of SHC facilities in Osun state was lopsided. The available data showed that the distribution of 
SHC was in favour of local governments in the state capital at the expense of those local 
governments outside the state capital.The variations in the distribution of these facilities in the 
state showed that some areas were marginalized while others were adequately catered for. 
Therefore, people did not have equal access to healthcare facilities in the state. 
Effective service delivery to the people is a function of availability and accessibility of healthcare 
facilities. The data presented showed that divergence exists between the constitutional provisions 
and the attitude of political actors in the state. The actors have deviated from Chapter 11 Section 
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17 3(d) of the 1999 constitution which states that the state shall direct its policy towards ensuring 
adequate medical and health facilities for all persons (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999). 
Although, the figures showed that a number of people benefited from the free healthcare services 
in O.P.D attendance, Antenatal, Admission, Delivering immunisation, family planning, and 
surgical operation, these services were not made accessible to the people at equal pace. 
6.2.2 Healthcare Service Delivery in Oyo State 
Oyo state government has recognised the need to have a healthy workforce for the full realisation 
of human potentials. Therefore, it has adopted a holistic approach to creating an enabling 
environment for the workforce. Public health facilities in Oyo state include teaching hospital, 
specialist hospital, state hospital, general hospital, primary healthcare centre, health clinics, and 
health posts, dental and state clinics.  
Table 30 presents the number of public health facilities in 2016. The highest public health facilities 
were Primary Healthcare/Maternity centre with 499 and the lowest was Teaching and Specialist 
hospitals with 3 each. 
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Table 30: Number of public health facilities in Oyo State, 2016 
Health Facilities Type Number 
Teaching Hospital 3 
Specialist Hospital 3 
State Hospital 4 
General Hospital 29 
Maternity Hospital - 
PHC/Maternity Centre 499 
Health Clinics 173 
Health Posts 29 
Dental 10 
State Clinic 11 
Total 761 
Source: Department of Planning, Research, and Statistics (HMIS Unit), Ministry of Health, Oyo 
State 
Table 31 presents the different categories of health personnel in Oyo state. It shows a tremendous 
increase from 6,229 in 2001 to 7,285 in 2005. There was a decline in the number of Medical and 
Dental practitioners from 2004 to 2005. Medical personnel such as Nurses, Pharmacy Technicians, 
Environmental health officer, and Health record officer initially maintained a steady increase and 
later decline.   
Table 31: Oyo State Health Personnel by categories 2001-2005 
Health Personnel By 
Categories 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Specialists Doctors 33 33 34 38 38 
Medical Practitioners 149 140 153 153 144 
Dental Practitioners 17 16 18 18 16 
Health 
Planners/Administrators 
14 14 16 18 28 
Health Researchers 0 0 0 0 0 
Nurses/Midwives 
(RMS/SCNS) 
1789 1803 1850 1863 1666 
Pharmacists 29 30 40 43 51 
Pharmacy Technicians 124 128 128 130 127 
Specialists Nurses 
(Gynaecology) 
53 58 58 50 201 
Environmental Health 
Officers 
379 380 385 340 340 
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Medical Laboratory 
Technologists 
67 68 68 72 122 
Medical Lab. 
Technicians  
16 17 5 4 17 
Medical Lab. Assistants  6 6 17 20 35 
Scientific Officers 16 16 6 6 16 
Statistician/Health 
Record Officers 
55 94 97 108 136 
Radiographers 12 12 12 12 23 
Community Health 
Officers 
160 172 172 175 192 
Community Health 
Extension Worker 
667 667 690 695 681 
Physiotherapists 7 20 20 22 18 
Dental Technologist 22 22 22 22 11 
Dental Therapists 9 15 15 15 9 
Optometrists 0 0 0 1 1 
Health Educators 3 3 3 0 0 
Epidemiologists 0 1 1 1 1 
Nutritionists 4 9 9 10 10 
Health Assistants 1048 1120 1204 1202 1646 
Sub Total 4679 4844 5023 5018 5529 
Others 1550 1720 1705 1723 1756 
Total 6229 6564 6728 6741 7285 
Source: Oyo State Statistical Health Bulletin 
Table 32 highlights the comparative analysis of Oyo State medical and health staff by categories 
2001 to 2005. Considering the total workforce during the period, there was an increase from 2001 
to 2005. The increase represents 2% (2001), 2.5% (2002), 2% (2003), 2% (2004), and 8% (2005) 
respectively. The increase was so apparent in the year 2005 because of new employment. However, 
there were some categories of staff like Health Researchers, Dental Technologists 
Epidemiologists, Radiographers, and Dental Practitioners, whose number remained static 
throughout the period. In addition, there was no increase in the number of specialist Doctors while 
medical practitioners decreased by 6% from 2003 to 2005. This means that medical practitioners 
were leaving the employment of the state for better opportunities outside the country. Thus, there 
was a shortage of medical Doctors, Nurses, and other paramedical staff in other areas of the health 
workforce in the state.   
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Table 32: Oyo State Ministry of Health Staff Statistics and Disposition 2005 
DEPT/GL PLANNING PHC SHC NURSING FIN 
& 
ADM 
PHARM HATISS TOTAL 
1 0 0 0 0 15 1 1 17 
2 0 3 0 0 16 0 4 23 
3 1 7 2 2 18 0 4 34 
4 6 4 2 6 7 3 0 28 
5 1 6 2 1 7 1 0 18 
6 3 5 2 3 6 0 1 20 
7 2 11 7 6 17 4 8 55 
8 4 17 8 2 16 2 2 51 
9 4 17 8 6 11 4 0 50 
10 0 16 2 6 2 4 0 30 
- - - - - - - - - 
12 2 2 1 4 3 3 0 15 
13 1 9 4 4 1 0 1 20 
14 5 61 12 2 1 0 2 83 
15 2 17 8 3 2 0 0 32 
16 1 3 1 1 0 1 0 7 
17 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 
TOTAL 33 59 181 46 122 23 23 487 
Source: Oyo State Statistical Health Bulletin 
Table 33 presents Oyo state health personnel between 2006 and 2008. There was a steady increase 
in the number of health personnel. The health personnel that experienced steady increase includes 
the Consultant, Medical Practitioners, Nurses, Laboratory scientists, Physiotherapists, 
Pharmacists, Pharmacists technician, Community health extension worker, Community health 
officers, Medical record officer, Medical record technician, Health technician, Health assistant, 
and Laboratory Attendant. 
Table 33: Oyo State Health Personnel (2006-2008) 
Health Personnel 2006 2007 2008 
Consultant 31 33 282 
Medical Practitioners 145 147 663 
Nurses/Midwives 
(RMS/SCNS) 
1623 1623 3443  
Laboratory Scientist 140 140 370 
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Physiotherapists 26 26 57 
Pharmacists 46 46 166 
Pharmacists 
Technician 
83 83 100 
Comm. Health 
Extension Worker 
843 843 852 
Community Health 
Officers 
176 176 184 
Social welfare 4 4 21 
Environmental Health 
Officer 
238 238 254 
Ward Orderly 341 341 290 
Medical Record 
Officer 
66 66 111 
Medical Record 
Technician 
10 10 28 
Statistician 2 2 5 
Medical Record 
Assistant 
10 10 17 
Card Issuers 119 119 119 
Laboratory Attendant 17 17 42 
Medical Store Officer 45 45 85 
Steward 15 15 15 
Health Technician 402 402 402 
Health Assistance 1537 1537 1645 
Cook 36 36 64 
Catering Officer 17 17 18 
Radiographers 5 5 35 
Laundry 12 12 21 
X-ray Technician 4 4 10 
Dental Surgeon 24 24 44 
Dental Therapists 22 22 25 
Dental Nurse 26 26 26 
Tailor 12 12 13 
Telephone Operator 5 5 22 
Motor Driver 50 50 57 
Maintenance Officer 36 36 201 
Finance and 
Administration 
174 174 774 
Mortuary Attendant 7 7 13 
Others 305 341 698 
Source: State Hospital Management Board and Director, Planning Research and Statistics, 2008 
Table 34 shows a total of 2991 health personnel in 2017. The number of Doctors, Nurses, Medical 
record, Medical laboratory scientist, Pharmacist, and Health assistant were 211, 919, 223, 88, 57, 
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and 273 respectively. The table indicates that Doctor and Nurses/Midwives, and other health 
officers are relatively small when compared with the number of local government councils in the 
state.  
Table 34: Oyo State Health Personnel (2017)  
Personnel Number 
Doctor 211 
Nurses/Midwives 919 
Community Health Officers 7 
Community Health Extension Workers 9 
Junior Community Health Extension Workers 0 
Laboratory Technician 39 
Pharmacist 57 
Pharmacy Technician 38 
Medical Laboratory Scientist 88 
Medical  Record 223 
Health Attendant 273 
Health Assistant 59 
Others 1068 
TOTAL 2991 
Source: Oyo State Ministry of Health, DPRS, NHMIS, 2017 
Table 35 shows that Antenatal attendance was high in 2005 with 734,958 and the lowest was in 
2001 with 131,464. The highest birth recorded in 2003 was 117,229 while the highest number of 
death recorded in 2002 was 1,648 deaths. Post-natal attendance was high in 2004 with 120,879 
and the lowest was in 2001 with 22996. 
Table 35: Oyo State Antenatal Care and Pregnancy Outcome (2001-2006) 
Year Antenatal 
Attendance 
Births Deaths Post Natal 
2001 131,464 91,704 450 22,996 
2002 142,372 34,711 1648 26,846 
2003 207,837 117,229 567 50,456 
2004 487,862 79,837 543 120,879 
2005 734,958 116,702 654 97,654 
2006 202,520 27,029 193 37,177 
Source: Department of Planning, Research, and Statistics (HMIS Unit), Ministry of Health, Oyo 
State 
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Table 36 presents information on the Oyo State Attendance in Public Facilities from 2001 to 2007. 
The highest number of attendance (Inpatient and Outpatient) is 928654 in the year 2006, which 
means a daily average attendance patient is 2544. The attendance dropped to 826821 with a daily 
average of 2265 in the year 2007. Generally, there was a low trend of patronage of government 
Health facilities during this period. This might be due to the shortage of government Health 
personnel and industrial actions/strikes.     
Table 36: Total Attendance in Oyo State Public Health Facilities 2001-2007  
Year
s 
Number of 
OUT-
PATIENT 
ATTENDAN
CE 
Number of 
IN-PATIENT 
ATTENDAN
CE 
DAILY 
AVERA
GE OUT-
PATIEN
T 
DAILY 
AVERA
GE IN-
PATIEN
T 
TOTAL 
AVERAGE 
OF 
ATTENDAN
CE 
DAILY 
NUMBER 
OF 
ATTENDAN
CE 
200
1 
426,246 44,383 1168 122 470,629 1290 
200
2 
304445 54,042 834 148 358487 982 
200
3 
426319 75,871 1168 191 502190 1376 
200
4 
370125 15,152 1014 41 385277 1056 
200
5 
236367 14,479 663 40 250846 687 
200
6 
882749 45,905 2418 126 928654 2544 
200
7 
793121 33,700 2173 92 826821 2265 
Source: Department of Planning, Research, and Statistics (HMIS Unit), Ministry of Health, Oyo 
State 
Table 37 presents the state health services attendance between 2013 and 2017. The highest 
Antenatal attendance was 459,694 in 2014 and the lowest was 392,436 in 2016. The Deliveries 
Caesarian steadily increased between 2013 and 2018 and declined in 2016 while the Deliveries 
Assisted declined in 2015. Normal Deliveries increases in 2013 from 43959 to 60882 in 2015 and 
declined in 2016. Out of the Vaccine given, Pentavalent Vaccine 1 was the highest with 282045 
in 2017 and the lowest was Pentavalent Vaccine 2 of 59,343 in 2013. The highest fully immunised 
children under one year was in 2017 with 227,066 while the lowest was in 2013 with 112,646. 
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Table 37: Oyo State Health Services Attendance (2013-2017) 
Services 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Antenatal 393939 459694 427384 392436 454558 
Deliveries 
Caesarian 
section 
4922 6821 8413 3001 3667 
Deliveries 
Assisted 
7864 9314 5589 5058 4490 
Deliveries 
Normal 
43959 62963 60882 57529 57744 
BCG 168449 287109 273283 270742 281055 
Hepatitis B 
Vaccine 0 
birth 
94294 209536 171732 185458 209667 
Measles 
Vaccine 1 
given 
127885 211066 216830 215387 250111 
Oral Polio 
Vaccine 0 
given 
103555 214030 210362 188700 222912 
Oral Polio 
Vaccine 1 
given 
164873 244122 260179 239039 281098 
Oral Polio 
Vaccine 2 
given 
117566 195937 203056 188400 225123 
Oral Polio 
Vaccine 3 
given 
144703 222740 233004 222196 261128 
Pentavalent 
Vaccine 1 
given 
74769 242270 258120 249344 282045 
Pentavalent 
Vaccine 2 
given 
59343 178807 198310 200912 227710 
Pentavalent 
Vaccine 3 
given 
67604 201535 225751 230102 262533 
Fully 
Immunised 
children 
under 1 year 
112646 171775 174777 193168 227066 
Source: Oyo State Ministry of Health, DPRS, NHMIS, 2017 
168 
 
Table 38 shows different family planning activities by methods given to the people between 2001 
and 2005. Orals constituted the highest in 2004 with 8,249, while the lowest was sterilization with 
4 in 2003. There was a steady increase in the use of Orals, Injections, and IUCDS from 2001 to 
2004 and a decline in 2005. 
Table 38: Comparative table of family planning activities by methods in Oyo State 2001-2005 
Years Orals Injections Implants IUCDS Barriers Sterilization Others 
2001 2276 1791 26 2412 1087 - 13 
2002 4099 4643 43 4823 3031 - - 
2003 5326 6164 39 5154 5093 4 151 
2004 8249 7356 84 7856 4780 62 223 
2005 4479 2855 476 2180 4099 12 263 
Source: Oyo State Statistical Health Bulletin 2006 
In Table 39, the use of Condoms was rampant among males with the highest of 263,052 in 2015 
and the lowest of 93,479 in 2016. The use of Condoms among females was highest in 2014 with 
14,666 and the lowest was in 2013 with 9,355. The implant was the least use of the family planning 
services with 6,947 in 2013.  
Table 39: Family Planning Services by Methods in Oyo State 2013-2017 
Yea
rs 
IUC
D 
inser
ted 
Impl
ant 
Condo
ms 
distrib
uted 
(sachet
)-Male 
Condo
ms 
distrib
uted 
(sachet
)-
Female 
Famil
y 
Planni
ng 
injecti
ons 
Oral 
pill 
cycle 
(pack
ets) 
Pers
ons 
gave 
oral 
pills 
Female 
15-49 
years 
using 
modern 
contracep
tives 
Family 
planni
ng 
clients 
counse
lled 
New 
family 
planni
ng 
accept
ors 
201
3 
1609
5 
6947 19440
6 
9355 54200 12410 9238 78284 91109 40723 
201
4 
1693
3 
1397
4 
14470
8 
14666 88466 18236 1393
0 
132230 20873
6 
81556 
201
5 
1630
4 
1900
3                     
26305
2
13191 92145 22512 1452
1 
143731 24974
0 
91133 
201
6 
1436
1 
1857
6 
93479 11074 81249 17874 1299
9 
131901 20740
3 
72580 
201
7 
1873
2 
3469
5 
15378
2 
14075 10939
9 
21173 1569
9 
179954 24784
0 
11025
3 
Source: Oyo State Ministry of Health, DPRS, NHMIS, 2017 
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Table 40 shows the number of health facilities by ownership between 2002 and 2007. The 
registered private had the largest number of health facilities in the state. In the public sector, the 
highest was at the local government areas followed by the state while the federal had the lowest. 
Table 40: Number of Health facilities by ownership in Oyo State 2002-2007 
Years Federal State Local 
Government 
Areas 
Registered 
Private 
Total 
2002 14 62 563 779 1418 
2003 12 55 583 703 1353 
2004 12 53 609 703 1377 
2005 12 55 609 765 1441 
2006 12 55 609 765 1441 
2007 12 54 607 887 1560 
Source: Department of Planning, Research, and Statistics (HMIS Unit), Ministry of Health, Oyo 
State 
Table 41 indicates the number of bed facilities in public health facilities. Primary healthcare had 
the highest with 2,523 followed by Teaching hospital with 1370. State and General hospitals had 
527 and 680 respectively. 
Table 41: Number of beds in medical and health institutions owned by federal, state and local 
government areas in Oyo State 2007 
Health Facilities Type Number of Beds 
Teaching Hospital 1370 
Specialist Hospital 136 
State Hospital 527 
General Hospital 680 
Maternity Hospital 46 
Health Clinic 61 
Dental Centre 10 
PHC Centre 2523 
Health Clinic 320 
Health Post 274 
FSP 11 
Total 5958 
Source: Department of Planning, Research, and Statistics (HMIS Unit), Ministry of Health, Oyo 
State 
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Table 42 shows the trend of measles prevalence by LGAs in Oyo State from the year 2001-2005. 
In the year 2001, Surulere local government had the highest number of cases and followed by 
Ibarapa East local government. This record shows that Ibadan North has the least number of cases. 
Similarly, in 2002, Ibarapa East had the highest number of measles cases and followed by Surulere 
local government. In 2004, Itesiwaju had the highest number of cases of measles and followed by 
Ibadan South East. The research study observes that cases of measles were rampant among 
Surulere, Ibarapa East, Itesiwaju, Atiba, and Ibadan South East since years back and later reduced 
in the year 2005. Cases of measles were reduced in the preceding years (2001-2004). 
Table 42: Cases of measles reported By LGAs in Oyo State, 2001-2005 
LGAs 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Afijo 13 135 354 25 50 
Akinyele No Report No Report No Report 1038 310 
Atiba No Report No Report No Report 214 1274 
Atisbo No Report 227 270 482 122 
Egbeda No Report 107 467 439 161 
Ibadan North 3 No Report No Report 322 462 
Ibadan North 
East 
295 90 134 422 473 
Ibadan North 
West 
34 8 53 88  
Ibadan South 
East 
 352 10 1638 582 
Ibadan South 
West 
160 48 4 56 56 
Ibarapa East 386 2908 2969 583 37 
Ibarapa North 120 No Report No Report No Report 18 
Ibarapa 
Central 
41 26 No Report 84 No Report 
IdO 54 64 26 193 67 
Irepo 137 No Report 42 107 No Report 
Iseyin 330 253 90 20 242 
Itesiwaju 113 307 337 1888 206 
Iwajowa 117 57 2 No Report No Report 
Kajola 55 15 29 14 20 
Lagelu No Report 54 No Report 16 19 
Ogbomoso 
North 
No Report No Report No Report 19 51 
Ogbomoso 
South 
No Report No Report No Report No Report No Report 
Ogo Oluwa 22 No Report No Report 61 11 
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Olorunsogo No Report No Report No Report 201 96 
Oluyole No Report No Report No Report 43 No Report 
Ona Ara 64 166 81 6 39 
Oorelope No Report No Report No Report 92 No Report 
Oriire 129 75 21 258 No Report 
Oyo East 137 76 167 109 No Report 
Oyo West No Report No Report No Report 208 62 
Saki East 125 No Report No Report 588 No Report 
Saki West 244 39 No Report 51 9 
Surulere 698 1240 768 153 No Report 
Total 3277 6247 5824 9418 4367 
Source: Ministry of Health, Department of Planning 
Table 43 shows the trend of the prevalence of Pneumonia by local governments between 2001 and 
2005. In 2001, Iseyin had the highest number, 658, while Ibadan North West had the lowest of 10. 
In 2002, Surulere had the highest number of 813 while Iwajowa had 2. In 2003, Surulere had the 
highest of 2751 while Iwajowa had the lowest of 7. In 2004, Ibadan North had the highest of 2049 
and Ogbomoso North had the lowest of 4. 
Table 43: Trend of Pneumonia prevalence by LGAs in Oyo State 2001-2005  
LGAs 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Afijo 262 239 103 No Report 19 
Akinyele No Report No Report No Report 1558 496 
Atiba No Report No Report No Report No Report No Report 
Atisbo 26 153 391 624 335 
Egbeda No Report 295 195 216 303 
Ibadan North 112 No Report 11 2041 31 
Ibadan North 
East 
No Report 31 No Report 229 2204 
Ibadan North 
West 
10 No Report 73 No Report No Report 
Ibadan South 
East 
No Report 113 No Report No Report No Report 
Ibadan South 
West 
61 No Report No Report 60 40 
Ibarapa East 16 75 72 31 No Report 
Ibarapa North 89 5 No Report No Report No Report 
Ibarapa 
Central 
126 21 No Report No Report No Report 
Ido 72 187 20 81 107 
Irepo 117 No Report 72 10 No Report 
Iseyin 658 177 507 184 510 
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Itesiwaju 266 54 156 614 367 
Iwajowa 116 2 7 No Report No Report 
Kajola 614 74 1622 502 243 
Lagelu No Report 308 No Report No Report 10 
Ogbomoso 
North 
No Report No Report No Report 4 20 
Ogbomoso 
South 
No Report No Report No Report 32 75 
Ogo Oluwa No Report No Report No Report No Report No Report 
Olorunsogo No Report No Report No Report 94 53 
Oluyole No Report No Report No Report 36 No Report 
Ona Ara No Report No Report No Report No Report No Report 
Oorelope No Report No Report No Report No Report No Report 
Oriire 531 51 107 No Report No Report 
Oyo East 63 130 356 334 No Report 
Oyo West No Report No Report No Report 205 45 
Saki East 292 No Report No Report 742  
Saki West 445 80  110  
Surulere 504 813 2751 260  
Total 4380 2808 6443 7967 4858 
Source: Ministry of Health, Department of Planning 
Table 44 shows the comparative analysis of data on routine immunisation in the State Health 
facility from 2001-2005. In the year 2001, the percentage of children aged 0-23 months immunised 
against BCG, Oral Polio increased from 32.4% BCG; 19% Oral Polio in 2003, and drastically 
reduced to 22% BCG, 11% Oral Polio in 2005. In addition, the percentage coverage of DPT 
increased in the year 2002 with 23% and declined to 6.9% in the year 2003, and later increased to 
14% in the year 2005. The percentage coverage of measles rose from 20% in the year 2001 to 28% 
in the year 2003 and gradually dropped to 18% in the year 2005. 
The total number of women of reproductive age (15-49) year, immunised against tetanus declined 
yearly. For yellow fever, the total number of children under 5 year, immunised against the disease, 
declined from 30824 in the year 2001 to 11638 in the year 2004 and rose to 50611 in the year 
2005. 
Generally, the routine immunisation in the State had declined since 2004, firstly, only 27 LGAs 
reported when collating the data and more so there is a need for public awareness of routine 
immunisation. It shows that people are waiting for National Immunisation Day. In addition, State 
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and Local Governments need support through the provision of infrastructures facilities for proper 
routine immunisation, improve logistic support, and ensure regular supply of the Antigen. 
Table 44: Comparative table of Immunisation coverage in Oyo State Health Facilities 2001-
2005 
Type of 
Immunisation 
Age 
Distribution 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Projected 
Population 
0-23Months 366029 376278 386814 397644 408778 
B.C.G 0-11 Months 
12-23 
Months 
Total 
Children 
Immunised 
(BCG) 
 % 
Population of 
Children 
Immunised  
56,075 
 
21,265 
 
77,340 
 
 
 
21% 
88378 
 
29368 
 
117746 
 
 
 
31% 
81602 
 
43811 
 
125413 
 
 
 
32.4% 
58074 
 
19538 
 
77612 
 
 
 
20% 
53650 
 
34379 
 
88209 
 
 
 
22% 
Oral Polio 0-11 Months 
12-23 
Months 
Total 
Children 
Immunised 
(Oral Polio) 
% Population 
of Children 
Immunised 
22.379 
 
17808 
 
40187 
 
 
 
 
11% 
45410 
 
13246 
 
58656 
 
 
 
 
16% 
56537 
 
15570 
 
72107 
 
 
 
 
19% 
39001 
 
11507 
 
50508 
 
 
 
 
13% 
32136 
 
13420 
 
45556 
 
 
 
 
11% 
DPT 0-11 Months 
12-23 
Months 
Total 
Children 
Immunised 
(DPT) 
% Population 
of Children 
Immunised 
41294 
 
18707 
 
60001 
 
 
 
16% 
75411 
 
11631 
 
87042 
 
 
 
23% 
14928 
 
8793 
 
23721 
 
 
 
6% 
39002 
 
12460 
 
51462 
 
 
 
13% 
42592 
 
15645 
 
58237 
 
 
 
14% 
Measles 0-11 Months 
12-23 
Months 
50670 
 
20595 
 
68444 
 
30486 
 
66985 
 
40036 
 
26731 
 
13566 
 
48819 
 
23328 
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Total 
Children 
Immunised 
(MEASLES) 
% Population 
of Children 
Immunised 
71256 
 
 
 
20% 
98930 
 
 
 
26% 
107297 
 
 
 
28% 
40297 
 
 
 
10% 
72147 
 
 
 
18% 
Projected 
Population 
15-49 YRS 
Women 
     
Tetanus 
Toxoid 
Women of 
Reproductive 
age 
Immunised 
(T.T) % of 
Women of 
Reproductive 
Age 
Immunised 
249247 244691 211473 99101 124088 
Projected 
Population 
9-59 Months      
Yellow Fever 9-23 Months 
24-59 
Months 
>5YRS 
Total 
Children (9-
59 Months) 
Immunised 
(yellow 
fever) 
 
13033 
13747 
 
4044 
30824 
10391 
5661 
 
1100 
17152 
11327 
5504 
 
6409 
23240 
7410 
2873 
 
1355 
11638 
25265 
17483 
 
7863 
50611 
Projected 
Population 
All ages      
Cerebrospinal 
Meningitis 
All ages % 
Immunised 
11937 9903  413 337 
Hepatitis B All Ages % 
Immunised 
7048 
20 LGAs 
Submitted 
2412 
25 LGAs 
Submitted 
 
24 LGAs 
Submitted 
10885 
23 LGAs 
Submitted 
45324 
28 LGAs 
Submitted 
Source: Ministry of Health; Department of Planning 
 
Table 45 highlights ten commonest diseases. This shows the number of cases for each of the ten 
diseases from the year 2001 to 2005. Malaria and Diarrhoea (SWB) are the two leading diseases 
among others. 
175 
 
Table 45: Commonest communicable diseases in Oyo State, 2001-2005 
2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  
DISEAS
ES 
CAS
ES 
DISEAS
ES 
CAS
ES 
DISEAS
ES 
CAS
ES 
DISEA
SES 
CAS
ES 
DISEAS
ES 
CAS
ES 
Malaria 1639
32 
Malaria 2504
44 
Malaria 3384
20 
Malaria 2359
94 
Malaria 1881
05 
Diarrhoe
a (SWB) 
1881
5 
Diarrhoe
a (SWB) 
2732
9 
Diarrhoe
a (SWB) 
3504
1 
Diarrho
ea 
(SWB) 
1633
8 
Diarrhoe
a (SWB) 
1770
0 
Measles 6579 Other 
Injuries 
1619
5 
Other 
Injuries 
1677
7 
Measles 9284 Pneumo
nia 
4858 
Pneumo
nia 
5368 Accident 1020
8 
Gonorrhe
a 
1412
0 
Pneumo
nia 
7912 Typhoid 4806 
Skin 
Diseases 
4770 Measles 8630 Accident 1180
4 
Typhoid 5128 Diarrhoe
a (WB) 
4742 
Diarrhoe
a 
4366 Skin 
diseases 
7926 Hyperten
sion 
1085
2 
Diarrho
ea (WB) 
2993 Measles 4367 
Malnutri
tion 
2616 Pneumon
ia 
6321 Measles 1063
4 
STD 1193 Pertusis 2683 
Ear, 
Nose, 
Throat 
2621 Malnutrit
ion 
5799 Pneumon
ia 
8543 Pertusis 577 Malnutri
tion 
1658 
Hyperte
ns 
2408 Diarrhoe
a (WB) 
5688 Skin 
Disease 
8021 Gonorrh
oea 
552 STD 400 
Pertusis 1451 Hyperten
sion 
4513 Diarrhoe
a (WB) 
6856 Cholera 497 Cholera 340 
Source: Ministry of Health; Department of Planning 
Table 46 gives the record of HIV/AIDS blood screening in Oyo State from 2001 to 2004. The total 
screened patient was highest in 2003 with 12,466 and the lowest of 8,786 in 2002. The total 
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screened patient traveller was highest in 2001 with 4399 while the lowest was 1989 in 2003. HIV 
positive donor was highest in 2003 with 153 while the lowest was 76 in 2002.   
Table 46: Record of HIV/AIDS Blood screening in Oyo State 2001-2004 
Yea
rs 
Total 
screen
ed 
Total 
screen
ed 
patient 
travell
ers 
% 
Total 
screen
ed to 
patient 
travell
ers  
Grand 
total 
screen
ed 
blood 
sampl
es 
Total 
HIV 
positi
ve 
donor
s 
% 
HIV 
positi
ve 
donor
s 
Total 
patient 
travell
ers 
HIV 
positiv
e 
% 
Patient 
travell
ers 
HIV 
positiv
e 
Grand 
Total 
blood 
sampl
es 
HIV 
positi
ve 
% 
Gran
d total 
HIV 
positi
ve 
200
1 
8860 4399 33.20
% 
13259 113 1.20
% 
485 11.02
% 
598 4.50
% 
200
2 
8786 2799 24.20
% 
11585 76 0.90
% 
249 8.90% 325 2.80
% 
200
3 
12466 1989 13.80
% 
14455 153 1.2 272 13.6 425 3.00
% 
200
4 
9262 2238 19.40
% 
11500 81 0.9 363 16.20
% 
444 3.90
% 
Tota
l 
39374 11425 90.6% 50799 423 4.2 1369 49.72 1792 14.2 
Source: Oyo State Hospital Management Board, Laboratory Unit   
In Table 47, the amount of health budget to the state budget was very low. This is an indication 
that the health sector was not accorded recognition in the state. In spite of the low allocation to the 
health sector, the actual released of the fund to the health sector from the actual health budget was 
less than 75% in the recurrent expenditure and less than 65% in the capital expenditure in each 
year. In both cases, the actual released of health budget fall short of the allocation to the health 
budget. The percentage of the budget of the state on healthcare services to the overall state budget 
is relatively low and has serious effect on intergovernmental relations.    
Table 47: Summary of Oyo State Health Budget 2001-2005 
Detail of 
Expendit
ure 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
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Recurrent 
Expendit
ure 
     
State 
Budget 
12,064,429,00
0.00 
13,560,022,55
0.00 
16,016,516,88
5.00 
19,065,083,1
00 
20,267,777,0
82 
Health 
Budget 
1,398,795,000 1,783,830,000 1,955,888,500 2,434,704,00
0 
2,255,521,00
0 
Actual 
Released 
845,363,221.4
9 
1,260,956,463 1,433,014,963.
36 
1,638,757,19
3.72 
1,501,646,49
4.32 
% Actual 
Released 
60.44% 70.69% 73.27% 67.31% 66.58% 
      
Capital 
Expendit
ure 
     
State 
Budget 
8,274,836,000 12,992,554,00
0 
12,559,875,00
0 
15,445,030,4
00 
19,676,640,0
00 
Health 
Budget 
694,300,000 960,000,000 1,180,850,000 1,060,000,00
0 
1,358,000,00
0 
Actual 
Released 
480,017,556.7
0 
486,748,528 546,877,295 615,085,484.
91 
772,941,028.
76 
% Actual 
Released 
69.14% 50.70% 46.31% 58.03% 56.92% 
Total 
Expendit
ure 
     
State 
Budget 
20,339,315,00
0 
26,552,576,55
0 
28,576,391,88
5 
34,510,113,5
00 
39,944,417,0
82 
Health 
Budget 
2,093,095,000 2,743,830,000 3,136738,500 3,494,704,00
0 
3,613,521,00
0 
Actual 
Released 
1,325,380,778.
19 
1,747,704,991 1,979,892,258.
96 
2,253,842,67
8.63 
2,274,587,52
3.08 
% Health 
Over 
Budget 
10.29% 10.33% 10.98% 10.13% 9.05%. 
% Actual 
Released 
63.32% 63.70% 63.20% 64.49% 62.95% 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Department of Budget 
Table 48 presents the percentage of health budget over the state budget. There was a steady 
increase in health budget over Oyo state budget between 2001 and 2003. There was a decline in 
the health budget in 2004. 
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Table 48: Percentage Allocation of the health budget in relation to total State Budget 2001-
2005 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
% of Health 
Budget over 
State Budget  
10.29% 10.33% 10.98% 10.13% 9.05% 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Department of Budget 
Table 49 presents the health sector allocations between 2015 and 2017. In 2015, Ministry of health 
has the highest allocation of N259.75 billion while procurement of drugs and other medical 
supplies has the lowest of N0.93billion. In 2016, the Ministry of health has the highest with 
N250.06 billion while the lowest was N0.68 billion. It was a common trend in Nigeria Ministries 
to expend most of their allocations for the payment of salaries, allowances, and overheads, while 
capital expenditure suffers.   
Table 49: Health sector allocations trend, NGN billion, 2015-2017 
Health sector allocations 2015 2016 2017 
Ministry of Health 259.75 250.06 308.46 
HHIS FGN contribution (excluding 
Ministry of health & NACA) 
62.99 
 
 
63.30 49.46 
Purchase of Health/Medical 
equipment (excluding the Ministry of 
Health) 
13.87 23.88 9.28 
Medical consulting (excluding 
NACA & Ministry of Health) 
0 0 0.30 
Medical Expenses 1.41 1.30 0.98 
Rehabilitation/Construction/Repairs-
Hospital/Health Centres (excluding 
Ministry of Health & NACA) 
3.52 0.68 1.42 
Procurement of drugs and other 
medical supplies (excluding the 
Ministry of Health) 
0.93 0.76 2.13 
National Agency for the Control of 
AIDS (NACA) 
2.78 4.21 4.58 
State House  
Medical  
Centre 
0 2.83 0.33 
Counterpart Fund GAVI 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Total 347.26 353.52 380.46 
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Source: Budget office 
Table 50 indicates states with the biggest expenditure for health (top spenders) like Lagos, Rivers, 
Kwara, Bauchi, Borno, Ogun, Kaduna, Kano, and Kogi. States with above N5b votes for health 
are Sokoto, Oyo, Yobe, Nasarawa, Jigawa, Katsina, Delta, Edo, Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom, and 
Zamfara. States with low expenditure on health are Abia, Osun, Niger, Enugu, Gombe, Anambra, 
Plateau, and Taraba. 
Table 50:  Health budget for states 2018 
States Budget 
Lagos 51.4b 
Rivers 27b 
Kwara 26.1b 
Bauchi 23.4b 
Borno 19.5b 
Ogun 15.1b 
Kaduna 10.5b 
Kano 10b 
Kogi 11.6b 
Oyo 8b 
Sokoto 7.7b 
Yobe 7.4b 
Nasarawa 7.2b 
Jigawa 6.5b 
Katsina 6.5b 
Delta 6.3b 
Edo 6.2b 
Bayelsa 5.9b 
Akwa Ibom 5.7b 
Zamfara 5b 
Abia 685m 
Osun 894m 
Niger 2b 
Enugu 2.5b 
Gombe 2.6b 
Anambra 2.7b 
Plateau 4.3b 
Taraba 4.9b 
Source: Daily Trust, Friday, August 3, 2018 
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Table 51 shows the recurrent and capital expenditure in the health sector between 2012 and 2018. 
The total recurrent expenditure was N1641.41billion while the total capital expenditure was 
N351.71billion. The implication of this was that government spent more money on the recurrent 
expenditure than capital expenditure in the health sector.   
Table 51: Health sector allocations trend, NGN billion, 2012-2018 
Ministry of Health Recurrent 
Expenditure 
Capital Expenditure Total 
2012 225.76 57.01 282.77 
2013 219.72 60.08 279.80 
2014 214.94 49.52 264.46 
2015 237.08 22.67 259.75 
2016 221.70 35.71 257.41 
2017 252.87 55.61 308.46 
2018 269.34 71.11 340.45 
Total 1641.41 351.71 1993.12 
Source: Budget office 
The data presented on the healthcare service delivery in Oyo state showed a general decline in the 
number of health personnel, particularly the Doctors, Nurses/Midwives, and other health officers. 
In some cases, the number of health personnel remained static. The shortage of medical personnel 
was attributed to poor healthcare facilities and the fact that people are leaving the service of the 
state. Since effective health service delivery is a function of adequate health personnel, medical 
equipment, and healthcare facilities among others, the lack or inadequate of these would lead to 
poor service delivery in the health sector of the state. It was quite evident that the number of 
medical personnel in 2017 for all categories of the staff was relatively small when compared with 
the number of local government councils.  
The reduction in the daily average attendance of inpatient and outpatient gave the impression that 
there was poor health service delivery in the public health facilities. In a similar way, there was a 
decline in Caesarean, Assisted and Normal deliveries in the public health facilities. The researcher 
claims that people may seek for healthcare service in the private sector the moment the public 
health facilities are not functioning. In addition, the prevalence of diseases such as Pneumonia in 
most of the local governments was an evidence of poor service delivery. The available data showed 
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that there was a decline in the routine immunisation in the state. The percentage of people 
immunised was relatively low when compared to the total population. 
In Oyo state, the spread of communicable diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea, and skin diseases 
were on the increase. This was an indication of poor service delivery in the state. The data also 
showed that the percentage of health budget relative to the state budget was as low as 9.05%. The 
percentage was below the Abuja Declaration agreement of 15% where leaders pledged to commit 
at least 15% of their annual budgets towards improving health sector (Abuja Declaration 2001). 
The different cases of healthcare services analysed showed poor healthcare service delivery in the 
state. There was evidence that the state medical equipment, healthcare facilities, and personnel 
were inadequate to meet up with the population. This implies that the changing pattern of 
federalism affects the capacity of the state to deliver services in the health sector. 
The figures presented on Oyo state health service delivery are related to intergovernmental 
relations. Healthcare delivery at the state level requires the joint responsibility of the state and local 
governments. PHC facilities accounted for the highest number of health facilities in the state. The 
PHC facilities are found at the local government areas where health facilities users receive 
treatment. The users of PHC facilities are referred to the state hospitals, teaching hospitals and 
specialist hospitals for treatment.         
6.3 Healthcare Service Delivery Agreement 
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)38 
guarantees everyone, the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. It 
also imposes obligations on states “to achieve the full realisation of this right” by ensuring the 
reduction of the stillbirth rate and of infant mortality; the healthy development of the child; and 
                                                          
38 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) accessed at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. The Constitution of WHO conceptualizes health 
as “a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”. 
This definition indicates that health is a state of affirmative well-being. See World Health Organization, WHO 
Constitution, Basic Documents of the World Health Organization, 37th edn (1992). See also UN Doc A/CONF 32/8. 
Similarly, Article 16 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to which Nigeria is a state party provides 
that: “Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health. States 
Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that 
they receive medical attention when they are sick.” According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone 
to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, the obligation to respect, protect, 
and fulfil the right to health is violated when, because of corruption in the health sector, a state makes no progress to 
achieve the right. UN E/CN 4/2006/48, para 40. 
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the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene (SERAP 2016, p.1). The 
provision also required states to take steps progressively to prevent, treat and control the epidemic, 
endemic, occupational, and other diseases; and create conditions, which would assure to all 
medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness (SERAP 2016, p.1). Similarly, in 
2001, Nigeria hosted the Heads of State of member countries of the African Union where the 
“Abuja Declaration” agreement was reached during which the leaders pledged to commit at least 
15% of their annual budgets to improve their health sector (Abuja Declaration 2001). 
In 2012, the percentage of the country’s health sector in the annual budget was 5.95%. In 2018, 
the government allocated N340.45 billion of the N8.6 trillion-expenditure plan, to the health sector 
(Healthnews.africa 10 November 2017). This represents 3.9% of the total budget, which is 
different from the recommendation of the Abuja Declaration. This represents a reduction of 4.23% 
and 4.16% in 2016 and 2017 budgets respectively (Healthnews.africa 10 November, 2017). A 
closer look at the budget showed that the government planned to spend N1888 on each citizen for 
the whole year (2018). Furthermore, the N340.45 billion budgetary allocation was less than the 
estimated N359.2 billion that Nigerians spend on medical tourism annually (Healthnews.africa 10 
November, 2017). The 2018 health budget proposal sets aside N269.34 billion for recurrent 
expenditure i.e. for operations, wages and salaries, purchase of goods and services, and current 
grants and subsidies, while N71.11 billion was for capital expenditure (Healthnewsafrica 10 
November, 2017). 
The country is adding only N20 billion to its capital expenditure when compared to N51.1billion 
earmarked in 2017 (Healthnewsafrica 10 November, 2017). A comparison of 2017 and 2018 
budget revealed that the country was actively spending less in terms of the proportion since the 
total budget for 2017 budget was N7.4trillion while that of 2018 budget was N8.6trillion 
(Healthnews.africa 10 November, 2017). 
In terms of ranking, health was twelfth on the priority list as Power, Works and Housing get the 
highest capital project proposal with N555.88 billion, almost eight times that of health. The World 
Health Organisation ranked Nigeria 187th out of 191 countries in terms of healthcare delivery 
(Healthnews.africa 10 November, 2017). In addition, one-third of more than 700 health facilities 
have been destroyed in the country and about 3.7 million people are in need of health assistance 
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(Healthnews.africa 10 November, 2017) Nigeria was third in high infant mortality rate in the world 
(Healthnews.africa 10 November, 2017). 
The major indicators of health care in Nigeria are life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality 
rates. Statistics have shown that the level of budgetary allocation cum international grants and aids 
are not commensurate with the level of healthcare delivery. Between 1999 and 2014, the Nigeria 
health sector received more than two trillion naira (N2 trillion) (SERAP 2016, p.8). In the same 
vein, for over sixteen years (1999 to 2014), the government received about three hundred and eight 
million dollars ($308million) and one hundred and thirty-eight euros, as grants to support vaccines, 
immunisation and polio eradication in the health sector (SERAP 2016, p.8). In spite of the funds 
and grants received by the Nigerian government, the country is still struggling with several 
outbreaks of diseases and epidemic including Monkeypox, Measles, and Lassa fever, in addition 
to efforts to end poliomyelitis and tackle the country’s noticeably high maternal and child deaths 
(Healthnews.africa 10 November 2017). 
Healthcare facilities (health centres, personnel, and medical equipment) are inadequate in Nigeria, 
especially in rural areas (Health Reform Foundation 2010; Maternal Mortality 2010; Nigeria 
Primary Health Care Policies 2010). According to the 2009 Communique of the Nigerian National 
Health Conference, healthcare system remained weak as evidenced by the lack of coordination, 
fragmentation of services, dearth of resources including drug and supplies, inadequate and 
decaying infrastructure, inequity in resource distribution, and access to care and very deplorable 
quality of care (Nigerian National Health Conference 2009). 
In Nigeria, the 2013 National Demographic Health Survey showed that only 28.7% of Nigerians 
had access to basic sanitation facilities (Africa Health Nigeria 2015). Some health indicators for 
Nigeria like birth rate, death rate, infant mortality rate, HIV prevalence, HIV deaths, and life 
expectancy, indicated a high infant mortality rate/poor maternal care, low life expectancy and 
periodical outbreak of disease (The Library of Congress Country Studies 2010). For example, in 
2007, HIV prevalence and HIV deaths were 2.6 million and 170,000 people respectively (The 
Library of Congress Country Studies 2010). In addition, in 2010, birth rate, death rate, infant 
mortality rate, and life expectancy were 36.1 per 1000 population; 16.3 per 1000 population; 93.0 
per 1000 live births; and 47 years respectively (The Library of Congress Country Studies 2010). 
Between 2006 and 2010, there was the outbreak of diseases like Cholera and Meningococcal that 
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affected 29,115 and 17,462 people respectively (Global Alert and Response 2010). Out of this 
number, 1,191 and 960 died of Cholera and Meningococcal, respectively (Global Alert and 
Response 2010). Thus, the government has not been able to realise the objectives of Article 12.2 
(a)39; Article 12.2 (c)40; and Article 12.2 (d)41 of Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the health sector. Consequently, the Nigerian government 
has not been able to fulfil the three essential elements of availability, accessibility, and 
acceptability toward improving the health status of the citizens.  
6.4       Service Delivery in Education 
The second goal of the MDGs is to achieve Universal Primary Education. Human capital 
development is vital for the progress and sustainable development of any nation. In such a case, 
the quality of input depends on the level of literacy of the population, which would help in the 
rapid social and economic development of a nation (Ajiye 2014). In order to achieve the MDGs in 
education, the Nigerian government introduced Universal Primary Education (UPE) as a 
programme that aimed at eradicating illiteracy, ignorance, and poverty, therefore, stimulating and 
accelerating national development.  
Universal Primary Education was launched in 1976, in conformity to the Education for all (EFA). 
Since then, the Nigerian government made concerted effort towards meeting the 2015 target. This 
reflected in the enrolment rate in primary education that stood at 87.6 percent in 2006, and 89.6 
percent in 2007; and later increased to a gross enrolment of 88.8 percent in 2008 (UNDP Report 
2007). The number of pupils that started from Primary One to Primary Five, known as the “survival 
rate” in 2000, was 97 percent but dropped to 72.3 percent in 2009 (UNDP Report 2007). Lagos 
                                                          
39 “The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the 
child”. According to WHO, the stillbirth rate is no longer commonly used, infant and under-5 mortality rates being 
measured instead. 
40 “The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases” requires the 
establishment of prevention and education programmes for behaviour-related health concerns such as sexually 
transmitted diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, and those adversely affecting sexual and reproductive health, and the 
promotion of social determinants of good health, such as environmental safety, education, economic development and 
gender equality. 
41 “The creation of conditions, which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness”, both physical and mental, includes the provision of equal and timely access to basic preventive, curative, 
rehabilitative health services and health education; regular screening programmes; appropriate treatment of prevalent 
diseases, illnesses, injuries and disabilities, preferably at community level; the provision of essential drugs; and 
appropriate mental health treatment and care.  
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State had the highest proportion of students that started Primary One and reached Primary Five 
(98.7%), while Akwa Ibom State had the lowest (27.1%) (National Bureau of Statistics 2009). At 
the regional level, South West had the highest with 91.7% and North Central had the lowest with 
67.7% in 2009 (National Bureau of Statistics 2009). The introduction of Universal Basic Education 
in the Fourth Republic marked a turnaround in the eradication of illiteracy in the country, and it is 
the subject of the next section.     
6.4.1 Universal Basic Education 
The administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo introduced the Universal Basic Education 
(UBE), in September 30, 1999, to eliminate illiteracy in the country (Compulsory Free Universal 
Basic Education Act 2004) UBE provides compulsory, free universal basic education for all 
children of primary and junior secondary schools age in the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(Compulsory Free Universal Basic Education Act 2004). 
Universal Basic Education (UBE) was approved by the federal government of Nigeria in its 
National Policy on Education. The policy stated that:  
Basic education shall be of nine (9) years duration, comprising six (6) years of 
primary education and three (3) years of junior secondary education. It shall be free 
and compulsory. It shall also include adult and non-formal education programs at 
primary and junior secondary education levels for the adults and out-of-school 
youths (Federal Government of Nigeria 2004, p.13).  
The UBE programme was a significant framework aimed at improving the lives of the populace 
and give access to education of every Nigerian child (UNDP 2005). The programme allowed pupils 
to spend 6 years in primary school and 3 years in junior secondary school (Kelleher and Isyaku 
2008). According to Part 1 section 1 of the Compulsory Free Universal Basic Education Act, 
2004which states that:  
Without prejudice to the provisions of item 30 of Part II of the Second Schedule 
and item 2 (a) of the Fourth Schedule to the 1999 Constitution dealing with primary 
school education, the Federal Government’s intervention under this Act shall only 
be an assistance to the States and Local Governments in Nigeria for the purposes 
of uniform and qualitative basic education throughout Nigeria (Compulsory Free 
Universal Basic Education Act 2004). 
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The UBE Act of 2004 recognised the state and local governments as the levels of government that 
are responsible for primary school education. However, the federal government complements the 
state and local governments through the provision of the intervention fund. In an interview with 
the Deputy Director of one of the State Universal Basic Education (SUBEB), he disclosed that 
SUBEB implemented the federal government projects at the state level as directed by the federal 
government (Personal Interview V, February 26, 2018). He added that the federal government 
solely provided the intervention fund (Personal Interview V, February 26, 2018).  
This act of self-financing of primary school education projects, where the federal government 
targeted specific projects at the state level without regard to the needs of the locality, has made a 
mockery of the UBE (SERAP 2007). Therefore, there was a duplication of projects, which 
amounted to wastage of resources. In spite of the counterpart and interventionist funds made 
available to UBEC, accessibility of  Nigerian children to  education is relatively low (SERAP 
2007).  
In the petition, dated 15 January 2007, to the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Commission (ICPC), SERAP stated, “despite reported activities and spending by the 
UBEC, more than 5 million Nigerian children still have no access to primary education” (SERAP, 
2007). In 1999, the estimated number of children in primary school age in Nigeria was 19.5 
million. Of this, 15.7 million were in school while the remaining 3.8 million were on the streets 
(International Bureau for Education 1999).    
The 2016/2017 Multiple Indicator Survey (MICS5) released by the National Bureau of Statistics 
and UNICEF, revealed a steady decline in primary schools’ enrolment, and an increase in the 
number of out of school children in the country, especially in states in the North East and North 
West (New Telegraph, 1 May 2018). The survey further revealed that the current percentage of 
children enroled in a primary school in the country was 39.4%. However, it showed that the net 
attendance ratio for children within primary and secondary schools age bracket, who entered into 
the first grade of primary and secondary schools have decreased from 70.1% to 60.9% and from 
54.2% to 46.9% respectively (New Telegraph, 1 May 2018). The primary school completion rate, 
which was formerly 85.5%, had also reduced to 63%, while the transition rate from primary to 
secondary school witnessed drastic downturn from 74% to 49% (New Telegraph, 1 May 2018).   
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The decline in the pupils’ enrolment in primary and secondary schools has serious implications for 
intergovernmental relations. The State Universal Basic Education Board is to implement the 
various programmes of Universal Basic Education Commission. A decline in pupils’ enrolment in 
primary schools means that SUBEB would reduce the staff strength by laying off some workers. 
In other words, any federal government policy towards employment of new staff has to be put on 
hold. The decline in enrolment of primary school would lead to decline in the enrolment of 
secondary school because state government get their inputs (i.e. pupils’ enrolment) from the 
various schools within the local government education authorities (LGEA). The declining rate in 
pupil’s enrolment implied that SUBEB needed to cut down costs associated with the programmes 
of government at the state and local levels. Such reduction in cost would erode the community 
support of the state to the local governments. Therefore, the state government would be constrained 
to alter their programmes at the state and local levels. Subsequently, there would be an increase in 
the number of children out of school age. The overall effect is that the Millennium Development 
Goal of eradicating illiteracy would be defeated. Also, a change in programme of SUBEB 
associated with reduction in cost at the state and local levels means that the state may not be able 
to have access to the Universal Basic Education Commission’s intervention fund in the succeeding 
years particularly when the state has not finished expending the current budgetary allocations. 
A comprehensive report of the Department for International Development (DFID) on education in 
Nigeria stated thus:  
Nigeria’s education system faces a multi-dimensional crisis. Net primary school 
enrolment is about 65% and disproportionately large numbers of girls are out of 
school. Quality is also poor…Pupil-teacher ratios are particularly high in rural 
areas, textbooks are in limited supply and more than 50% of schools are in need of 
some renovation. Poor management of resources is at the root of the crisis. Only 
50% of the funding available from the Universal Basic Education Commission’s 
intervention fund (the main source of funding for basic education) has so far been 
spent at state level… In some states of northern Nigeria, less than one-third of 
school-age girls attend primary school, with even lower ratios at the secondary level 
(http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-West Central/Nigeria/Major 
Challenges/ 
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6.4.1.1 Osun State Universal Basic Education 
 Each state had the mandate to establish the State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB). The 
legislature in each of the states had the mandate to prescribe, by law, the composition of the Board 
(Part IV, Section 12(1 and 2) Universal Basic Education Act 2004). The Act empowered each state 
to provide basic education to pupils in the first nine years of education i.e. between primary one 
and the first three years of Junior Secondary School ((Personal Interview V, February 26, 2018).). 
A law enacted by the State House of Assembly, established the Osun State Universal Basic 
Education in 2005.  Thus, the basic idea of primary education was literacy and numerals. The 
establishment of SUBEB has influenced the enrolment of pupils, increased pupils’ retention, 
fastrack the completion rate and ensures easy access to basic education than before ((Personal 
Interview V, February 26, 2018).  
Table 52 shows the trend of pupils’ enrolment in primary schools in Osun state. A steady increase 
was recorded from 382,492 in 2015 to 303,172 in 2016. However, there was a decline in pupils’ 
enrolment in the state to 218,099 in 2017.  
Table 52: Summary of pupils’ enrolment for primary schools in Osun State 2011-2017 
Year Number of Pupils 
2011/2012 350918 
2012/2013 360103 
2013/2014 356453 
2014/2015 382492 
2015/2016 303172 
2016/2017 218099 
TOTAL 1,971,237 
Source: Osun State Universal Basic Education 2017 
 
Table 53 shows teachers’ enrolment for primary schools in Osun State. The highest teachers’ 
enrolment was in Osogbo LGEA with 631. Iwo and Olorunda LGEAs followed this with 583 and 
524 respectively. The lowest teachers’ enrolment was in Boluwaduro with 115 pupils. 
Table 53: Teachers’ enrolment for primary schools in Osun State 2018 
LGEA No. of Teachers 
Atakunmosa East 236 
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Atakunmosa West 242 
Ayedaade 456 
Ayedire 254 
Boluwaduro 115 
Boripe 302 
Ede North 357 
Ede South 304 
Egbedore 256 
Ejigbo 442 
Ife Central 464 
Ife East 393 
Ife North 326 
Ife South 355 
Ifedayo 145 
Ifelodun 402 
Ila 213 
Ilesa East 346 
Ilesa West 392 
Irepodun 284 
Irewole 438 
Isokan 330 
Iwo 583 
Obokun 305 
Odo-Otin 308 
Ola-Oluwa 277 
Olorunda 524 
Oriade 438 
Orolu 211 
Osogbo 631 
Ife East Area Office 326 
Total 10655 
Source: Osun State Universal Basic Education 2018 
 
Table 54 indicates the trends in the Universal Basic Education Intervention Fund in Osun state. 
There was a steady increase in the UBE intervention fund from 2010 with 622,781,965.64 to 
1,030,797,297.30 in 2013. There was a decline in the counterpart fund in 2014 and an increase in 
2016 from 1,042,027,027.02 to 1,286,313,183.55 in 2017.   
 
Table 54: Osun State Universal Basic Education Expenditure 2010-2017 
Particulars Counterpart fund received from Osun State 
Government 
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2010 UBE Intervention Fund 622,781,965.64 
2011 UBE Intervention Find 872,527,306.70 
2012 UBE Intervention Fund 852,936,713.92 
2013 UBE Intervention Fund 1,030,797,297.30 
2014 UBE Intervention Fund 952,297,297.30 
2015 UBE Intervention Fund 876,756,756.76 
2016 UBE Intervention Fund 1,042,027,027.02 
2017 UBE Intervention Fund 1,286,313,183.55 
Source: Osun State Universal Basic Education 2017 
 
Table 55 presents different categories of books provided to the pupils at the primary school level. 
The books provided include computer science (50,000 copies); assorted laboratory materials 
(27,000 copies); English language (13,000 copies), Mathematics (1,200 copies); Verbal reasoning 
(1,800 copies); and Verbal Quantitative (1,800 copies). 
Table 55: Books provided by Osun State Universal Basic Education 2006-2010 
Title of Textbooks Number of Copies 
Computer Science Textbooks for Grades 1-6 50,000 
Assorted Laboratory Materials for Grades 5 
and 6 
27,000 
English Language for MAN for Grades 2 and 3 13,000 
Learn English for Grades 1-6 1,500 
Learn Mathematics for Grades 1-6 1,200 
Verbal Reasoning for Grades 1-6 1,800 
Verbal Quantitative for Grades 1-6 1,800 
Different types of Charts 250 
Source: Osun State Universal Basic Education 2010 
 
Table 56 shows stationeries provided by Osun State Basic Education Board in 2017. Osun SUBEB 
provided 25,600 teachers lesson notes; 25,600 teachers lesson plan; 10,655 teachers guide; 1,244 
policy guidelines; 30,000 cartons of chalk; 300 cartons of whiteboard marker; 1,500 packets of 
Blue Biro; 1,500 packets of Red Biro; 2,150 Dairies; 1,500 Attendance register; and 2,150 
Admission register.    
Table 56: Stationeries provided by Osun State Basic Education Board 2017 
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Table 57 indicates the various construction and rehabilitation projects as well as instructional 
materials, individually or jointly provided by UBEC and SUBEC. The projects embarked on by 
SUBEB include construction of classrooms, repair, and renovation of existing structures, provision 
of instructional materials etc. 
Table 57: Osun State Universal Basic Education Board projects’ implementation 2010 to 
2018 
Year Name of Project Project 
Description 
Implementation 
Agency 
Cost (N) 
2010 Construction Construction of 
eight 1000-
Capacity Model 
Middle school 
with all facilities 
UBEC/SUBEB 1,309,295,975 
2011 Construction Construction of 
eleven 900 
Capacity Model 
primary school 
UBEC/SUBEB 1322128317 
2012 Construction Construction of 
154 Model 
classroomms 
Block 
UBEC/SUBEB 677924955 
2013 Construction Construction of 
117 classrooms 
Block 
UBEC/SUBEB 450268002 
2013 Construction Construction of 
three 900 
Capacity 
UBEC/SUBEB 315690795 
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Quadrangle 
blocks of 
classrooms 
2014 Construction Construction of 
44 classrooms 
Block  
UBEC/SUBEB 396487818 
2014 Construction Construction of 
12 classrooms 
Block 
SUBEB 40735180.10 
2014 Rehabilitation Repair and 
renovation of 
classrooms 
UBEC/SUBEB 62799288.50 
2014 Rehabilitation Repair and 
renovation of 
classrooms 
SUBEB 116460372 
2015 Construction Construction of 
16 classrooms 
fenced with 
metal gates 
UBEC/SUBEB 162945318 
2015  Construction Construction of 2 
Blocks of 10 
classrooms 
SUBEB 111092552 
2015 Rehabilitation Repair and 
renovation of 33 
blocks of 106 
classrooms 
UBEC/SUBEB 290452918 
2015 Rehabilitation Repair and 
renovation of 
existing 
structures 
SUBEB 508430058 
2015 Fencing Construction of 
Block well fence 
with metal gates 
UBEC/SUBEB 56339574.20 
2015 Fencing Construction of 
Block well fence 
with metal gates 
SUBEB 21207510 
2016 Toilet Construction of 
Toilet 
SUBEB 588764358 
2016 Borehole Drilling of 
Borehole 
SUBEB 22584600 
2017 Construction Construction of 
Block Well fence 
with a metal gate 
SUBEB 82092174.80 
2017 Running grant Grant for running 
of schools 
SUBEB 1369283400 
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2018 Instructional 
materials 
Provision of 
instructional 
materials 
SUBEB 174000000 
2018 Furniture Supply of 
students/Pupils 
and Teachers’ 
Furniture 
SUBEB 966716330 
2018 Others Procurement and 
Installation of 
100KVA 
Transformer 
SUBEB 41160000 
     
Source: Osun State Universal Basic Education Board 
The data on various construction and rehabilitation projects as well as instructional materials, 
individually or jointly provided by UBEC and SUBEC showed an increase in the number of pupils’ 
enrolment between 2011 and 2016 and a decline in the enrolment of pupils between 2016 and 
2017. The implication of this was that the number of school-age pupils that were out of school has 
increased. Although, there was a flow of counterpart fund from the federal government to the state 
government between 2010 and 2017 for the implementation of the SUBEB projects, yet, the data 
showed that instructional and learning materials were relatively very small considering the pupils’ 
enrolment in the state. The various construction and projects rehabilitation embarked upon 
between 2010 and 2018 were not adequate to achieve the eight goals of MDGs of allowing pupils 
in the first nine years of education to have access to education.  
The classrooms facilities provided would result in wastage with a large number of school-age 
pupils out of school. Therefore, service delivery function in education has suffered a serious 
setback, particularly with the insufficient teachers’ enrolment at the local government levels. The 
delivery of quality education is a function of adequate trained teachers. The researcher claims that 
the state lacked the capacity to deliver services in education due to a large number of pupils of 
school age that had no access to education. The next section gives the analysis of service delivery 
function in education in Oyo state.      Effective service delivery in education requires adequate 
and qualified trained teachers who would be able to impact on the pupils the required skills and 
knowledge. Unfortunately, the data presented showed that there was inequality in the teachers’ 
enrolment among the local governments. While some local governments had a larger number of 
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teachers’ enrolment, others had relatively low teachers’ enrolment. Such inadequacy in the 
teachers’ enrolment would affect pupils’ access to quality education. Thus, the state becomes 
incapacitated to deliver services to the school age pupils. The next section gives the analysis of 
service delivery function in education in Oyo state.  
6.4.1.2 Oyo State Universal Basic Education 
The UBE programme was launched in 1999 and passed into law in 2004 which led to the 
establishment of the Oyo State Universal Basic Education. State Universal Basic Education was 
to monitor and supervise projects of UBE at the state level. Table 58 shows the number of primary 
schools, teachers’ enrolment and pupils’ enrolment in Oyo State UBEC between 2000 and 2017. 
There was a steady increase in the teachers’ enrolment from 18,884 in 2000 to 28,374 in 2009. 
However, teachers’ enrolment experienced drastic reduction with 26,028; 25,919; 25,142; 24,954; 
24,104; 26,026; 23,116; and 22,520 in 2010, 2011 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, 
respectively. Similarly, there was an increase in the pupils’ enrolment from 844,758 in 2000 to 
1,709,667 in 2016. A shortfall occurred in 2017 with 1,506,411 pupils.   
Table 58: Number of Primary Schools, Teachers’ Enrolment and Pupils’ Enrolment in Oyo 
State Universal Basic Education Board 2000-2017  
Year No of Primary 
Schools 
Primary School 
Teachers’ Enrolments 
Primary School Pupils’ 
Enrolment 
2000 1703 18884 844758 
2001 1707 22029 848153 
2002 1719 21687 862584 
2003 1728 19511 943616 
2004 1795 22238 945007 
2005 1940 28900 939920 
2006 2028 28695 942504 
2007 2115 28435 1002653 
2008 2115 28360 1005241 
2009 2115 28374 1009193 
2010 2195 26028 1009573 
2011 2236 25919 1009862 
2012 2260 25142 1060842 
2013 2339 24954 1088639 
2014 2371 24104 1202694 
2015 2378 26026 1511161 
2016 2375 23116 1709667 
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2017 2409 22520 1506411 
Total    
Source: Oyo State Universal Basic Education Board 2017 
 
Table 59 presents the SUBEB budget in Oyo state between 2013 and 2018. The 2013 and 2014 
budget was 2.4b and 3.4b respectively. The amount was reduced to N2.9b (2015) and N2.1b 
(2016). A steady increase occurred in 2017 with N4.2b and N8.3b in 2018.   
Table 59:  Oyo State Universal Basic Education Board Budget 2013-2018 
Year Amount Budgeted 
2013 2,490,800,601.44 
2014 3,453,300,601.44 
2015 2,935,882,000.00 
2016 2,193,089,700.00 
2017 4,239,182,057.73 
2018 8,367,693,636.69 
Source: Oyo State Universal Basic Education Board 2018 
The data presented indicated a steady increase in the number of primary schools between 2000 and 
2017. A total of 706 primary schools were added to the existing schools. The number of schools 
was considered inadequate with the population of Oyo state. A decline in the teachers’ enrolment 
indicated that there would be insufficient teachers to meet up with the additional established 
schools. In addition, pupils’ enrolment showed a steady increase between 2000 and 2016 with a 
sharp decline in 2017. Such a decline in pupils’ enrolment would mean that the number of pupils 
of school age that were out of school was on the increase. Therefore, some pupils did not have 
access to education, and this has not made the state to achieve the MDGs in universal primary 
education. The next section gives the analysis of service delivery in education in Ondo state.    
6.4.1.3 Ondo State Universal Basic Education 
Ondo state Universal Basic Education was established to coordinate the implementation of UBEC 
program at the state level. The State UBEC was to monitor and supervise the projects undertaken 
by the federal government at the state level. Table 60 presents the number of primary schools, 
teachers’ and pupils’ enrolments in each of the local government in Ondo state in 2018. The LGEA 
with the highest number of schools was Ondo West LGEA with 104 schools, followed by Odigbo 
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LGEA with 101 schools. Akoko South East has the lowest with 24 schools. Akure South has the 
highest number of teachers’ enrolment with 865, followed by Ondo West and Ilaje, with 781 and 
644, respectively. Irele has the lowest teachers’ enrolment of 144. In terms of pupils’ enrolment, 
Ilaje has the highest with 97,462, followed by Okitipupa and Akure South with 47,450 and 27,774, 
respectively. Akoko South East has the lowest with 5836 pupils.  
Table 60: Number of Primary schools, Teachers’ enrolment and Pupils’ enrolment in Ondo 
State Universal Basic Education Board 2018 by Local Government 
Local Government No of Primary Schools Teachers’ 
Enrolments 
Pupils’ enrolment 
for primary 
Akoko North East 45 425 7181 
Akoko North West 59 458 11540 
Akoko South East 24 207 5836 
Akoko South West 54 587 25229 
Akure North 58 380 10425 
Akure South 91 865 27774 
Ese-Odo 69 147 17676 
Idanre 71 283 10242 
Ifedore 48 376 6725 
Ilaje 100 644 97462 
Ile-Oluji/Okeigbo 79 390 14371 
Irele 62 144 17346 
Odigbo 101 628 26028 
Okitipupa 89 585 47450 
Ondo East 49 326 6926 
Ondo West 104 781 20073 
Ose 56 257 8651 
Owo 84 518 19101 
Total 1243 7569 382355 
Source: Ondo State Universal Basic Education Board 2018 
 
Table 61 indicates the enrolment of pupils in primary schools in the state between 2009 and 2013. 
One common trend during this period was that Ondo West LGEA had the highest number of pupils 
from 2009 to 2012 while Akure North LGEA had the lowest. In 2013, Odigbo LGEA had the 
highest pupils’ enrolment of 106,293 and the lowest was from Akoko South East with 30,677 
pupils. 
Table 61: Pupils’ enrolment for primary schools in Ondo State 2009-2013 
LGEA 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
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Akoko North East 49809 49809 49809 50414 65274 
Akoko North West 56370 56370 56370 56663 93672 
Akoko South East 22946 22946 22946 46400 30677 
Akoko South West 58834 58834 58834 58834 63319 
Akure North 14826 14826 14826 15395 49789 
Akure South 71521 71521 71521 72293 95555 
Ese Odo 30049 30049 30049 30764 79188 
Idanre 22916 22916 22916 22916 58913 
Ifedore 23724 23724 23724 23865 48903 
Ilaje 72949 72949 72949 73424 96978 
Ile-Oluji/Okeigbo 53351 53351 53351 52961 70173 
Irele 54398 54398 54398 54398 72849 
Odigbo 88622 88622 88622 88622 106293 
Okitipupa 77984 77984 77984 78105 89559 
Ondo East 23036 23036 23036 23740 48970 
Ondo West 90785 90785 90785 91250 102624 
Ose 33711 33711 33711 33533 41185 
Owo 41112 41112 41112 41276 78661 
Total 886943 886943 886943 914853 1292582 
Source: Ondo State Universal Basic Education 2013 
The data presented indicated that primary schools were distributed, unevenly, across the 18 local 
government councils in the state. The inequality created in the state would deny some pupils access 
to education, particularly where there was a fewer number of schools. In addition, teachers’ 
enrolments were not evenly distributed. There would be a shortage of teachers in schools with 
fewer teachers’ enrolment. Similarly, pupils’ enrolment for primary school were unevenly 
distributed, this would create gaps between schools with large enrolment and those with low 
enrolment. The implication of this was the insufficient teachers to give quality education to the 
pupils in schools with large enrolment. In this case, the teachers-pupils ratio would be high, and 
this would reduce efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. The researcher argues that the 
state did not have the capacity to attain MDGs objective of free universal primary education due 
to lack of equal access to free education and insufficient teachers to provide quality education to 
the pupils.  
6.4.1.4 Ekiti State Universal Basic Education 
Ekiti State Universal Basic Education came into existence with the establishment of UBE in 2004. 
The State’ UBE was committed to various projects of the federal government by providing 50% 
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of the projects that need to be executed at the state level. There are 16 local government councils 
in the state.  
Table 62 indicates teachers’ enrolment for primary schools in the state between 2010 and 2017. A 
common trend was that Ado LGEA has the highest teachers’ enrolment during the period. Ido-Osi 
and Irepodun/Ifelodun LGEAs, followed this between 2010 and 2012. Between 2014 and 2016, 
Ekiti West followed Ado as the second largest LGEA with teachers’ enrolment. Throughout the 
period, Ilejemeji had the lowest teachers’ enrolment. Thus, the total teachers’ enrolment in the 
LGEAs in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 were 9,057; 9,293; 9,450; 8,609; 
10,455; 9,719; 9,078; and 8,633 respectively.  
Table 62: Teachers’ Enrolment for primary schools in Ekiti State, 2010-2017 
LGEA 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Ado 1254 1354 1476 1331 1560 1389 1502 1498 
Efon 212 317 365 343 382 363 245 284 
Ekiti East 331 382 454 423 671 423 350 471 
Ekiti South West 538 560 592 549 646 546 438 734 
Ekiti West 650 670 688 669 898 872 838 722 
Emure 219 258 279 256 289 291 304 292 
Aiyekire 471 425 359 354 457 394 388 420 
Ido-Osi 785 790 813 676 730 684 614 531 
Ijero 691 684 678 594 678 764 639 466 
Ikere 652 660 666 606 773 767 706 660 
Ikole 694 685 668 579 693 688 635 527 
Ilejemeji 208 193 189 187 215 194 216 188 
Irepodun/Ifelodun 754 765 794 667 829 740 743 611 
Ise/Orun 493 455 445 425 521 417 467 399 
Moba 417 410 401 392 456 422 405 344 
Oye 688 685 583 558 657 765 588 486 
Total 9057 9293 9450 8609 10455 9719 9078 8633 
Source: Ekiti State Universal Basic Education 2018 
 
Table 63 indicates pupils’ enrolment in the state Universal Basic Education. The common trend 
during this period was that Ado had the highest number of pupils’ enrolment, followed by Ikole. 
Ilejemeji LGEA had the lowest pupils’ enrolment during this period except in 2011/2012 when 
Ekiti South West was the lowest with 4739 pupils. 
Table 63: Pupils’ enrolment for primary schools in Ekiti State, 2010-2017 
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LGEA 2010/20
11 
2011/20
12 
2012/20
13 
2013/20
14 
2014/20
15 
2015/20
16 
2016/20
17 
 
Ado 20324 21450 22300 23000 23424 24160 24210  
Efon 6380 6660 7021 7274 7482 7601 7732  
Ekiti East 7425 7225 7384 7441 7479 7502 7903  
Ekiti South 
West 
4674 4739 4881 5714 4434 6344 6814  
Ekiti West 9092 8482 8800 11732 8403 10316 9034  
Emure 4500 5183 8110 6127 7381 6661 7424  
Aiyekire 8131 7716 7322 7082 7621 6575 7528  
Ido-Osi 8500 7654 9333 7322 6621 8263 8720  
Ijero 10281 6781 7481 7770 8100 10170 8659  
Ikere 5546 5831 7373 7601 7151 9315 8340  
Ikole 10722 9412 12631 13320 13720 14217 14500  
Ilejemeji 700 6601 1720 2300 3510 4091 2254  
Irepodun/Ifelo
dun 
1010 7900 7521 8511 9311 9911 10721  
Ise/Orun 7500 8000 8300 8311 8400 9100 9500  
Moba 6050 5190 5763 5254 7054 6635 7509  
Oye 8380 6717 7100 7127 7500 No 
Report 
No 
Report 
 
Total 119215 125541 133040 135886 137591 140861 132508  
Source: Ekiti State Universal Basic Education 2018 
 
6.5 How states creation in the Fourth Republic has constrained effective service delivery in 
Osun, Oyo, Ondo, Ekiti and Lagos states 
 In spite of the agitation for the creation of new states in the Nigerian Second Republic (1979-
1983), no state was created until the collapse of the Republic. The nineteen-state structure that was 
inherited by Shagari administration continued until the military regime of Babangida. Thereafter, 
the proliferation of states started. Osun state was created from Oyo state in 1991 while Ekiti state 
was created from Ondo state in 1996. Lagos state has been in existence since the creation of states 
in 1976. 
The rationale behind states creation is to allay the fear of the minority and provide effective service 
delivery to the people. The nineteen-state structure in the Second Republic was economically 
viable and able to provide dividends of democracy to the people through service delivery. 
However, the proliferation of states from 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991 and 36 in 1996 has 
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constrained service delivery at the subnational levels. Apart from Lagos state which has tried to 
balance its budget since its creation, all other states had to depend on the federal government for 
survival (Ojo 2009). In the time past, a large number of states in Nigeria requested for bail out 
from the federal government to pay staff salaries. 
Aside from Lagos state, the selected states (Osun, Oyo, Ondo and Ekiti) are not economically 
viable for effective service delivery. These states depend on federal allocations from the Federation 
Allocation Account Committee (FAAC). A cursory look at the internally generated revenue of 
these states vis-à-vis their total revenue showed that the states with the exemption of Lagos state 
relied heavily on the statutory allocations. Therefore, effective service delivery of these states has 
become very difficult. For example, between 2007 and 2011 the total revenue for Osun, Oyo, 
Ondo, Ekiti and Lagos states were N256.2bn, N354.6bn, N231.8bn, N201.0bn and N1944.6bn 
respectively. Out of this, the internally generated revenue for Osun, Oyo, Ondo, Ekiti and Lagos 
states were N38.2bn (7.2%), N54.8bn (15.5%), N16.6bn (7.2%), N15.9bn (7.9%), and N714.3bn 
(36.7%) (Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports 2007-2011). Similarly, between 2011 and 2017, 
the internally generated revenue for Osun, Oyo, Ondo, Ekiti and Lagos states were N50.3bn, 
N96.1bn, N63bn, N20.3bn and N1670.7bn respectively (National Bureau of Statistics/Joint Tax 
Board/ State Boards of Internal Revenue, 2011-2017).  
Further analysis showed that in Osun state, the total revenue in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 
were N53.4bn, N44.5bn, N28.3bn, N14.8bn, and N16.9bn respectively while the internally 
generated revenue during the same period were N7.28bn, N8.51bn, N8.07bn, N8.89bn, and 
N6.49bn. In Oyo state, the total revenue in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 were N82.4bn, 
N73.7bn, N58.7bn, N52.4bn, and N66.9bn respectively while the internally generated revenue in 
the same period were N15.3bn, N16.3bn, N15.7bn, N18.9bn, and N22.4bn. In Ondo state, the total 
revenue in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 were N91.7bn, N78.2bn, N51.7bn, N43.2bn, and 
N56.8bn respectively while the internally generated revenue during the period were N10.5bn, 
N11.7bn, N10.1bn, N8.68bn, and N10.9bn. In Ekiti state, the total revenue in 2013, 2014, 2015, 
2016, and 2017 were N46.6bn, N43.6bn, N31.5bn, N21.8bn, and N30.6bn respectively while the 
internally generated revenue during the period were N2.34bn, N3.46bn, N3.29bn, N2.99bn, and 
N4.97bn. In Lagos state, the total revenue in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 were N353.6bn, 
N381.2bn, N356.6bn, N381.1bn, and N423.7bn respectively while the internally generated 
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revenue for the same period were N236.2bn, N276.2bn, N268.2bn, N302.4bn,and N333.9bn 
(BudgIT 2018). This analysis clearly showed dwindling internally revenue generation of the state 
of Osun, Oyo, Ondo, and Ekiti which has accounted for poor service delivery. However, Lagos 
state has substantial part of its revenue from within the state.  
The implication of these figures for intergovernmental relations is that these states, with the 
exemption of Lagos state depend solely on the federal government for survival. The over-reliance 
of these states on the statutory allocations put these states under the control of the federal 
government. Consequently, the autonomy of these states became eroded. The figures showed that 
all the states (except Lagos) had low percentage of internal revenue. This was a clear picture that 
the selected states of Osun, Oyo, Ondo and Ekiti were fiscally weakened and economically 
unviable for effective service delivery.     
In 2018, the monthly recurrent expenditure of Osun state was N7.22bn while its monthly income 
was N2.25bn, leaving a shortfall of N4.97bn. In Oyo state, the monthly recurrent expenditure was 
N10.14bn while its monthly income was N6.56bn, leaving a shortfall of N3.58bn. In Ondo state, 
the monthly recurrent expenditure was N6.54bn with monthly income of N6.07bn, leaving a 
shortfall of N0.47bn. In Ekiti state, the monthly recurrent expenditure was N5.54bn while the 
monthly income was N3.40bn, with a shortfall of N2.14bn (BudgIT 2018). However, Lagos state 
had the monthly recurrent expenditure of N28.92bn while its monthly income was N37.75bn, 
leaving an excess of N8.83bn (BudgIT 2018). Therefore, when compared with other selected states 
(Osun, Oyo, Ondo and Ekiti), Lagos state was the only state that was able to conveniently cover 
its recurrent expenditure in 2018. While other states had shortfall, Lagos state had excess fund. 
The figures showed that only Lagos state was economically viable to deliver effective services to 
the populace. States like Osun, Oyo, Ondo and Ekiti had poor internally generated revenue base. 
These states would always request for bailout from the federal government to meet the monthly 
recurrent expenditure.   
Also, the low internally generated revenue of these states reflected in their budgetary allocation to 
capital expenditure, particularly in education, health and infrastructure. Between 2010 and 2013, 
out of the total capital expenditure of N278.022bn in Osun state, education, health and 
infrastructure had N15.75bn (5.6%), N3.50bn (1.2%) and N7.823bn (2.8%) respectively. In Oyo 
state, out of the total capital expenditure of N516.865bn, education, health and infrastructure had 
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N133.05bn (25.7%), N33.00bn (6.3%) and N286.65bn (55.4%) respectively. In Ondo state, out of 
the total capital expenditure of N267.321bn, education, health and infrastructure had N26.8bn 
(10%), N26.785bn (10%) and N130.172bn (48.6%) respectively. In Ekiti state, out of the total 
capital expenditure of N191.701bn, education, health and infrastructure had N28.265bn (14.7%), 
N3.841bn (2%) and N53.849bn (28%) respectively. Lagos state had a total of N547.1bn capital 
expenditure. Out of this, education, health and infrastructure had N1.600bn (0.2%), N13.600bn 
(2.4%) and N387.37bn (70%) respectively (Nigeria Vision 20:2020). The implication of this was 
that the bulk of the revenue of the states were gulped by the administrative overheads rather than 
the provision of services. For example, between 2012 and 2018, Oyo state government spent 
N1641.41bn on recurrent expenditure and N351.71bn on capital expenditure (Department of 
Planning, Research, and Statistics, Oyo State 2018).  
The poor internally generated revenue of the selected states has affected service delivery in health, 
education and infrastructure development of the state. This is so because of the meagre percentage 
of revenue allocated to the health and education sectors. It is quite obvious that none of the selected 
state has satisfied the “Abuja Declaration” agreement where the leaders pledged to commit at least 
15% of their annual budgets to improve their health sector (Abuja Declaration 2001). 
Effective Service delivery in the selected states has been constrained due to the revenue allocation 
formula in the country. The revenue allocation formula of 48.5% (federal), 24% (state 
government), and 20% (local government) did not match up with the expanded obligations of the 
newly created states. Aside from Lagos state, the selected states relied heavily on statutory 
allocations to meet up with their expenditure (recurrent and capital). Hence, service delivery in 
these states suffer serious setbacks. Quite a number of the selected states use a large percentage of 
their statutory allocations on recurrent expenditure such as payment of salaries and other 
overheads. 
The proliferation of states in the Fourth Republic has made the newly created states to become 
weaker while the centre becomes more powerful. The creation of Osun and Ekiti states from Oyo 
and Ondo states respectively weakened the revenue base of the new states and stifle effective 
service delivery.   
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6.6 Constitutional provisions regarding the division of powers and responsibilities among the 
levels of government 
The 1979 and 1999 Constitutions contained the division of powers and responsibilities among the 
levels of government. Section 4, Second Schedule, Part 1 and Part 11 of the 1979 Constitution 
contained 66 items and 28 items in the exclusive legislative and concurrent legislative lists, 
respectively (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979). Similarly, in the Fourth 
Republic, the Second Schedule Part 1 and Part 11 of the 1999 Constitution contained 68 items and 
30 items in the exclusive and concurrent legislative lists respectively (The Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The Second Schedule Part 1 Section 4 of the 1999 constitution 
enumerated the items upon which the federal government could act on while Part 11 Section 4 
enumerated items in the concurrent legislative list that specified the extent of federal and state 
legislative powers. Part II, section 5 of the 1979 and the 199942 constitutions stated that: 
If any Law enacted by the House of Assembly of a State is inconsistent with any 
law validly made by the National Assembly, the law made by the National 
Assembly shall prevail, and that other Law shall to the extent of the inconsistency 
be void (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
The above constitutional provisions reveal that the federal government has exclusive powers on 
66 items and 68 items in the 1979 and 1999 constitutions respectively. In addition, both the federal 
and the state governments have powers to legislate on the items in the concurrent legislative lists 
in the 1979 and 1999 respectively. The 1979 and 1999 Constitutions set out the extent of the federal 
and state legislative powers on revenue issues. The Constitution empowered the National 
Assembly to make provision for the division of public revenue between the Federation and the 
State, among the States of the Federation, between the States and local government councils, and 
among the local government councils in the States (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999, p.133).  
Similarly, the House of Assembly of a state has the power to make provisions for grants or loans. 
It can also impose charges, upon any of the public funds of that State or upon the revenue and 
assets of that State, for any purpose. Such might not be related to a matter with respect to which 
                                                          
42 The 1999 constitution was a mere adaptation of the 1979 constitution. The 1999 constitution has the features of 
the 1979 constitution with some modifications. 
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the National Assembly has the power to make laws (Part II, Section 4 subsection 1 and 2, The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 and 1999).   
Section 7 of the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions listed the functions of local government as follows: 
The functions of a local government council shall among others include the 
participatory role in the Government of a State in the provision and maintenance of 
primary, adult and vocational education; the development of agriculture and natural 
resources, other than the exploitation of minerals; the provision and maintenance 
of health services; and such other functions as may be conferred on a local 
government council by the House of Assembly of the State (The Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
All these were measures to ensure that each level of government is constitutionally guided to 
perform assigned functions. The 1999 constitution excluded land matters from the items listed in 
the Second Schedule. This makes land administration to fall within the exclusive residual 
jurisdiction of the states.  
The Land Use Act, promulgated in 1978 was motivated by the need to make land 
accessible to all Nigerians; prevent speculative purchases of communal land, 
streamline and simplify management and ownership of land, make land available 
to governments at all levels for development, and provide a system of government 
administration of rights that would improve tenure security (Land Use Act 1978 
The Complete 2004 Laws). 
Notwithstanding the above provision on land matters, there was non-compliance by the federal 
government. For example, the Urban and Regional Development Division (URDD) of the Federal 
Ministry of Works and Housing (FMW&H) was accused of exercising relevant town planning 
powers such as approving building plans for all forms of development. The Lagos State Urban and 
Regional Planning Board (LASURPB) argued that under the 1999 constitution (as amended), town 
planning was a residual matter within the exclusive legislative and executive competence of the 
state (Abiodun 2003, p.43 cited in Bamgbose 2008). In order to assert the level of government that 
has the constitutional right over the land, Lagos state sued the Federal government to the Supreme 
Court on March 20, 2002. Fifteen months later, judgment was delivered in favour of Lagos state. 
Delivering the judgment, the Supreme Court declared that 
Town planning and the regulation of physical development of the land was the 
exclusive responsibility of the state government in whose territory the land lay. 
Henceforth, the Federal government should not engage itself in giving building 
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permits, licenses or approval over federal land in any state territory except within 
the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) (Abiodun 2003, p. 43 cited in Bamgbose 2008).     
The decision of the Supreme Court showed that LASURPB had the constitutional right over a land 
matter that falls within the jurisdiction of Lagos State. The interference of the Federal Ministry of 
Works and Housing (FMW&H), on relevant town planning matters was a violation of the 
constitutional right of the state. This was a bridge of constitutional law and abuse of power by the 
federal government. It was quite evident that the attitude and behaviour of the operators of the 
constitution differed from the constitutional provision (Abiodun 2003, p.43 cited in Bamgbose 
2008)”.     
In addition, most of the powers accorded the states in the Second Schedule of the 1999 Constitution 
were exercised concurrently with the federal government. The federal and state governments 
complement each other in the area of provision of health and education. The Second Schedule Part 
11, items 27-30 of Section 4 of 1999 (as amended) constitution specifies the concurrent powers of 
the federal and the state governments on education. In this, both the National Assembly and the 
State House of Assembly have the power to make laws on education matters. By implication, 
primary, post-primary and tertiary education in the country is the joint responsibility of the central 
and the state governments. In practice, the federal government has embarked on various 
interventionist programmes like the construction of schools under the Universal Basic Education 
Programme (Khemani 2001). 
The problem associated with these interventionist programs was that the constituent units were not 
consulted properly on the location of these projects (Personal Interview V, February 26, 2018). In 
cases where the constituent units made inputs on the federal government proposed interventionist 
projects, such inputs were jettisoned and the projects executed would not reflect the needs and 
aspirations of the local communities (Personal Interview V, February 26, 2018).  
Aside from this, Lagos state violated the constitutional provision in the creation of additional 37 
local governments. Part 11 section 8 subsection 3 (a-d) and subsection 5 and 6 stipulate the 
procedure involved in the creation of additional local government. This section of the constitution 
conferred on the State House of Assembly the power to create a new local government after the 
fulfilment of the major requirements that preceded the approval of the local government by the 
State House of Assembly. Part of the requirements was the approval of a proposal for the creation 
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of a local government by at least two-thirds majority of the people of the local government area 
where the demand comes through a referendum. In addition, the approval of the result of the 
referendum required a resolution, supported by a two-thirds majority of members of the House of 
Assembly (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
However, the approval by the State House of Assembly on the creation of local government is 
inconclusive until Section 8 subsection 5 and 6 are satisfied. Section 5 empowered the National 
Assembly to make consequential provisions with respect to the names and headquarters of local 
government area while section 6 requires the House of Assembly, after the creation of more local 
government areas pursuant to make adequate returns to each House of the National Assembly (The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). As far as the creation of additional local 
governments in Lagos state was concerned, the state government satisfied all the requirements of 
Part 11 section 8 subsection 3(a-d) of 1999 constitution but did not consider subsection 5 and 6 
necessary. Thus, the additional local governments created in Lagos state were not ratified by the 
National Assembly, which made its creation inconclusive. A respondent alluded to this 
unconstitutional process, saying ‘the State Assembly in Lagos state was right in the creation of 
new local government councils, but the process was inchoate until it had the approval of the 
National Assembly’ (Personal Interview IX, July 5, 2018).  
The above showed that the state government did not adhere to the provisions of the constitution. 
This amounted to flagrant abuse of power. The operators of government at the state level acted 
contrary to the constitution, even when it had powers to create additional local governments, the 
process was not completed. In this, the court of law declared Lagos state government action as 
illegal and ultra vires. Another  abuse of power was exhibited when President Olusegun Obasanjo 
withheld the monthly allocation of Lagos state in 2005. By constitutional design, Section 162 
subsection 3-5 of the 1999 constitution specified the distribution of public revenue to the levels of 
government. Specifically, subsection 5 states that: 
The amount standing to the credit of local government councils in the Federation 
Account shall also be allocated to the States for the benefit of their local 
government councils on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by 
the National Assembly (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
In the 2005 fiscal year, the federal government withheld the monthly allocation due to local 
governments in Lagos state on the ground that the 37 additional local governments created were 
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illegal (Vanguard, 5 June 2005). The position of the federal government was that government 
could not fund the illegal Local Government Council Development Areas, created by Lagos state. 
The government of the state challenged the decision of the Federal Government in the Supreme 
Court. The Court ruled in favour of Lagos State, but the federal government still held on to Lagos 
state government monthly allocation. The Supreme Court ruled that President Olusegun Obasanjo 
has no constitutional power to withhold funds for local councils or tamper with the Federation 
Account (The Guardian, 11 December 2004). The Court added that though, Lagos state had the 
constitutional power to create new councils, “there is still one more step or hurdle to be taken or 
crossed by the National Assembly for Lagos state to actualise the creation of the new councils” 
((The Guardian, 11 December 2004). The court overruled the creation of new local councils by the 
Lagos State House of Assembly without the consequential legislation by the National Assembly.  
Consequently, the Supreme Court then ordered the disbursement of funds to the 20 local councils 
of Lagos state recognised by the constitution (The Guardian, 11 December 2004). Following this, 
the President disobeyed the   subsisting order or judgment of the Supreme Court and sanctioned 
the Lagos state government by withholding the monthly allocation (Vanguard 5 June 2005). The 
federal government had instructed the Finance Minister to withhold Lagos state monthly allocation 
(The Guardian, 11 December 2004). The judgment placed a burden and a responsibility upon the 
Lagos State government to revert to its original position of 20 local governments (The Guardian, 
11 December 2004). In addition, the federal government claimed that Lagos state had no power or 
right under the 1999 constitution to create new local councils without the approval of the National 
Assembly as provided under the constitution (The Guardian, 11 December 2004). The 
disobedience of court order by the federal government amounted to the abdication of the rule of 
law, a development capable of engendering anarchy in the society (The Guardian, 11 December 
2004).  The non-adherence of the federal government to section 162 sub Section 5 of the 
constitution and its refusal to obey the court order, constituted an abuse of power.  The constitution 
accorded the power of interpretation of law and settlement of disputes to the judiciary. Thus, the 
judiciary is the final arbiter of law, and the parties concerned have the constitutional obligation to 
obey its decisions.  
The federal government failed in the performance of its constitutional duty of allocating to the 
state the amount due to it from the federation account. The State House of Assembly was 
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constitutionally empowered to create local government; Lagos state did not follow the due process, 
as it was required to take a step further by allowing the National Assembly to give approval to it. 
This action of Lagos state was a violation of constitution provision and flagrant abuse of power. 
This implies that actors of government in Nigerian federalism did not comply with the provisions 
of the constitution. The above is an indication that both the federal and the state governments failed 
in discharging their constitutional responsibilities.  At times, the actors used their positions to 
exhibit unlawful behaviour. The researcher claims that the behaviour and attitude of the operators 
of the Nigerian constitution contradicted the constitutional framework. Therefore, for the actors, 
it was constitution provision on one side and practice on the other side.   
Similarly, in the Second Republic, Oyo and Ondo states violated constitutional provisions by 
exercising powers beyond their jurisdictions. In Oyo state, the then  governor,  Chief Bola Ige,  
closed Igbeti Marble plant (jointly owned by private investors and Oyo state government) on the 
ground that the government should have exclusive control of mining and minerals in the state (Graf 
1988). Constitutionally, mining and minerals were items listed in the exclusive legislative list 
under the jurisdiction of the federal government (Second Schedule, Section 4 The Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979). The state government had earlier entered into an agreement 
with a private mining operator in the state until a disagreement ensued between them (Graf 1988). 
This disagreement made the state government close the marble plant on the account that it had 
exclusive control over mining. This was an exercise of abuse of power by Oyo state government. 
First, Oyo state government had no power to legislate on mining because it was purely an exclusive 
matter of the federal government. The involvement of the state government in mining activities 
and the closure of the plant thereafter negated the constitutional provision. More importantly, the 
state government had no right to enter into an agreement with the private investor on a matter that 
did not fall within its jurisdiction. This action of Oyo state government was not in accordance with 
the provision of the constitution. The researcher, therefore, claims that the operators of the levels 
of government deviated from the constitution.  
Similarly, Governor Michael Ajasin of Ondo State (1979-1983) decided to explore oil in Ondo 
state, despite the fact that oil prospecting was an exclusive preserve of the federal government 
(Graf 1988).  This was a clear evidence of state government exercising federal powers that 
contravened the provisions of the 1979 constitutional provisions (Graf, 1988: 137). In these two 
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similar cases, there was a flagrant abuse of constitutional powers by the actors. In addition, it 
showed that the constitutional provisions did not guide the actors at the levels of government. 
Thus, a divergence existed between the constitutional provisions and practice. 
6.7 Constitutional provisions on revenue allocation  
By constitutional design, the revenue accrues to the federation is to be shared between the central 
government and the subnational levels. Section 162 Subsection 1-5 of the 1999 constitution gives 
the detail of the procedures involved in the disbursement of federation revenue to the levels of 
government (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Aside from this, the 1999 
constitution established Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) to 
monitor the accruals and disbursement of revenue from the Federation Account. The National 
Assembly, in deliberating on the revenue proposals submitted by the RMAFC, takes into 
consideration the revenue allocation principles: population, equality of States, internal revenue 
generation, land mass, terrain, derivation and population density (The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
The 13% derivation for the oil-producing states was supposed to be implemented in May 1999 but 
the Obasanjo administration refused to commence its implementation (ThisDay, 17 February 
2003). Instead, he appointed a committee to review the 1999 constitution. The Obasanjo review 
committee recommended that the 13% derivation should be increased but the Obasanjo 
administration refused. Rather, the government approached the Supreme Court for the definition 
of a seaward boundary of a littoral state (ThisDay, 17 February 2003). The Supreme Court held, 
inter alia,  
The seaward boundary of a littoral state within the Federal Republic of Nigeria is 
the low water mark of the land surface thereof or (if the case so requires) the 
seaward limits of inland waters within the state. (2) Since the southern boundary of 
each littoral state in the Federation is the low-water mark, the littoral states in (the 
defendants) are not entitled, under the proviso to Section 162 (2) of the 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria that provides for the principle of derivation, to a share in 
the revenue accruing to the Federation Account from natural resources derivable 
from the continental shelf of Nigeria. (3) The mere fact that oilrigs and/ or wells 
located in the offshore areas bear names of indigenous communities on the coastline 
adjacent to such offshore areas is not important in proving ownership of such 
offshore areas. Such naming is only an administrative arrangement made by the 
plaintiff (the federal government) (ThisDay, 17 February 2003). 
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The Supreme Court decision was in accordance to the rules of international law. The international 
law (Nigeria Weekly Law Report 2002)states that the natural resources located within the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of Nigeria are subject to the provisions of any 
treaty or other written agreement between Nigeria and any neighbouring littoral foreign state 
derived from the Federation and not from any state (of the Federation)43. There was clear evidence 
that the Supreme Court’s decision relied on international law.  
The implication of the Supreme Court judgment has serious implication for socio-economic and 
political issues of the country. The exploitation of oil was within the littoral states that constituted 
the minorities. The decision of the court could jeopardise the economic interest of the country. 
More often than not, the agitation, by the minorities of these littoral states, often resulted to 
disruption of oil production, particularly when oil pipelines were vandalised, and oil workers 
kidnapped (Human Right Watch 1999). The decision of the apex court was not in tandem with the 
1992 law that established no distinction between offshore and onshore oil in the application of the 
principle of derivation, and the allocation of revenue derived from the sales of oil. The Supreme 
Court judgment was right because it was in line with the provision of Section 162(2) of the 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria that provides for the principle of derivation, to a share in the revenue 
accruing to the Federation Account from natural resources derivable from the continental shelf of 
Nigeria.  
Similarly, the 1960 Independence constitution and 1963 Republican constitution made no 
distinction between the onshore and offshore oil revenue for applying the derivation principle 
(Section 134(6) of the 1960 constitution and Section 140 (6) of the 1963 constitution). This 
generated controversy that made the government granted the concession of 200 metres water depth 
(ThisDay, 17 February 2003).  
The refusal of the government to implement the 13% derivation was a violation of Section 162 (2) 
of the Constitutional. In the revenue allocation formula of 1992, the Federal government had 
48.5%, State governments 24%, Local government Councils, 20%, and Special fund, 7.5%. In 
May 2002, former president, Olusegun Obasanjo, used his Executive Order to invoke the existing 
provision and redistributed the revenue, which gave the Federal government 56%, State 
                                                          
43 Paragraph 8(d) of the Statement of Claim. See A-G., Federal V. A.G., Abia State and 35 others (No. 2) [2002]6 
Nigeria Weekly Law Reports (Pt. 764), p.556. 
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governments 24%, and Local government councils 20.60% (Revenue Allocation Formula 1999). 
Part II Section 5 (1) of the Constitution stated: 
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive powers of the 
Federation- (a) shall be vested in the President and may, subject as aforesaid and to 
the provisions of any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him 
either directly or through the Vice-President and Ministers of the Government of 
the Federation or officers in the public service of the Federation; and (b) shall extend 
to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, all laws made by the National 
Assembly and to all matters with respect to which the National Assembly has, for 
the time being, power to make laws (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999).  
The president could only issue an Executive Order to enforce existing powers, duties and 
mandates, under the existing laws, to manage staff and resources of executive agencies for greater 
economy, efficiency, effectiveness and, for the realisation of high-level policy goals (The Punch, 
9 July 2018).  
Thus, the president could not use an Executive Order to create new powers, duties or rights or 
expand existing ones beyond the mandate given by the legislature (The Punch, 9 July 2018). The 
action of the Executive, under the pretence of an Executive Order, constituted an abuse of 
constitutional powers, and, an act of dictatorship (The Punch, 9 July 2018). One of the key 
informants observed that the practice of government did not conform to the constitutional 
provisions (Personal Interview VI, February 26, 2018). The practice went beyond the level 
stipulated by the provisions (Personal Interview VI, February 26, 2018). Supporting this claim, a 
politician in the Second Republic, who described African countries as the least obedient to the rule 
of law, stressed that the pronouncement of the constitution must be obeyed (Personal Interview 
IV, November 29, 2017). 
6.8 State-Joint Local Government Account 
Section 162 (6) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, stipulated that each 
state should maintain a special account to be called “State Joint Local Government Account”. All 
allocations to the local government councils of the State, from the Federation Account and from 
the Government of the State, should be paid into this account (The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999). In addition, the amount standing to the credit of local government 
councils in the Federation Account should be allocated to the state for the benefit of their local 
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government councils on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National 
Assembly (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
By this provision, no local government received direct allocation and disbursement from the 
federal government, except through the state government. However, most state governments have 
taken advantage of this joint account to siphon funds of local governments for other use, without 
the consent of such local governments. For example, in Cross River State, there were reports that 
the State government admitted that it had contravened the provisions of the state local government 
law in its handling of the allocations to the local governments from the Federation Account (The 
Punch, 20 July 2004). There were reports that the unconstitutional act of the state government was 
a measure to prevent mismanagement of the allocations by the democratically elected chairmen of 
the local government (The Punch, 20 July 2004). The Government claimed that this was necessary 
in order to ensure effective provision of services to the people.  
In addition, there were various reports pointing to the fact that the state government seized the 
allocations without the consent of the Chairmen (The Punch, 20 July 2004). The report, however, 
quoted one Mr. Abgiji, ‘special adviser’ to the governor on local government matters, who insisted 
that the excess deduction was consensual (The Punch, 20 July 2004). However, the state 
government failed to make use of the constitutionally approved bodies like The Inspectorate 
Division of the Ministry of Local Government, The Office of the State Auditor-General for Local 
Governments, and The Public Accounts Committee of the State House of Assembly that was set 
up to monitor the local government activities. This represents the abuse of constitutional provision 
(The Punch, 20 July 2004). 
The federal government took notice of this illegal action of the state governments, spending money 
meant for the local governments.  In July 2004, the House of Representatives Committee Chairman 
on Local Government, Honourable Tengu Tsergba, said, among other things that state 
governments stifled the development of local governments’, and that the problem of the local 
government was mismanagement and the manner in which the state governments arbitrarily 
deducted of their allocations (cf. Sunday Punch, 25 July 2004, pp.24 and 43). Similarly, President 
Olusegun Obasanjo underscored the allegations of mismanagement of local government funds by 
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the state Governors, when he tasked traditional rulers to monitor them closely in the disbursement 
of the funds (New Age, 23 June 2004). 
As was the case in the Second Republic, many states in the Fourth Republic have shown preference 
for caretaker committees instead of elected local governments. This was the only platform by 
which they could ensure maximum control of the affairs of local government councils because the 
selected members of the Caretaker Committees were their party loyalists. If there were elections, 
it was possible for the opposition parties to control some of the councils (Nigerian Tribune, 10 
July 2015, p.4). Similarly, in the Fourth Republic, a large number of state’ Governors adopted 
caretaker committees at the local government councils. For example, Anambra state has not 
conducted local government since the inception of the democratic dispensation of the Fourth 
Republic. However, Kwara and Ogun states stand out in terms of a more effective compliance with 
constitution provisions on conduct of local government elections.  
The Kaduna State government dissolved the elected local government councils, before the general 
elections in 2011. The Governor inaugurated Caretaker committee Chairmen and members in July 
2011 (The Nation Newspaper, 31 May 2007). In Ekiti state, the administration of Governor Segun 
Oni, dissolved local councils in June 2007, and appointed caretaker committees to administer the 
various councils prior to the conduct of election (Ibietan and Ndukwe 2014). In Imo state, 
Governor Rochas Okorocha has not conducted local government election since 2011. He came to 
power in 2011 under the platform of All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) (Olaniyi 2017). The 
failure of state governments (Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Yola, Adamawa and Taraba) in the 
northeast geopolitical zone of the country to conduct local government elections bordered on the 
issue of security due to the Islamic fundamentalist ‘Boko Haram’ (Olaniyi 2017).  
In Ondo State, local government election was held on 23 April 2016, nine months before the 
expiration of the second term of the administration of Dr. Olusegun Mimiko. The election was the 
first in seven years. This implied that the government did not conduct elections for the composition 
of local government councils in the state, since 2008 when the administration of Governor Mimiko 
came to power (The Punch 28, November 2016, p.1). Apart from October 22, 2011 local 
government election in Lagos state, another election did not take place until July 22, 2017 
(Premium Times July 23, 2017).  Oyo state government did not conduct local government election 
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in nine years. When Governor Rashidi Ladoja was about to vacate office on 29th April 2008, he 
held elections into the local governments in the state (The Nation Newspaper 31 May 2007). 
Governor Alao Akala, who succeeded him, dissolved the 33 councils on 29 May 2007 and 
appointed a fresh list of local government caretaker committee Chairmen on 30 May 2007 (The 
Nation Newspaper 31 May 2007). Oyo state had been adopting the method of instructing the State 
House of Assembly to renew the tenure of caretaker committee at the expiration of one term 
(Olaniyi 2017). In November 2016, Oyo state government made a policy statement that local 
government election would be held in the state in February 2017. A critic in the state responded to 
this: 
No one should be carried away by the Governor’s (Ajimobi’s) promise. He has 
made similar promises in the past unrendered, more so, his predecessor in office 
Chief Alao Akala, was guilty of the same offence (The Courier, 25 November 2016, 
p.4). 
 In Rivers State, in 2015, the immediate past government directed Rivers State Independent 
Electoral Commission (SIEC) to conduct a local government election on 23 May 2015, just six 
days before its exit from office (Nigerian Tribune, 10 July 2015 p.4). In Osun state, local councils 
functioned for only four years since the return to civil rule in 1999. From May 2002 to May 2003, 
all the local councils in Osun state were composed of caretaker committees, appointed by the 
governor, Bisi Akande.  Governor Oyinlola, on assumption of office, in May 29, 2003, dissolved 
the Caretaker Committees (The Nation Newspaper, 31 May 2007).   
The Niger state government appointed a Transition Committee to manage the affairs of the council 
(The Punch, 3 April 2003). During this period, it was reported that the Niger State government 
purchased Peugeot 406 cars for the Chairmen of the transition committees (the governor’s selected 
functionaries) of the 42 local government councils in the state (The Punch 3 April 2003). The 
report also had it that the contract was awarded to the son of a former head of state. In addition to 
the cars, a Thuraya mobile telephone was bought for each of the council chairmen at the cost of 
N200, 000 each-all taken from the State Joint Local Government Account, the statutory allocation 
for local governments from the Federation Account is lodged (The Punch, 3 April 2003).  
The Niger state government’s decision to appoint a transition committee was in part to favor his 
political acolytes with juicy packages that were drawn from an unauthorized local government 
fund. This act of misconduct of the state government did not only contravene Section 162 
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subsection 7 and 8 of the 1999 constitution but was also inimical to the grassroots development. 
The Constitution did not grant the states the power to   use the local government fund in the “State 
Joint Local Government Account”. Thus, the idea of the “State Joint Local Government Account” 
is for administrative convenience and the fund is meant to be distributed among the local 
government councils in accordance with the prescription of the House of Assembly (The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, p.67). 
During President Obasanjo’s first term in office, local government money was used to purchase 
Toyota Prado jeeps for the Nigeria Police (Aluko 2006). Even if security was the main reason 
behind the purchase, the act contravened procedural regulations (Aluko 2006). The federal 
government could have advised the local governments to assist the Police in this respect, instead 
of spending millions of naira on behalf of that level of government without consultation (Aluko 
2006). The action of the federal government contravened Section 162 (3) of the Constitution. 
Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall be distributed 
among the Federal and State Governments and the local government councils in 
each State on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National 
Assembly (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, p.66). 
The President’s action was a total neglect of Section 162(3) and its constitutional role. Since the 
money was used to purchase Toyota Prado Jeeps, there was no indication that local governments 
received their total share of the federation revenue during the period (The Punch 3 April 2003). 
The researcher claims that the federal government was not being transparent and accountable. The 
law requires the federal government to disburse to the local government the latter monthly 
allocation through the state government. Similarly, the federal government neglected its 
constitutional role.  
By constitutional design, police and other government security services established by law are 
under the exclusive legislative list of the federal government (The Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999, p.132). Therefore, the use of local governments’ fund to service the security of the country 
was unconstitutional. Despite the constitutional arrangement to ensure a hitch-free local 
government administration, the state governors have used their power to retard development 
through the misuse or withholding of local government fund. State governors have often ignored 
the various bodies set up to monitor the affairs of the local government and took laws into their 
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hands. The unlawful deductions of local government fund by the state and federal governments 
without the knowledge of the local government were not only unconstitutional but also criminal 
in nature. The actions of the federal and state governments on the misuse of local government fund 
have incapacitated the local government councils in the service delivery.  
In the Second Republic, Oyo state government invested in some unviable ventures on behalf of 
the local governments without the consent of the latter (Kehinde 1999). The government invested 
in the Africana Breweries, manufacturers of Castel Beer, which eventually went bankrupt. A 
similar decision was extended to the investments of the government, on behalf of the local 
governments, in Cocoa Products Company, which never yielded any dividend to any local 
government, and in the Trans Nigeria Company, which folded up some years ago (Kehinde 1999). 
The opportunity cost of these imposed wasteful investments were the forgone rural development 
programs, such as the provision of potable water, electricity, good roads, etc (Kehinde 1999).  
6.9  Local Government Elections 
Section 7 (1) of the 1999 Constitution guaranteed democratically elected local government 
councils. The Constitution mandated every state of the Federation to ensure the enactment of 
relevant laws for local government councils’ existence in terms of their establishment, structures, 
composition, finance, and functions (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, 
p.5). The distinctive feature of Section 7 of the 1999 constitution was the establishment of local 
government councils through elected officials. In the Fourth Republic, there was no uniformity in 
the system of assumption of office of local government officials. The system adopted by the 
governors in the administration of the local government varies from appointment or selection while 
there were few cases of elected officials. This action of the state governors in either appointing or 
selecting officials contravened the constitutional provision on local government democratic 
system. 
Table 64 gives an overview of the mode of representation at the local government level. The table 
presents a chronology of local government administration from the Second Republic to the first 
term of President Olusegun Obasanjo administration. In addition, there was no uniformity in the 
local government system. While some used Directors of Personnel, others used state government’s 
party supporters to form transition committees. This system allows the state governors to enjoin 
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the support of the transition committees who are party supporters and loyalists of the governors. 
With this arrangement, it becomes difficult for local government officials to challenge any action 
of the governor that contradicts the constitutional provision.   
Table 64: A chronology of local government administration from 1976-2004. 
Year Mode of selection 
1976-1979 Elected council with the election on personal 
merit (zero party parliamentary system) 
Oct.1979-Dec. 1983 Hand-picked (i.e. selected) LG chairmen and 
councilors. 
Jan. 1984-Aug.1985 Sole administrators/management council. 
Aug. 1985-Dec.1987 Management committee systems with sole 
administrator (civil servants as chairmen) 
Jan. 1988- July 1989  Elected chairmen and councilors with 
supervisors- all elected on personal 
merit/recognition 
Aug. 1989-Dec. 1990 Management committee with sole 
administrator (civil servant as chairman) 
Jan. 1991-Nov. 1993 Elected councils on party basis (SDP/NRC) 
Nov. 1993-Apr. 1994 Administration of LGs by LG Secretary (DPM) 
under MILAD’s directives. 
April 1994-1997 Selected chairmen and four supervisors 
(indigenes) to run the affairs of the councils 
1997-June 1998 Elected councils of the five registered political 
parties under the Abacha regime. 
 
July 1998- May 1999 Sole administrators (civil servants) with four 
indigenes selected as supervisors. 
June 1999- 1 June 2002 Elected councils on political party basis (return 
to the civilian era- the 4th Republic) 
(presidential system) 
June 2002- June 2003 Selected councils by state governors called 
transition committees 
June 2003- 26 Mar. 2004 No uniform system initially; some states used 
‘directors of personnel management’ of the 
LG, others used the state government’s party 
supporters to form new ‘transition 
committees’. All the states later opted for the 
latter arrangement.  
27 March 2004 to date Councils elected on party basis (the Fourth 
Republic) 
Source: Adapted from Aluko, Jones Oluwole. Corruption in the Local Government System in 
Nigeria 2006. Ibadan: Book Builders Editions Africa, pp. 128-129 
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The table gives a clear picture of flagrant abuse of constitutional provisions by the state governors 
since the Second Republic. During the democratic process of the Second Republic, office holders 
at the local government councils were selected. The military government in 1991 introduced the 
system of the election on party basis, which was terminated in November 1993. Rather than 
adhering to the constitutional provisions in the Fourth Republic, governments, since May 29, 1999, 
have composed local governments councils through appointment rather than election.  
 
In Ogun State, on May 29, 2002, after the expiration of the tenure of subsequent political officers 
the state government, under the leadership of Olusegun Osoba, appointed caretaker committees at 
different occasions to manage the affairs of local governments in the state. These caretaker 
committee members were in the government until May 29, 2003, when Gbenga Daniel assumed 
office as the governor of the state. The administration of Gbenga Daniel appointed caretaker 
committees between May 2003 to April 2004, September to December 2007, and December 2010 
to July 2011 respectively. The tenure of elected political functionaries on July 21, 2012, was 
supposed to have expired in 2015 but the government converted the positions of the functionaries 
to caretaker committees managing the affairs of the councils. Table 65 presents the synopsis of the 
names of political functionaries in Ikenne local government of Ogun state. The election and 
appointment of the political office holders cut across the entire local governments in the state. 
 
 
Table 65: A synopsis of names and tenure of political functionaries in Ikenne local 
government from May 1999 to 2015 
 
Name Nature of Emergence Date 
Arch.Kayode Adebayo Executive Chairman 
(Election) 
May 1999- May 2002 
Otunba Tiwalade Sobo Chairman Care-taker 
Committee 
May 2002-April 2003 
Evang. Olalekan Ifede Chairman Transition 
Committee 
May 2003-June 2003 
Hon. Kayode Sodiyan Chairman Transition 
Committee 
July 2003-February 2004 
Chief Adepegba Otemolu Chairman Transition 
Committee 
February 2004-April 2004 
Chief Adepegba Otemolu Executive Chairman 
(Election) 
April 2004-September 2007 
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Otunba Tiwalade Sobo Chairman Transition 
Committee 
September 2007-November 
2007 
Rt.Kayode Ogunderu Chairman Transition 
Committee 
November 2007-December 
2007 
Otunba Tiwalade Sobo Executive Chairman (Elected) December 2007-December 
2010 
Mrs.Omolola Okunuren Acting Chairman December 2010-February 
2011 
Mr.Rotimi Onajole Chairman Transition 
Committee 
February 2011-July 2011 
Barrister Olufemi Adeniyi Chairman Transition 
Committee 
July 2011-July 2012 
Hon. Tajudeen Salako Executive Chairman 
(Election) 
July 13, 2012- July 13, 2015 
Hon. Tajudeen Salako Chairman Caretaker 
Committee 
July 14, 2015, to date 
Source: Compendium on Ikenne Local Government, 2016 
 
The above indicated that the state government was more comfortable with caretaker committees, 
in lieu of elected officials at the Local Government Councils. More importantly, the reason might 
be connected with the kind of control the governor would exercise on the appointed caretaker 
committee members rather than the elected officials. Out of the fourteen different local 
government administrators in the state, from May 1999 up to 2015, elected political functionaries 
had managed the councils four times (149 months/70.3%).  Caretaker committees had managed 
the affairs of the councils on four occasions (44 months/20.8%), Transition committees on four 
occasions (16 months/7.5%) and Acting Chairman (the most senior career officer) once (3 
months/1.4%), and non-elected leaders have been in charge for ten times out of fourteen (Ikenne 
Local Government 2016). 
 
In an interview, a key informant remarked that every state governor would want his favourites and 
those that would be loyal to him to be at the local level (Personal Interview IV, November 29, 
2017). Another informant noted that everything is politics because no one would want his enemy 
or opponent to represent him at the local level, therefore, necessity laid it upon the governors to 
appoint or select the local government officials for better representation of the governors (Personal 
Interview VIII, June 19, 2018). Another factor for the selection or appointment of local 
government officials was the desire of the state governors and the political party to spread the gains 
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of the political party across sections of the state. In this case, state governors and political party 
often believe that the dividends of democracy need to be spread across all sections of the country 
irrespective of party affiliation. The researcher claims that an appointed or selected official would 
always display his loyalty to his boss, who appointed him.  If the appointed official acted contrary 
to the dictate of his boss, the latter would not hesitate to remove him.   
 
6.10 Federal Character 
The principle of federal character was introduced into the 1999 constitution as one of the directive 
principles of the state policy, which aimed at correcting the structural imbalance in the appointment 
of public officers in the country (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
Section 14(3) of the constitution made provisions to measures to ensure the promotion of national 
unity and prevent the domination of few ethnic or sectional groups in government (The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, p.10).   The section stated thus:  
The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and 
the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the 
federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to 
command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of 
persons from a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that 
Government or in any of its agencies (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999). 
The Third Schedule Part 1 Section 8 and 9 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) stipulated the 
powers of the Federal Character Commission, to work out an equitable formula subject to the 
approval of the National Assembly, for the distribution of all cadres of positions in the public 
service of the Federation and of the States. These include the armed forces of the Federation, the 
Nigeria Police Force and other government security agencies, government-owned companies and 
parastatals of the States. In addition, the commission is to enforce compliance with the principles 
of proportional sharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels of 
government (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, pp.140-141).  
The essence of this constitutional provision is to correct the structural imbalances in Nigerian 
federalism, particularly in the appointment of public office holders in government and public 
institutions. Despite this constitutional provision, appointments into boards of parastatals and key 
sectors of the economy and the security apparatus had been in favour of certain ethnic group (The 
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Punch, 21 July 2016).  For example, in the ministerial appointments, the Senate dropped some 
Presidential nominees due to lack of geographical spread (The Punch, 21 July 2016). In the process 
of scrutinizing the nominees, the Senate dropped Mr. Yomi Edu (Lagos), Alhaji Adama Waziri 
(Yobe), Mrs. Joy Emordi (Anambra), Mrs. Audu Salome (Taraba), and Senator Onyabo Obi 
(Anambra) because the nomination favored some sections of the country. The lopsided was 
reflected in the appointments made by President Buhari where eighty-one (81) out of one hundred 
(100) appointments were from the North while other regions shared the remaining 19 appointments 
(Daily Post, 30 October 2017). 
Similarly, members of the House of Representative decried the alleged violation of the federal 
character principle in the recruitment exercises by Ministries, Departments, and agencies of the 
Federal government, which they noted was deliberately to favour particular sections of the country 
(Daily Post, 18 April 2018). The Chairman Committee on Public Accounts, Mr. Kingsley Chinda, 
cited the appointment of heads of security agencies by the President, an issue that dominated public 
discourse and trends on the social media on a daily basis (Daily Post, 18 April 2018). In a Vanguard 
Newspaper of July 19, 2018, there was uproar in the Senate following complaints against the 
lopsided nature of federal appointments into the federal boards and parastatals by the President. In 
this case, Senator Ekweremadu referred to Section 14(3) of the 1999 constitution and picked holes 
in the appointments of Chairman of boards without recourse to federal character principle, with a 
particular zone of the country South East being neglected and marginalised (Vanguard, 19 July 
2018). Ekweremadu noted that there was non-adherence to the federal character principle in line 
with the constitution and for national unity (Vanguard, 19 July 2018). The members of the Senate 
(Vanguard, 19 July 2018) put many federal appointments on hold. 
In another occasion, the Chairman Committee on Interior, Mr. Adams Jagaba, cited the recruitment 
conducted in 2014 by the Nigeria Immigration Service to demonstrate how the MDA flouted the 
federal character principle (Daily Post, 18 April 2018). According to him, his committee 
uncovered how some states were unduly favoured, disclosing that 500 people were recruited from 
a particular local government (Daily Post, 18 April 2018).  
In an interview conducted with one of the key informants, he observed that some sections of the 
country, particularly the Northern part had taken over federal appointments (Personal Interview II, 
November 3, 2017). A member of the legislative house in one of the selected states stated that: 
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Nigerian federalism is not a true federal system due to the lopsided appointments 
into public positions. Important appointments in Nigeria are reserved for the 
loyalists and ethnic groups of those in the position of authority, therefore, 
jettisoning the federal character principle (Personal Interview X, July 13, 2018). 
Aside from this, a Deputy Speaker, in one of the states, described federal character principle as a 
mere constitutional provision, which could not be attained in reality due to the diversities in the 
nature of our society (Personal Interview VIII, June 19, 2018). He stressed further that personal 
interest of the leaders had to override the interest of the masses, a situation that had created an 
unequal distribution of appointments in Nigerian polity (Personal Interview VIII, June 19, 2018). 
The above analysis indicated that the political leaders have manipulated the principle of federal 
character, which aimed at creating structural balance in the appointments of public office holders 
to promote sectional and sub-national interests. The researcher claimed that political office holders 
and actors at different levels of government failed to comply with the constitutional provision of 
correcting the structural imbalance in the appointment of public office holders. The implication of 
this was the continued lopsided federal appointments and marginalisation of minority groups in 
the country.  It is pertinent here, to reflect on this problem of federal stability and the ineffective 
intergovernmental relations. This occupies the next section. 
 
6.11 A reflection of federal stability and effective Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria 
Nigerian federalism has suffered setbacks in the past decades partly because of the socio-economic 
and religious crisis, and the structural arrangements that characterised Nigerian federal polity 
(Ovwasa and Olarewaju 2014, p.170). Such structural imbalance has affected the practice of the 
federal system, which in most cases has been conflictual. The structural imbalance in the polity of 
the country has created tension and conflict between the central government and the constituent 
units (Ovwasa and Olarewaju 2014, p.170). 
The current state of Northern domination of the South through the creation of states, where the 
North has 19 states and the South has 17, does not augur well for stable federalism (Oladeji 2008, 
p.287). Table 66 presents the structure of Nigeria’s present political economy. The table shows the 
structural imbalance in the Nigerian federalism. This structural imbalance could not guarantee the 
peace and stability of the country. It is obvious that the political structure shows inequalities in the 
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number of states, local governments, Senators, House of Representatives and federally allocated 
revenue, which has tilted revenue in favour of the North at the disadvantage of the South. The 
contribution of the North to revenue was 14% while the South contributed 86%. Federal, state and 
local governments’ allocation to the Northern region was 56%, 57%, and 55%, respectively, while 
the Federal, State and Local governments’ allocation to the Southern region was 44%, 43%, and 
45%, respectively.  
  
Table 66: The structure of Nigeria’s present political economy 
North Number South Number 
Number of states 19 Number of states 17 
Northeast 6 Southeast 5 
Northwest 7 South-South 6 
Northcentral 6 South west 6 
Number of local 
governments 
419 Number of local 
governments 
357 
Number of 
Representatives 
 189 Number of 
Representatives 
169 
North east 48 South east 43 
North west 92 South south 55 
North central 49 South west 71 
Number of senators 57 Number of senators 51 
Federal Allocation 56% Federal Allocation 44% 
States 57% States 43% 
Local Governments 55% Local Governments 45% 
Contribution to major 
revenue sources 
14% Contribution to major 
revenue sources 
86% 
Oil and gas 0.0% Oil and gas 100% 
Value Added Tax *** 28% Value Added Tax *** 72% 
***FCT’s 
Contribution of 20% 
is inclusive 
   
Source: Ministry of Finance and office of the Accountant General of the Federation 
In addition, the structural imbalance continued to make the North to have more representatives in 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. In the House of Representatives, the North has 191 
members and the South has 169 members. In the Senate, the North has 57 and the South 51 
members.   Militancy activity in the Niger Delta region was connected with the economic 
224 
 
marginalisation by the federal government of the oil-rich producing communities, which was 
partly in form of declining federal allocation to the Niger Delta areas (Ejibunu 2007; Nwogwugwu, 
Alao and Egwuonwu 2012, p.25).  
The shift in power from the North to the South in the Fourth Republic indicated that a particular 
region, particularly the North has been dominating the affair of the country. For example, from the 
independence in 1960, the Northerners have been the largest producer of the leadership position 
at the federal level. The dispossession of the North from power in 1999 by the South led to the 
cancellation of the election that would have produced a Southerner as the President of the country. 
The federal government annulment of the June 12, 1993 election gave the impression that the 
Northerner did not want the power to shift to another geopolitical zone.  
The structural imbalance has led to instability in government because there are agitations by 
different sections of the country on the need to shift power from one geopolitical zone to another. 
In an interview, one informant observed that our federal system of government has been so 
centralised that it looks as if we are practicing a unitary system of government (Personal Interview 
IX, July 5, 2018). The interviewee further observed that the practice of unitary system in the federal 
political arrangement has not only created instability in government but has made federalism to 
have a serious setback in the country (Personal Interview IX, July 5, 2018). He, therefore, remarked 
that a stable federal system would be achieved if the country can follow the principle of federalism 
as conceived by K.C. Wheare (Personal Interview IX, July 5, 2018).   
The structural economic and political imbalance in Nigeria polity is inimical to federal stability 
and national development. The political structure shows inequalities in the number of states, local 
governments, Senators, House of Representatives and federally allocated revenue between the 
North and the South. For example, out of 36 states in Nigeria, the North has 19 states while the 
South has 17 states. Out of 774 local government councils, the North has 419 while the South has 
357. In the House of Representative, the North has 191 while the South has 169. The North has 57 
in the Senate while the South has 51. This demonstrates inequalities between the North and the 
South.  
The implication is that the North would always overrule and override the South in decision-making 
since electoral democracy is a game of numbers. In a similar dimension, an economic imbalance 
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exists between the North and the South. The structural imbalance in the country has made different 
groups cry out in order to draw the attention of the government to their needs and aspirations. In 
the course of doing this, they often result in violence which created instability in the polity. The 
structural imbalance in the country has constituted a major obstacle to a stable federal system in 
Nigeria. In view of this, John Stuart Mill considered three conditions for a federal system. These 
are (1) a mutual sympathy among the population as well as a community of interest; (2) member 
states must not be so powerful as to rely solely on their individual strength; and (3) there must not 
be a marked inequality among the member states (Porter 1977, pp.101-124).     
Therefore, restructuring of the federal system in Nigeria for the peaceful co-existence of the 
heterogeneous and diverse individuals is non-negotiable. Such restructuring would engender 
cooperation among the levels of government. A key informant has observed that a true federalism 
could be attained only when the present thirty-six state structure was reorganised into six 
geopolitical zones (Personal Interview X, July 13, 2018). He stressed that majority ethnic group 
or restless minorities must not dominate such new federal arrangement but allows for equitable 
distribution of powers among different groups (Personal Interview X, July 13, 2018).   
Secondly, a stable federal government could be attained when the federal government devolved 
some of her responsibilities to the reorganised state structure of six zones. The implication of this 
would be more monetary allocations to the states and more taxing powers of the structured states 
to generate fund within their jurisdictions (Vanguard, 31 August 2012). The field survey conducted 
revealed that the major functions of government are domiciled at the federal level (Personal 
Interview VII, June 4, 2018). The interviewee pointed out that the constitution needed to be 
amended because the federal government was too powerful (Personal Interview VII, June 4, 2018). 
The Speaker of a legislative house in one of the selected states observed that: 
The power given to the federal government is too much. All politics are local, and 
development is local. True federalism would not exert more power over the 
constituent units, therefore, there is the need to go to the drawing board and give it 
a legal backing (Personal Interview VI, February 26, 2018).     
Thirdly, it is imperative for the Nigerian state to be committed to the primary goal of federalism. 
Alexander (1968, p.61) sought a value that essentially consisted of creating or strengthening a 
collective sentiment of belonging together irrespective of an individual or sub-group differences. 
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This is in agreement with J.S. Mill’s law of federal stability (1861, cited in Ojo, 2017). According 
to Mill,  
A federal system should not be morbid; thus, underlying the importance of equality 
in size and powers of the individual regional or constituent governments. It, 
therefore, becomes implicit and imperative in the federal system, that the powers 
of the individual regional governments and their relationship with the central 
government should be the same; as well, that no regional government should be 
allowed special position with regard to the central government. Such inequality 
breeds arrogance and conflict, which could have a great consequence on the entire 
union (Mill 1861, cited in Ojo 2017). 
An interviewee observed that the present federal arrangement allowed ethnic loyalty to prevail 
over national loyalty (Personal Interview VI, February 26, 2018). He stressed further that 
nationalistic outlooks were reduced to the barest minimum. He, therefore, suggested a true federal 
system where people expressed loyalty to the country rather than their ethnic affiliation (Personal 
Interview VI, February 26, 2018).  
The above submission by the interviewee was in line with Ramphal (1979, p.18) who asserts that: 
For a federation to resist failure, the leader and the followers must “feel federal” 
they must think of themselves as one people with common self-interest capable, 
where necessary, of overriding most other considerations of small group interest 
(Ramphal 1979, p.18).    
Another key informant observed that over-reliance on the monthly allocation by the subnational 
units of government has not encouraged them to explore their revenue base in order to increase 
their internal revenue for effective service delivery (Personal Interview II, November 3, 2017). 
The above submission was in line with the view of another informant who observed that most 
states were not worthy of being a state because they were unable to deliver their services due to 
their level of incompetency to generate revenue within their states (Personal Interview IV, 
November 29, 2017). 
A Minister of the Second Republic in his article titled “Nigerian amalgamation is a fraud” in 2013 
said that: 
It was only on the paper that Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria were 
amalgamated, and never the people were amalgamated. He stressed that the 
Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated on paper in the sole interest of 
the westerners for their economic benefits (Raheem, Oyeleye and Adeniji 2014, 
pp.163-174)  
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The above analysis showed that instability in Nigerian federalism can be attributed to a mismatch 
of the country by the colonial government. This foundational issue of mismatch has further created 
other problems that have threatened the federal system of government in Nigeria.  
In his response, the interviewee considered Nigerian federalism as asymmetric in nature. It states 
that the Northern part of the country is almost of equal size to the sum of the other parts of the 
country. To him, the North would always have an advantage because of the population. He affirms 
that a stable federal system would be created when inequality is avoided in the distribution of 
resources and appointments (Personal Interview IV, February 29, 2017).   
Intergovernmental relation requires that the levels of government interrelate for the effective 
functioning of the political system in the country. Such interaction allows the state government to 
assign constitutional responsibilities to the local governments. The constitution provision also 
requires both the federal and state governments to perform concurrent functions. Even when the 
laws of the two levels of government are in conflict, the federal law must prevail over the state 
law. In spite of this provision, there was excessive use of constitutional powers by either the central 
or the state government, which often led to the conflictual relationship between the federal and the 
lower levels of government. In the Nigerian federalism, the lower levels of government have 
become agents rather than partners of federal government in the structural arrangement (Bello 
2014). Thus, the processes of intervention and control between the center and the periphery are 
inevitable but should follow the constitutional provisions (Bello 2014).  
 
6.12 Summary 
In this chapter, the researcher started by exploring health service delivery as one of the MDGs 
directed towards attaining development of the country. The research study observed that the 
development of the country is attained where there are healthy individuals who are productive in 
all areas for socio-economic development. The researcher discussed health care services delivered 
in some of the selected states. An analysis of healthcare service delivery reveals that Nigeria has 
not fulfiled the agreement made at the Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) that guaranteed for everyone the right to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health. The researcher discovered that the percentage 
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allocation of the state budget to the health sector was very low. The percentage of the country’s 
health sector in the annual budget was 5.95% in 2012; 4.23% in 2016; 4.16% in 2017; and 3.9% 
in 2018. The percentage share of the country’s budget to the health sector was far below the “Abuja 
Declaration” where Heads of State of member countries of the African Union pledged to commit 
at least 15% of their annual budgets to improve health sector.  
The research study found that a larger percentage of the health sector budget was spent on recurrent 
expenditure such as payment of salaries and other operations. For example, recurrent expenditure 
in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 were N225.76b, N219.72b, N214.94b, N237.08b, 
N221.70b, N252.87b, and N269.34b, respectively. Capital expenditure in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 
2016, 2017, and 2018 were N57.01b, N60.08b, N49.52b, N22.67b, N35.71b, N55.61b, and 
N71.11b, respectively. The researcher argues that in spite of the various international grants made 
available to the Nigerian government for polio eradication, immunisation, there is still high infant 
mortality rate, low life expectancy and the periodic outbreak of diseases.  
The implications of these findings are that public health facilities continue to deteriorate and access 
to adequate healthcare of the people becomes difficult. The resultant effect was an increase in 
infant mortality rate and the outbreak of diseases. The low percentage of the share of the country’s 
budget to the health sector far cry from Abuja Declaration of 15% was a violation of the agreement 
reached by the Heads of State of member countries of African Union. The consequence of this was 
that states were incapacitated to provide effective healthcare service delivery to the people. The 
proliferation of states had reduced budgetary allocations to the states. Thus, the changing pattern 
of the federal structure affected the fiscal capacity vis-à-vis service delivery of the states.  
The above analysis implied that the MDGs of reducing infant mortality, improving maternal 
health, and combating the outbreak of diseases could not be achieved in the selected states. This 
research work argues that the proliferation of states because of the changing structure of federalism 
affected the fiscal capacity of the states to deliver quality healthcare services to the people. The 
researcher then turns to the analysis of service delivery in education.  With particular reference to 
the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), the researcher observed that some projects 
targeted and executed by the federal government were not actually satisfying the needs of the 
people. At times, these projects were duplicated, thereby leading to wastage of resources. The 
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researcher argues that a decline in the primary schools’ enrolment showed that many pupils of 
school age were out of school.  
The implication of this was that many children were denied access to free primary education. 
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICs)of 2016 and 2017, corroborated this assertion, with the 
observation that only about 39.4% of Nigerian children of primary school age enroled in school 
while 60% of children of school age are out of school (National Bureau of Statistics 2018). The 
Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics, in collaboration with the United Nations Children 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF), conducted the survey. The survey further revealed that South East 
had the highest number of pupils’ enrolment with 60.5%, followed by the South West (56.5%), 
South-South (52.5%), North Central (48.2%), North West (32.5%), and North East (27.2%) 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2018).  
The researcher also found out that teachers’ enrolment in the states were declining. The 
implications of these were low quality education to the pupils and the high teachers-pupils ratio. 
Similarly, the researcher argues that instructional and learning materials were not adequate in the 
states’ primary schools. The implication of this was poor implementation of the schools’ 
curriculum, and poor quality of teaching delivery to the pupils. The analysis showed that the states 
could not achieve the UBE programme that lays emphasis on the accessibility of pupils of school 
age to primary education, availability of teachers and proper implementation of the curriculum. 
Therefore, the researcher claimed that the changing pattern of the federal system affects the 
capacity of the states to deliver education service to the pupils.  
The delivery of basic social services to the people is the responsibilities of the levels of government 
in a federal system. These duties and responsibilities of the central, state and local governments 
were embodied in the constitution to ensure that each level of government operates within its 
sphere of jurisdiction.  
Also, the chapter explores the constitutional provisions regarding the division of powers and 
responsibilities among the levels of government. The drafters of the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 
(as amended) anticipated strong and united levels of government before entrenching the functions 
and responsibilities of the federal and the constituent units in the constitution. In the same way, 
the constitution put measures towards ensuring interactions among the levels of government. 
230 
 
However, the actors at different levels of government abuse the constitutional powers. Therefore, 
the constitutional provisions are not in tandem with the practices by the actors. For example, the 
state government abuses State-Joint Local Government Account by spending money meant for the 
local government illegally. This chapter discovered that appointments to public office, even when 
it followed due process do not reflect the federal character, as it was lopsided. In addition, the 
researcher argues that revenue allocation in Nigeria was tilted towards the federal government, 
which has made the subnational levels to rely on the federal government for financial assistance.   
The analysis also revealed structural imbalance in Nigerian federalism, which has constituted an 
obstacle to federal stability. The researcher, therefore, claims that a restructured federal system 
that would give people a sense of belonging and ensure peaceful co-existence is necessary for a 
stable federal system. Summary, conclusion and recommendation would be the subject matter of 
the next chapter. 
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                                                                 Chapter Seven 
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1 Conclusion 
The research study interrogated intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Second and the Fourth 
Republics in the selected states of Osun, Oyo, Ondo, Lagos and Ekiti states. The central focus of 
this study is the implications of the nature of the contemporary intergovernmental relations on 
service delivery in five out of the six states in the South West, Nigeria. The researcher started this 
study by exploring the background of intergovernmental relations using federalism as a 
framework. The study then examined the implications of the contemporary intergovernmental 
relations on service delivery.  
The methodological approach to the study was an interpretive research paradigm, based on the 
assumption that social reality is not singular or objective, but shaped by human experiences and 
social contexts, and is, situated within its socio-historic context. The methodology for data 
collection and analysis was qualitative. In order to provide answers to the research questions 
raised, responses were sought from the key informants of the research through interview method. 
This enabled me to collect primary data. Other sources of primary data are government 
publications, bulletin and reports, public documents of civil organisations like BudgIT and 
SERAP. In addition, the research study got information from secondary sources such as journals, 
texts, newspapers, archives, internet materials, magazines etc. These sources provided the basis 
for a critical review of literature.  
An interrogation of the major issues relating to the nature of contemporary intergovernmental 
relations in Nigeria was discussed under seven chapters.  The first chapter centred on the 
background of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria using federalism as a framework. This was 
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followed by the statement of the problem, research questions, research objectives, and structure of 
the dissertation., . .  
The second chapter presented the principles that underpin federalism and the different phases of 
the evolution of federalism in Nigeria. The study discussed the typologies of intergovernmental 
relations and its analysis. The researcher then explored the major thematic issues of the research 
study and reviewed extant literature on autonomy, distribution of powers and responsibilities, 
centralisation of power, vertical/horizontal relations, intergovernmental fiscal relations, and 
administrative mechanisms for managing intergovernmental relations, service delivery, and 
constitutional provisions. Furthermore, the research examined intergovernmental relations and 
governance, as well as the challenges and implications of intergovernmental relations and 
sustainable development goals I considered the view of scholars and identified the gaps in 
literature. In addition, the study engages the subject matter of fiscal intergovernmental relations, 
which is based on the question of the relative powers of central and constituent units to raise 
revenue.  
Chapter three focused on research methodology. The study engages the role of methodology in a 
political science investigation and explored the methodological approach to the study. The 
researcher presented the rationale for using qualitative research design. Also, the study considered 
the population, sampling, sampling technique, sources of data collection, data collection 
instrument and data analysis. The validity of the data collection was also explored. 
 
In Chapter four, the study examined a contextual and theoretical framework of the structure and 
authority in Nigeria’s intergovernmental relations. The study was anchored on two models. It was 
discovered that a single model is not adequate to explain the nature of intergovernmental relations 
in Nigerian polity due to the constitutional framework that defines the autonomous nature of the 
levels of government on one hand and the interdependent functions of the levels of government on 
the other hand. Therefore, the study adopted a hybrid of Coordinate-Authority model and the 
Overlapping-Authority model to explain the authority structure and the interplay that existed 
among the political actors at different levels of government in the Second and the Fourth 
Republics. The researcher then discussed the major propositions of the models and assessed the 
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two models based on their strengths and weaknesses. The study further examined the pattern of 
IGR in Nigeria and discovered that there is a fiscal imbalance among the levels of government. 
The centralised fiscal structure that tilted more revenue to the central government has affected the 
fiscal capacity of the constituent units in effective service delivery. The researcher also engaged a 
comparative analysis of federalism in the two Republics (Second and the Fourth). The study also 
explored the key intergovernmental bodies with a view to determine their effectiveness in 
intergovernmental relations. 
In chapter five, the study examined intergovernmental relations and constitutional provisions in 
Nigeria from the colonial period to the post-colonial period. It then explored the provisions of the 
1979 and 1999 constitutions to discover whether there are discrepancies between the constitutional 
provisions and their practice by different political actors. In chapter five, the study presented and 
analysed the empirical findings of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Second Republic and 
the Fourth Republic. The researcher further discussed the changing pattern of Nigeria’s fiscal 
federalism and its implications on service delivery. The study found out that the centralised fiscal 
structure of Nigerian federalism tilted more revenue to the central government at the detriment of 
the constituent units. Furthermore, the researcher discussed the empirical analysis of 
intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Second and the Fourth Republics. 
In chapter six, the study engaged in empirical analysis of service delivery in the selected states. 
With the data collected, the study was able to discover the nature of services rendered to the people 
in the selected states. Specifically, the research study focused on service delivery in health and 
education sectors in some of the selected states. Also, the study discussed the theory and practice 
of constitutional provisions of the powers and responsibilities of the levels of government. The 
various sections of the constitution were used to determine whether the attitudes and behaviours 
of the actors at different levels of government were in tandem with the constitutional provisions. 
The study claimed that the actors’ behaviour towards their assigned duties was a violation of the 
rule of law and represented an infringement on the fundamental human rights of the citizens. 
7.2 Summary of Findings 
The findings of the study revealed that the central government has more fiscal power for policy 
direction, than the constituent units.. In addition, the central government has sole prerogative to 
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legislate on exclusive matters and overriding power over the items in the concurrent legislative 
list. Similarly, the increase in the number of the constituent units, from 19 states in the 1979 
constitution, to 36 states in the 1999 constitution, and the expanded expenditure obligations, 
weakened the revenue base of the subnational units. The constituent units, in the Fourth Republic, 
are less viable than those of the Second Republic.  This development weakened the fiscal strength 
of the constituent units for effective service delivery. The subnational units are not equipped with 
adequate revenue resources to fulfil their expenditure obligations because the federal government 
retains the bulk of government revenue. 
 
Extant literature revealed a loss of autonomy of the constituent units due to the influence of the 
federal government on the constituent units, particularly on financial matters. The federal 
government exercises excessive control over the subnational levels. The constitution allocates 
more taxing powers to the central government and lesser taxing assignments to the constituent 
units. In this case, the central government has the capacity to raise more revenue than the state or 
local governments. 
 
The study also revealed serious setbacks in service delivery. The proliferation of states in the 
country had reduced the resource base of the older states and weakened the revenue generation of 
the new states. The revenue allocation of the constituent units could not match up with the 
expanded obligations of the states. The study revealed that many states in Nigeria had poor internal 
revenue generation; therefore, they became more dependent on the federal allocation and, 
consequently, becoming less viable. The lack of financial capabilities of the states affects their 
capacities to deliver services. With the exception of Lagos State, that has a large   revenue base, 
other states in the South West geopolitical zone have low internal generated revenue and found it 
difficult to deliver basic services to the populace. 
 
The research study revealed that the delivery of education services is hindered in the pupils. 
Selected states are incapacitated to deliver education services to the pupils. The 
researcherdiscovered that teachers and pupils’ enrolment in the selected states were declining. The 
implications of these were low quality education to the pupils and inadequate teachers-pupils ratio. 
Similarly, the researcher argued that instructional and learning materials were not adequate in the 
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states’ primary schools. The implication of this was poor implementation of the schools’ 
curriculum and poor quality of teaching delivery to the pupils. The analysis showed that the 
selected states could not achieve the UBE programme that lays emphasis on the accessibility of 
pupils of school age to primary education, availability of teachers and proper implementation of 
the curriculum. Therefore, the study remarked that the changing pattern of the federal system 
affects the capacity of the states to deliver education service to the pupils.  
Similarly, service delivery in healthcare revealed that Nigeria has not fulfiled the agreement made 
in  Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
that guaranteed for everyone the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health. The researcher discovered that the percentage allocation of the state budget to the health 
sector was far below the “Abuja Declaration” where Heads of State of member countries of the 
African Union pledged to commit at least 15% of their annual budgets to improve health sector. 
In addition, a larger percentage of the health sector budget was spent on recurrent expenditure such 
as payment of salaries and other operational costs.. The implications of these findings are that 
public health facilities continue to deteriorate and access to adequate healthcare of the people 
becomes difficult. The resultant effect was an increase in infant mortality rate and the outbreak of 
diseases. In addition, the research finding revealed structural imbalance in Nigerian polity. The 
federal government is saddled with too many responsibilities while the subnational levels of 
government have lesser responsibilities. This lopsided federal arrangement has caused conflictual 
relationship among the levels of government that has often led to litigation in courts of law.  
 
Another finding was that actors at different levels of government breach the constitutional 
provisions. The research study claimed that constitutional provisions are not in tandem with the 
practices adopted by the operators and actors. There have been flagrant abuses of constitutional 
provisions by the operators. In other words, the operators of the constitution do not adhere, strictly 
to its provisions. 
 In the research study, it was discovered that appointments to public office, even when it followed 
due process, did not reflect the federal character, as it was lopsided. The lopsided federal 
appointments bred marginalisation and often led to agitation by various groups and interests. The 
study showed that intergovernmental relations witnessed conflictual relationship among the levels 
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of government. The democratic dispensation of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, since May 29, 1999, 
has witnessed the most conflicting political opposition ever experienced, which brought 
competition rather than cooperation between the central and the subnational governments. 
Similarly, state-local relations witnessed series of conflict that often led to litigation between the 
levels of government. 
7.3 Recommendations 
Based on the findings of the research study, the study offers the following recommendations.  
7.3.1 Reforms of fiscal relationships 
In order to proffer solution to the lopsided nature of fiscal federalism, there is the need for fiscal 
decentralisation of the levels of government. In this case, more revenue powers should reside with 
the subnational levels of government. This would give the state and local governments more 
decision-making powers over their expenditures. Such fiscal decentralisation would bridge the gap 
between the expanded obligations of government and revenue. Also, there is the need for direct 
disbursement of local government funds rather than the “State Joint Local Government Account” 
that has made the state to be in control of the local government revenue. In addition, the reform 
should allow the local governments to generate their revenue and disburse their expenditures.  
Similarly, the researcher argues that for effective service delivery, the levels of government need 
to ensure maximum utilisation of available resources. This is because most of the constituent units 
do not tap the resources available at their disposal to increase their revenue base in order to improve 
their service delivery. Therefore, their continuous reliance on the monthly allocation from the 
federation account for the execution of projects. For example, the non-payment of workers’ 
salaries started after the fall in the price of oil at the global market, which invariably affected the 
amount available in the Distributable Pool Account (DPA) for sharing to the levels of government. 
This shows that the constituent units are over dependent on federation revenue and have no drive 
to generate revenue inwardly. 
It is expected that different levels of government exercise their tax assignments by generating 
revenue through various constitutional means. With the exception of States like Lagos, Rivers, and 
Sokoto, other states in Nigeria have poor internal generation drive, hence, their internally 
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generated revenue as a percentage of total revenue was relatively very low. Between 2007 and 
2011, the internally generated revenue as percentage of total revenue in Lagos, Sokoto, Ogun, 
Abia, Oyo, Rivers, Osun, Edo, Kwara, Gombe, Kogi, Kano, Ekiti, Ondo, Plateau and Nasarawa 
were 36.7%, 21.9%, 20.1%, 18.0%, 15.5%, 15.0%, 14.9%, 14.4%, 13.6%, 12.6%, 12.5%, 11.7% 
7.9%, 7.5%, 7.2%, and 6.6% respectively (Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report 2007-2011). 
7.3.2 Constitutional Amendment 
The constitutional provisions regarding the devolution of powers to the levels of government need 
to be amended. The 1979 and the 1999 Constitutions tilted powers to the central government. The 
functions of the federal government shoud be limited to policy matters while the subnational levels 
should be involved in service delivery due to their closeness to the people. There is the need to 
transfer some of the exclusive functions of the federal government to either the concurrent list or 
residual list. .  
7.3.3 Re-orientation of political and administrative classes: Both political and administrative 
classes need to be orientated on how to build cordial relationships with each other at different 
levels of government. A clear job description of political and administrative classes must be spelt 
out in the constitution in order to avoid conflict of interests. Therefore, the elected and career 
officials should see their roles as complementary rather than competitive. Therefore, a 
constitutional amendment that defines the roles and relationships of the state actors as 
complementary would promote and sustain intergovernmental relations towards effective service 
delivery.   
7.3.4 Strengthening of intergovernmental relations mechanism  
The institutions (both formal and informal) of intergovernmental relations must be alive to their 
responsibilities for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of plans. The various projects 
and programmes embarked upon by Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) must be 
properly executed. In addition, adequate information relating to the activities and performance of 
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MDAs must be obtained at different levels of government. The information obtained must be made 
available to the members of the public.  
 
7.3.5 Need for clarity on concurrent matters 
The constitution must be amended to clearly spell out the limitations of federal and state 
governments on certain concurrent matters as provided in the 1999 constitution. For example, 
federal government should only give intervention support to the primary school education and not 
to take over the running of the primary school education. Also, there must be delineation of roles 
of the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) and State Universal Basic Education Board 
(SUBEB) for effective service delivery.  
7.3.6 The need for the constituent units to meet up with their socio-economic and political 
obligations. 
The constituent units (the state and the local governments) in Nigeria constitute the levels of 
government that are closer to the people and saddled with the responsibilities of service delivery. 
The state government shared concurrent functions with the federal government, as contained in 
the Second Schedule Part 11 of the 1999 constitution while the functions of local government are 
contained in the Fourth Schedule of the 1999 constitution (as amended) (The Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Similarly, the 1999 constitution stipulated the tax assignments 
and revenue sharing formula of the constituent units. However, the constituent units have not been 
able to meet their various constitutional obligations, and this has affected the federal system of 
government, particularly in the area of service delivery. For the constituent units to meet up with 
their socio-economic and political obligations, the following should be considered.  
a. Restructuring of fiscal allocation 
There is the need to restructure revenue allocation in favour of the constituent units. The revenue 
sharing formula needs to be revisited to allow the constituent units have adequate financial 
resources to discharge its constitutional responsibilities.  
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In its report, the Committee on revenue allocation and fiscal federalism at the National Political 
Reform Conference observed that: 
State governments and many other stakeholders are dissatisfied with the relatively 
large proportion of the revenues in the federation account that is retained by the 
Federal Government as against the proportion that goes to the 36 states and FCT, 
and their local governments. This has given rise to agitations for the need to share 
revenues in such a manner that the state and local governments can be financially 
and economically empowered to enjoy a level of autonomy associated with 
federalism (National Political Reform Conference 2005, p.10). 
The revenue allocation formula adopted by various commissions in Nigeria were not accepted by 
the people because any principle adopted tended to favour one section of the society at the 
detriment of the other. This showed that the bulk of the federal revenue was allocated to the center. 
Because of this, the constituent units become dependent on the centre and less viable to perform 
the assigned responsibilities. This situation has led to agitation by the constituent units for the 
restructuring of federal revenue in favour of the subnational levels.  
b. Direct disbursement of local government fund by the federal government 
The present arrangement of “State Joint Local Government Account” does not augur well for 
development at the subnational levels. The constitution stipulates that the state and the local 
governments should operate joint account called “State Joint Local Government Account”. The 
joint account enables the state government to keep and later disburse the 10% allocation meant for 
local government. However, it has been observed that the withholding of the 10% due to the local 
government by the state government has hampered effective service delivery at the local level.  
c. Expansion of Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) drive of the subnational units 
The need to increase the revenue base of the subnational levels of government in enhancing service 
delivery cannot be underestimated. The subnational governments are to increase their internal 
revenue drive by exploring and utilising the available resources within their jurisdiction for the 
good of the society. The subnational governments are to look inward and tap the available 
resources within their local government areas.  
Service delivery of the levels of government is a function of tax-raising powers and revenue 
allocation. Both the 1979 and 1999 Nigerian constitutions were very clear about the powers of the 
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three levels of government to raise revenue through taxes. The Second Schedule Part 1 contained 
the tax-raising powers of the federal government, and Part II Section 7 has the tax-raising powers 
of the state government. Section 7 Fourth Schedule contains the tax-raising powers of the Local 
government (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999) 
d. Reassessment of intergovernmental fiscal relation  
The constitutional allocation of revenue to the levels of government shows that the constituent 
units receive the least amount of revenue from the Distributable pool account of the federation. 
This revenue received by the constituent units is not commensurate with the responsibilities and 
obligations empowered them through the constitution. Hence, they have limited financial resources 
to carry out their assigned obligations. For example, the revenue sharing formula from the 
Federation Pool Account is 48.5%, 24%, and 20% to the federal, state and local governments 
respectively. The remaining 7.5% is distributed between derivation funds for oil and mineral 
producing areas, a stabilisation fund, an ecological fund, and the federal capital territory, (FCT). 
It is obvious that the constituent units that are the major service providers have limited financial 
resources at their disposal. Bach (1989), Ekpo (1994), and Anyanwu and Ehwarieme (1999) have 
observed that there was the need to reassess intergovernmental fiscal relation due to the belief that 
the constituent units (i.e. the state and local governments) were responsible for the provision of 
social services. Yet, they had limited financial resources to discharge the responsibilities.  
The research study argues that for the citizens to reap the dividends of democratic governance 
there is the need for adequate financial resources for the sub-national level through fiscal reforms 
that would give larger revenues to the constituent units. This is one of the measures introduced in 
China when it discovered that sisable horizontal imbalances emerged across the provinces (Dabla-
Norris 2005). The 1994 tax reform in China introduced a major overhaul of the tax and transfer 
system and tax administration. The over-arching objective of the reform was to strengthen the 
macroeconomic performance, achieve regional equalisation and efficient public goods provision 
(Dabla-Norris 2005).  
Specifically, the tax reform attempted to arrest the fiscal decline (raised the two revenue ratios), 
simplified the tax system, eliminated distortions, modified revenue assignments to different levels 
of government, and shifted from ad hoc, negotiated transfers to transparent rule-based revenue 
assignments (Dabla-Norris 2005). Important measures introduced in 1994 included reforms in the 
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tax system and introduction of production-based value-added tax (VAT). Other measures include 
reassignment of taxes between central and local governments to have separate “central fixed 
incomes, “local fixed incomes,” and shared revenue from the VAT, the establishment of a separate 
state tax administration to collect central and shared taxes, and the establishment of a general 
purpose equalization transfers. The redistribution of taxes between the central and local 
governments enabled them to have separate central and local fixed incomes, establish separate 
state tax administration and general-purpose equalization transfers44    
7.3.7 Strengthening mechanisms and institutions for intergovernmental policy coordination 
Institutions of government created for promoting co-operation among government units should be 
strengthened for effective intergovernmental network. Similarly, officials at different levels of 
government must monitor the various projects and assess its level of performance for service 
delivery. 
 7.3.8 Transparency and accountability 
The civil society groups should check abuse of constitutional provisions by the actors of 
intergovernmental relations. The civil society body should report cases of abuse of office at the 
different levels of government.  
7.3.9 Maximisation of resources 
The levels of government in the federal system particularly the state and the local governments 
should look inward by boosting their internally generated revenue. Aside from this, there is the 
need to curb wastages that arise from numerous political appointees who have reduced the money 
to take care of the people.  
7.3.10 Adoption of the principle of Self-determination 
The principle of self-determination is the right of the people to choose their own government 
through peaceful and democratic means. This implies that each person could determine what 
                                                          
44 Revenue assigned to local governments included 25 percent of the new VAT, a turnover type, business tax, the 
personal income tax (PIT), and the enterprise income tax levied on local SOEs and foreign-financed enterprises. The 
central government received 75 percent of the VAT, excise, and trade taxes, and the EIT from centrally owned SOEs. 
See Bahl (1999), Ahmad and others (2002, 2004a) for a detailed discussion of the 1994 Tax Reform. 
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becomes of the society without any interference. For example, an individual should have the will 
to make a decision during the election by casting his/her vote. Elected officials, rather than 
appointed ones, should occupy the various positions at the local government councils. This could 
be possible by correcting the deficient political structure, particularly the existing thirty-six states 
structure, which has shown neither economic viability nor ethnic homogeneity (Vanguard, 31 
August 2012). 
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Appendix 1 
                                                                     Informed Consent Document 
Dear Participant, 
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My name is Solomon Adebayo ADEDIRE. I am a Ph.D. (Political Science) candidate studying at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, South Africa. The title of the research is: 
Examining Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria’s Second Republic (1979-1983) and the Fourth 
Republic (1999-2007): Insights from selected States in the South West, Nigeria. The aim of the study 
is to examine the implications of the nature of the contemporary intergovernmental relations on service 
delivery in Osun, Oyo, Ondo, Lagos and Ekiti States in the Second and Fourth Republics. I am interested 
in learning about the politics associated with the imbalance in the constitutional provisions of the levels 
of government and the actual practices of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Second Republic 
(1979-1983) and the Fourth Republic (1999-2007). I recognise you as one of the stakeholders in the 
field of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s political development. To gather the information, I am 
interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter. 
Please note that:  
 Your confidentiality is guaranteed as your input will not be attributed to you in person, but 
reported only as a population member opinion. 
 The interview may last for about 1 hour and may be split depending on your preference. 
 Any information given by you cannot be used against you, and the collected data will be used 
for purposes of this research only. 
 Data will be stored in the secure storage and destroyed after 5 years. 
 You have a choice to participate, not participate or stop participating in the research. You will 
not be penalised for taking such an action. 
 The research aims at knowing the differences and similarities in intergovernmental relations in 
Nigeria’s Second and the Fourth Republics. 
 Your involvement is purely for academic purposes only, and there are no financial benefits 
involved. 
 If you are willing to be interviewed, please indicate (by ticking as applicable) whether or not you 
are willing to allow the interview to be recorded by the following equipment: 
 
 Willing Not willing 
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Audio equipment   
Photographic equipment   
Video equipment   
 
I can be contacted at School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg 
Campus, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg.  
Email: 216076256stu@ukzn.ac.za; bayoadedire@yahoo.com 
Cell: +2348023892753 or +27618290669. 
My supervisor is Dr. Khondlo Mtshali who is located at the School of Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg 
Campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal.  
Contact details: email: Mtshalik@ukzn.ac.za Phone number: 0332605892 
My Co-supervisor is Dr. Omololu Fagbadebo who is located at the School of Management, IT & 
Governance, Pietermaritzburg Campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Contact details: email: Fagbadebo@ukzn.ac.za; otomololu@yahoo.com Phone number: (Cell) 
+27611533824 
  
The College of Humanities Research Ethics Officer is P. Mohun who is located at Humanities 
Research Ethics Office, University of KwaZulu-Natal. Contact details: email: 
mohunp@ukzn.ac.za  Phone number 0312604557  
 
Thank you for your contribution to this research. 
 
 
                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                Social Sciences,  
272 
 
                                                                                                                                College of 
Humanities, 
                                                                                                                                University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, 
                                                                                                                                South Africa, 
Appendix 11 
 
September 2016 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN (or insert the addressee) 
 RE: Letter of Introduction of Mr. Solomon Adebayo ADEDIRE, Ph.D. Student at University of 
KwaZulu-Natal 
This is to introduce and confirm that Mr. Solomon Adebayo ADEDIRE is a Ph.D. (Political 
Science) student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. The title of 
his Ph.D. research is ‘Examining Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria’s Second Republic 
(1979-1983) and the Fourth Republic (1999-2007): Insights from selected States in the South 
West, Nigeria’. The outcome from the study is expected to improve practice, inform policy and 
extend the theory in this field of study. As part of the requirements for the award of a Ph.D. degree, 
he is expected to undertake original research in an environment and place of his choice. The UKZN 
ethical compliance regulations require him to provide proof that the relevant authority where the 
research is to be undertaken has given approval. 
We appreciate your support and understanding to grant Mr. Adedire permission to carry out 
research in your organization. Should you need any further clarification, do not hesitate to contact 
us. 
 Please find attached the detail of the information needed. 
Thank you in advance for your understanding. 
Dr. Khondlo Mtshali  
Supervisor 
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University of KwaZulu-Natal 
International and Public Affairs 
School of Social Sciences,  
Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville 
Pietermaritzburg. 
Email: Mtshalik@ukzn.ac.za 
Tel: 033-260-5892 
Dr. Omololu Fagbadebo 
Co-supervisor 
University of KwaZulu-Natal 
School of Management, IT & Governance, 
Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville 
Pietermaritzburg. 
Email: Fagbadebo@ukzn.ac.za; otomololu@yahoo.com  
Tel: (Cell) +27611533824 
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                        Semi-structured Interview Questions 
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Questions for the Politicians of the Second and the Fourth Republics 
1. How would you describe the relationships among the levels of government in the Second 
and the Fourth Republics? Account for the reasons for such relationships. 
2. As one of the politicians during the Second or Fourth Republic, What do you consider to 
be the areas of conflict between the federal and the state governments; and between the 
state and the local governments?  
3. Are there cordial relationships between the public officials and political leaders at all levels 
of government in Nigeria’s Second and the Fourth Republics? 
4. How does the changing pattern of the federal structure affect the fiscal capacity of the state? 
5. Are there any programmes you executed during your tenure?  Can you provide examples? 
6. In what ways, can the constituent units’ meet up with their socio-economic and political 
obligations? 
7. What was the nature of intergovernmental relations among the institutions and agencies of 
government in the Fourth Republic? 
8. Can you tell me cases of arbitrary use of powers by the levels of government in the Second 
Republic or the Fourth Republic? 
9. In what ways did you, as a politician of the Second Republic or the Fourth Republic helps 
to improve federal-state-local relations? 
10. What were the roles of political leaders and appointed officials at different levels of 
government during the Second and the Fourth Republics? 
Questions for the civil societies 
1. Can you assess intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s Second and the Fourth 
Republics? 
2. What are the roles of civil society in the political process? 
3. In what ways did you carry out these roles in the Second and the Fourth Republics 
towards effective intergovernmental relations? 
4. How would you describe the activities of various agencies of intergovernmental 
relations in Nigeria? 
5. Can you tell me areas of divergence between the constitutional provisions and the 
actual practices of the levels of government in the Second and the Fourth Republics? 
6. What are the possible ways of ensuring effective consultation, co-operation and co-
ordination among the levels of government in Nigeria?  
7. In what ways, can the constituent units meet up with their socio-economic and 
political obligations? 
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Questions for the Opinion leaders 
1. What do you consider to be the major differences between intergovernmental 
relations in Nigeria’s Second Republic and the Fourth Republic? 
2. What are the options for a more stable federal structure through a more coordinate 
and interdependence relationship between the central and the component units of 
government in Nigeria? 
3. Can you assess the performance of the levels of government in Nigeria’s Second 
and the Fourth Republics in the area of service delivery? 
4. How would you describe the current structure of fiscal federalism in Nigeria? 
5. Can you suggest ways of improving the federal-state-local relations in Nigeria? 
6. In what ways did the federal government implement its policies at the subnational 
units of government? Can you give practical examples? 
 
 
 
 
